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A PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION
Abstract
The present dissertation has two major purposes. The first is to examine the 
origin of intercultural communication a s  an independent academ ic field 
cultivated in the US. In order to carry out this task, this study employs Edmund 
Husserl's archaeology a s  a  method. In short, this study unveils intercultural 
communication has developed as  a manifestation of W estern ideologies (e.g., 
individualism, pragmatism, etc.). The second objective, on the other hand, is to 
examine the necessary  conditions which constitute the phenom enon of 
intercultural communication we experience in reality. Eidetic analysis is 
employed a s  an appropriate method for accomplishing this objective. The 
present eidetic analysis elucidates that differences in logics and  styles are  two 
necessary  conditions which constitute a  phenom enon of intercultural 
communication. This study suggests intercultural communication is not a  pre­
determined fixed phenom enon, but a  unique place where different logics and 
different styles m eet together. It is a  manifestation of basic hum an similarities 
and meaningful human diversity. This dissertation also indicates latency (i.e., 
latent presuppositions, latent topics, latent m ethods, and latent theory, etc.) in 
the field of intercultural communication in the end.
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction
In the (our) current modernity, there is an academ ic area of inquiry 
named "intercultural communication." It investigates various phenom ena of 
interactive human communication among people from different cultures, various 
forms of cross-cultural phenomena, and unique intracultural phenom ena. Many 
people have contributed valuable insights for a  deeper understanding of 
intercultural phenom ena.
While intercultural cultural communication is maturing as  an area  of 
communication studies, this does not m ean we (as people who are interested in 
the field) should not reevaluate the area  of intercultural communication in terms 
of its presuppositions, which are reflected in topic selection, chosen methods, 
and theories. Such réévaluations are necessary  becau se  we investigate 
intercultural phenom ena presuming a  prior literature of intercultural 
communication. The prior literature influences what and how we study 
intercultural communication (e.g., topic selection, method choice, theory 
construction). Put differently, the history^ of intercultural communication always 
influences us whether we are conscious of this or not. The past is not gone. 
Rather, the past is always here a s  a  living tradition, so is the history of 
intercultural communication. In order to know what we a re  and what we 
presume as  we study the field, it is necessary  to understand and evaluate the
 ^ It is important to notice "history" in this sense is different from the conventional meaning of 
history. While the conventional meaning treats history as a  past and a  recorded isolated event. 
history, here, means a  iiying tradition which we always already presum e and is renewed by us and 
shifting oyer time. Just like Jean  Gebser ( 1949/1985) paradoxically indicates the nature of origin 
as ever-present origin, history in this study is ever-present history.
history In a  critical manner. Such effort, ultimately, leads to self-understanding. 
We are essentially historical beings living in a  certain space-tim e continuum.
While w e (people in general) a re  the product of history, we are making 
history at the sam e  time that we are re-interpreting each past event. We are not 
only a  bearer of our history but also a  co-bearer of our history. Likewise, each 
scholar in the field of intercultural communication is renewing the history 
through various forms of participation (e.g., publishing books and articles, 
presenting conference papers, teaching courses, et cetera). The history is 
presumed. W e a s  historical beings a re  a  product and producer simultaneously, 
as is history. This implies we who are  interested in studying the field of 
intercultural communication have m ore responsibility than w e realize. Whether 
we like or not, w e are renewing the history of intercultural communication over 
time a s  co-m akers of the field. The history shifts over time, presuming "ever­
present origin," a s  Jean  G ebser (1949/1985) paradoxically states. In order to 
fulfill such a  responsibility, it is also necessary  to re-evaluate the field of 
intercultural communication.
Purpose of the Studv
While the  history of the field is presum ed as ever-present history, we tend 
to be am biguous about the origin of the  history and the relationship between the 
history and us (who live in now). Therefore, a  sort of historical investigation^, 
which attem pts to clarify the origin and  the relationship between the origin and 
the present, is necessary . Without understanding such issues, the investigator 
can not evaluate the  area  of intercultural communication in a  critical and a  self-
2 This effort is similar to archaeology. The details will be explained in the method chapter.
reflective manner. On this point, metaphorically speaking, we do not know 
many things about who we are and who our parents are  and the relationship 
between them and us. Only after revealing such ambiguities, can we evaluate 
what we are doing.
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to understand the origin of 
intercultural communication a s  an academ ic field. S ta ted  differently, the 
investigator attem pts to understand the original motive which made this field 
possible. More specifically, the investigator attem pts to understand the field 
situating it in a  larger historical context. This process will unfold when, how, and 
by whom this a rea  of an  academ ic study cam e into existence. Such a  venture 
also reveals how the origin of intercultural communication has been 
sedimented in the current studies of intercultural communication. History, 
again, a s  many philosophers (e.g., Dilthy, Gadamer, Husserl) also argue, is not 
just an objective dead past, but a  living tradition that constitutes our present, 
and is constituting our future.
While the investigator m ust expose the certain historical context w here 
intercultural communication em erges as a  field for the first time, he necessarily 
must also examine the p resen t historical context w here we are renewing 
"intercultural communication" in order to understand the intimate relationship 
between the (ever-present) origin and the present. This attempt also might 
clarify how the field has been moving and shifting over time since the origin. 
Therefore, a  second purpose is to clarify the transformational process of the 
field.
While archaeological historical investigation is the  major purpose, this 
study has another purpose: to investigate the necessary  conditions which
constitute a phenom enon of "intercultural communication" a s  experienced in 
life. This kind of basic effort has rarely been done. We in the field tend to 
presum e what "intercultural communication" is and w hat it is not. While we tend 
to presum e "intercultural communication" a s  a  communication p ro cess  between 
people from different cultures (Hall, 1959; Samovar & Porter, 1972, 1976; 
Sarbaugh, 1979; and m any others), the conditions which necessarily constitute 
"Intercultural communication" we experience in reality are virtually never 
critically examined. Therefore, examining such conditions is another purpose 
for this study.
This study also strengthens the prior studies of intercultural 
communication. Prior studies in som e ways touched upon the e s se n c e  of 
intercultural communication. However, since they (prior studies) did not 
delineate the essen ce  (i.e., delineate "what are necessary  conditions" and 
"what are not") of intercultural communication comprehensively and 
svstematicallv. they could not have been aware of prejudices, which might 
preem pt or distort their investigation. Prior studies of intercultural 
communication might have been presuming certain ideologies or m etaphysics 
em bedded in modernity (i.e.. W estern modernity). These historically em bedded 
presumptions m ade all prior studies culturally prejudiced in certain way. The 
products (i.e., the prior studies of intercultural communication) are  always partial 
and blindly ethnocentric in nature. Attempting to delineate the necessary  
conditions which constitute the ontic status of intercultural communication 
allows the investigator to challenge and risk his prejudices (which could be 
shared  with the prejudices em bedded in prior studies). This phenomenological 
attem pt also allows the  Investigator to examine intercultural communication
phenom ena by going back to th ese  phenom ena themselves in reality. Again, 
such a basic attem pt has never b een  done in the area of intercultural 
communication.
Finally, this study is, in a  sen se , a  culturally biased interpretation of the 
phenom enon of intercultural communication. W henever one attem pts to write 
about "culture" or "communication" o r "intercultural communication," he or she 
necessarily m ust write it from his or her prejudices. Writing this dissertation is 
no exception. This present study is necessarily analytical and linear, following 
a  specific order. The investigator writes this dissertation in a  rational way, which 
reflects a  certain cultural perspective. Moreover, since the investigator is 
situated in a  certain historical epoch a s  a  certain historical being, he can not 
escape from his (historically sedim ented) prejudices. He can only do his best to 
enable his blind prejudices (usually derived from historically em bedded 
presuppositions). Attempting to recognize his own prejudices is his minimum 
responsibility (even though this minimum responsibility itself is very a  difficult 
task to accomplish) for this project. Without this attitude, the hidden structure 
and meaning of intercultural communication will remain in the dark.
In short, this present study has  two major tasks. The first one is a  sort of 
historical investigation of intercultural communication which has two parts. Part 
one is to unveil the origin of the field of intercultural communication, putting it in 
the original historical context where it originally appeared as  such. Part two 
attem pts to unveil the transformation of intercultural communication by placing it 
in a  significantly shifted historical context. The second task, on the  other hand, 
is an attempt to delineate, through a  phenomenological method, the necessary  
conditions which constitute the phenom enon of intercultural communication.
This task m ay unveil what "intercultural communication" a s  a  phenomenon in 
reality is. The above three purposes (the first has two parts) lead to the 
corresponding research questions mentioned below.
R esearch Q uestions
1. W hat is the origin of the field "intercultural communication^ ?" More 
specifically, in what historical context, how, by w hose efforts, and why did 
"intercultural communication" com e into existence a s  an  academ ic field?
2. How did the meaning of "intercultural communication" transform as the 
historical context shifted significantly ?
3. What a re  the necessary  conditions for something to appear a s  a 
phenom enon of "intercultural communication" in life?
The above three are  the research questions under investigation in this 
dissertation. Finally, the organization of this study is outlined in the following 
section.
Outline of the Studv 
The present study, including this introductory chapter, consists of seven 
chapters. The second chapter attempts to review the a rea  of intercultural 
communication in term s of its general history, its major topics, its major 
definition, its major methodology, and its major theoretical approach. The 
purpose of this section is not to review the literature in term s of its content in an 
exhaustive manner, but to review the form of the literature's manifestation in 
terms of its history, its particular form of definition, its choice of the major 
methodology, its choice of major theoretical approach, and its corresponding
3 "Intercultural communication" here m eans an independent academic field which has been 
developed in the US specifically. The investigation delimits the domain more specifically in the 
method section.
major theory. This "semlotic" review might unveil the hidden nature of 
intercultural communication a s  a  field.
After unm asking the hidden nature of intercultural communication a s  a  
field, the third chap ter introduces two appropriate methods for this study. 
Archaeological historical investigation is one method, while eidetic analysis Is 
the other. Since both are  m ethods of phenomenology, the investigator first 
explains the general characteristic of phenomenology a s  a  method. Then, he 
describes the general characteristics and the specific procedures regarding 
archaeological historical method. This is followed by a  description of eidetic 
analysis in term s of its general characteristics and its methodological 
procedures. T he investigator dem arcates the domain of both methods a s  well.
After introducing two m ethods employed in this study, the investigator 
offers a  theoretical framework. G ebser's  theory of consciousness mutation 
helps us understand th e  original motive which created the field of intercultural 
communication in term s of a  structure of human aw areness (Chapter 5). It also 
helps in carrying out a  phenom enology of intercultural communication (as a  
direct experience) by recognizing various ways people experience the 
phenomenon (Chapter 6). The theoretical basis must be introduced after the 
method chapter b e cau se  G ebser's  theory presum es phenomenology. G ebser's 
theory m akes m ore se n se  after understanding the premise of phenomenology.
Chapter five attem pts to trace the origin of intercultural communication as  
an independent academ ic field by situating it in the original historical context 
where the field originally appeared. More precisely it exam ines in what 
historical context, how and why and by whom (if it is possible) did the field of 
intercultural communication com e into existence. Fundamental presuppositions
em bedded in the  original meaning of intercultural communication will be 
revealed also. C hapter five also exam ines the meaning-transformation of the 
field. W hen a  historical context significantly shifts, the m eaning of intercultural 
communication shifts along with it. T he investigator exam ines this meaning shift 
by placing intercultural communication in the post Cold War historical context. 
Implications and consequences of the  meaning shift of intercultural 
communication a re  also addressed  in this chapter. Archaeological historical 
method is em ployed in order to clarify the original motive and the transformed 
meaning of intercultural communication.
While the previous chapters decipher the sedim ented meaning of 
intercultural communication a s  a  cultural artifact social scientists created, 
chapter six attem pts to unveil the real appearance of intercultural 
communication a s  a  phenom enon which is taking place in reality. In order to 
accomplish this task, the investigator attem pts to clarify the necessary  
conditions for intercultural communication to take place a s  a  phenom enon in 
reality by employing a phenomenological method named "eidetic analysis."
Finally, the concluding chapter attem pts to unveil the latency of 
intercultural communication a s  a  field. More specifically, the investigator 
deciphers a  concealed  presupposition, theoretical latency, potentially 
alternative m ethods, and potentially latent topics. The task of unveiling these 
latencies also correlates to the implications for the study of intercultural 
communication. In the end, the investigator interprets a  latent meaning of 
"intercultural communication."
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CHAPTER TWO
Literature Review 
W hat is the major purpose of a  literature review ? A com m on-sense 
answer would be that it is to rationalize the study (specifically to rationalize the 
study's hypotheses or research  questions) by reviewing literature in a  given field 
and by evaluating strengths and  w eaknesses of each study in the literature. Yet 
another answ er is that the purpose of a  literature review is to identify elements 
that prior studies have failed to exam ine. When the domain of a  study is 
relatively specific and narrow, a  review of literature is relatively easy, although it 
is not always factual, of course. On the other hand, when the domain of a  study 
is relatively general and broad, a  literature review is much more difficult. There 
are, thus, many alternative w ays to review literature; it is almost impossible to 
review exhaustively any given field. This situation applies to the field of 
"intercultural communication." Intercultural communication is a  general and 
broad field. It is not only a  phenom enon in life but also a  field of communication 
studies. It also involves num erous sub-fields which express various modes of 
aw areness regarding intercultural communication. There is an abundant amount 
of literature in the field of intercultural communication, although the history of the 
intercultural communication study is short. Thus, the investigator needs to 
carefully consider the most adeq u a te  way of reviewing prior studies of 
intercultural communication.
Each prior study concerning the phenom enon of intercultural 
communication is a  text which ex p resses  the author's feelings, attitudes, forms of 
thought, et cetera. Put otherwise, each  text is a  cultural artifact and a  concrete
manifestation of the author's consciousness. In this sense, each text in the field 
of intercultural communication is just like other cultural artifacts, such a s  music, 
architecture, literature, technology, e t cetera. Each (cultural) text expresses, 
signifies and m eans something. While studies of intercultural communication 
might be different from one another in terms of topic selections, methods, 
theoretical foundations, e t cetera, authors of the studies have a  commonalty in 
the se n se  that they are all historical beings located in a  certain era (e.g., the 
current epoch). Therefore, studies of intercultural communication might have 
som e similarities in terms of the form of their manifestations, rather than in terms 
of their contents. In short, a  certain similarity that cuts across researchers of 
intercultural communication a s  historical beings m ay lead to a  certain similarity in 
their work. Each author of the prior studies of intercultural communication is m ost 
likely a  "social scientist." In other words, the "social scientific" form of thought 
might manifest in each text of intercultural communication. This speculation is 
worth investigating. Investigating the form of manifestation of each intercultural 
text unfolds each author's hidden consciousness that is making and defining a  
history of intercultural communication.
Therefore, this section exam ines the prior studies of intercultural 
communication in terms of their forms of manifestation a s  well as their contents. 
This task  is a  sort of semiotics^ which examines signification and meaning of a  
text. In this sense, this particular review can be considered as  a  semiotic 
literature review of intercultural communication. The investigator, particularly in 
this section, attempts to do a  semiotic review of intercultural communication a s  a  
field which includes a  semiotic review of the general history, the major topics, the
1 Semiotics is a  science of sign and meaning (Noth, 1995). It studies signification and meaning (of 
signs and texts).
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major definition, the major methodology, and the major metatheoreticai approach. 
Such a review of the study of intercultural communication is Indispensable. As a 
consequence, the investigator might be able to unveil the hidden picture and 
nature of intercultural communication a s  an academ ic area.
Another important factor is that this review is selective in nature. The 
purpose of this particular (semiotic) review is not to review the contents of each 
prior intercultural communication study in an exhaustive way, but to review the 
form of manifestation prevailing in the field of intercultural communication in 
terms of topic selections, particular ways of definitions, method selections, and 
theory selections. The exhaustive review is neither possible nor necessary.
Finally, this review focuses on the literature of "intercultural 
communication^" rather than that of "cross-cultural communication" or 
"intracultural communication." Again, the major purpose of this section is to 
unveil the latent nature sedim ented in the prior studies of intercultural 
communication.
A Brief Historv of Intercultural Communication
A phenom enon called "intercultural communication" has been  studied in 
various ways by different kinds of people. In other words, there is a  history of 
intercultural communication a s  an  academic field of inquiry. There is a  certain 
acknowledged origin and movement. The purpose of this section is to give the 
overall picture of the  historical movement of intercultural communication a s  a  field 
of study.
^Generally speaking, the academic area of intercultural communication has three sub-areas: (1 ) 
intercultural communication which investigates the interactive communication process among 
people from different cultures; (2) cross-cultural communication which studies various 
communicative phenomena in a  comparative way to identify similarities and differences across 
cultures; (3) intra-cultural communication which aims to describe a culture (usually in an 
anthropological manner).
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After Edward T. Hall published his book "Silent Language." many scholars 
acknowledged that his book stimulated the birth of intercultural communication a s  
a  specific academ ic study. Many scholars (Gudykunst, 1985, Leeds-Hurwitz, 
1990; Sam ovar & Porter, 1972, 1976; to nam e a  few) seem  to acknowledge this 
book a s  the first academ ic book specifically focusing on "Intercultural 
communication." This book h as  m ade many contributions. The book has 
enhanced the aw areness of intercultural communication and made people 
recognize intercultural communication a s  an academ ic field of study worthy of 
investigation. In a  way, therefore, Edward Hall is the first person who 
problematized the human interaction between different cultures a s  "intercultural 
communication," and called it a s  such. To u se  different words. Hall is virtually the 
first person who explored the potentially new field of study.
While Hall termed the potentially new field of study as "intercultural 
communication" during the late 1950s, intercultural related topics had been 
studied before that period. For instance, the studies of intercultural acculturation 
had started during the 1930s (e.g., Redfieid, Ralph, & Herskovis, 1936) under the 
area of cultural anthropology. Sociologists (Marden & Meyer, 1968; Shibutani & 
Kwan, 1965; Zimmer, 1955) had dealt with the various topics on intergroup 
relations a s  well. Many other intercultural related topics (e.g., acculturation, 
prejudices, ethnocentrism, racial and ethnic relations, stranger relations, et 
cetera) had been studied under various disciplines, such as  anthropology 
(especially cultural anthropology), sociology, social psychology (especially cross- 
cultural psychology), education, political science, international relations, 
linguistics, e t cetera. Although various intercultural related topics had been 
studied in various disciplines, intercultural communication as a  whole did not
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become an independent field of study until the 1970s. In other words, the 
aw areness of "intercultural communication" a s  such w as not strong enough to 
make a  new field of academ ic study before the 1970s.
Asante and G udykunst (1989), likewise, points out, that "intercultural 
communication" took on a  significant development a s  a  field of study during the 
1970s. Many scholars (Asante, Newmark, & Blake, 1979; Casmir, 1978;
Samovar & Porter, 1972; Sarbaugh, 1979) began  to publish books focusing on 
intercultural communication during 1970s. This was significant because the 
books were published under the field of communication studies.
"Communication" scholars began to problematize intercultural communication a s  
an area of communication. As Leeds-Hurwitz (1990) suggests, intercultural 
communication becam e a  stepchild and began growing up under the name of 
"communication."
As som e communication scholars (Asante & Gudykunst ,1989; Gudykunst, 
1983; Leeds-Hurwitz, 1990; Nwanko, 1979) pointed out, the early studies on 
intercultural communication had been predominantly descriptive in nature rather 
than exploratory. Stated differently, it was the 1980s when intercultural 
communication began to m ature a s  a  field of communication studies. Gudykunst
(1983), for instance, changed  an  editorial policy on the International and 
Intercultural Communication Annual. Until he changed the policy, the Annual had 
been just like any yearly journal, derived from the collected articles on various 
topics in the field. Essentially, intercultural communication prior to the 1980s had 
not been studied systematically. Rather, each  study problematized intercultural 
communication in its own way. As a consequence, intercultural communication 
as an integral field of study could not mature. Gudykunst (1983) therefore
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changed the Annual to a  thematic volume for the purpose of maturing 
Intercuitural communication as  an area of communication. He was particularly 
concerned with the lack of theoretical developm ent in studying intercuitural 
communication. His decision contributed to the growth of intercuitural 
communication's status a s  a  field of communication studies.
The Maior Topics in the Area of Intercuitural Communication
Reviewing the prior literature in the a rea  of intercuitural communication 
leads to discussion of several points. First of all, there are three sub-fields in the 
area  of intercuitural communication: intracultural communication, cross-cultural 
communication, and intercuitural communication. Intracultural communication 
attem pts to study a  single culture, while cross-cultural communication deals  with 
comparative cultural studies among at least two cultures. As Kim (1984) 
contends, intracultural communication is deeply rooted in cultural anthropology, 
w hereas cross-cultural communication is strongly influenced by cross-cultural 
psychology. Finally, the third field deals with studying human interaction among 
people from different cultures, which is intercuitural communication itself.
Although both intracultural studies and cross-cultural studies are 
indispensable to understanding intercuitural communication, the focus here is on 
the sub-field of intercuitural communication. This includes a  review of 
intercuitural communication a s  a  phenomenon.
Reviewing the topics chosen in the area  of intercuitural communication is 
important not only b ecause  it provides a clue to the overall picture of intercuitural 
communication phenom ena, but also because reviewing the chosen topics tells 
us something about intercuitural communication. The topics people choose to 
study are, in a  way, reflections of their interests and values.
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Reviewing the studied topics in the area  of intercuitural communication 
sheds light on two major tendencies^ which are interrelated. First, the study of 
intercuitural communication tends to focus on the identification of various 
"problems" presum ed to be derived from intercuitural communication. For 
instance, such problems include intercuitural misunderstandings, intercuitural 
conflicts, intercuitural adaptation, culture shock, and immigrants' acculturation. 
Intercuitural adaptation is a  particularly dominant topic that focuses on problems 
of intercuitural interaction.
The second tendency, which is closely associated with the first one, is that 
the study of intercuitural communication concerns various solutions to the 
problems arising due to culture differences. For instance, such solutions include 
intercuitural communication effectiveness or competence, intercuitural training 
(both cultural-specific or culture-general), and various forms of intercuitural 
identity.
With the above patterns or tendencies in mind, the investigator must ask, 
"Are these patterns of research telling us something?" While it is true that 
diverse topics are chosen  to cover various phenom ena of intercuitural 
communication, many studies are devoted to investigation of problems and their 
solutions. Thus, intercuitural communication as  a  study has been articulating the 
problems and providing solutions. A m ore important point is that this dominant 
pattern of perception (problem-solution) is rooted in certain prevailing values in 
the modern age  (i.e., conformity and efficiency). This becom es obvious when 
one looks at the two major topics in the area  of intercuitural communication: 
various forms of intercuitural adaptation (i.e., a  major problem of intercuitural
^The investigator reviewed all articles and books about "intercuitural communication" published 
after 1970s. These two tendencies are the results of the research, although people studied 
vanous phenomena of intercuitural communication in various ways.
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communication) and intercuitural communication com petence/effectiveness (i.e., 
a major solution of intercuitural communication). The relationship between these 
two topics ( intercuitural adaptation and intercuitural communication 
competence/effectiveness) is illustrated in the following section.
Intercuitural adaptation and two modern values. People in general do 
move around and change their residences for various reasons. When people 
change their place to live, they m ust adjust to a  new environment. Som e can 
adjust easily, while others need more time to adjust to the new environment. The 
sam e is true in intercuitural adaptation. However, since intercuitural adaptation 
usually requires more radical change (e.g., change of language, change of habit 
and custom, change of food, e t cetera) of environment, the process of 
intercuitural adaptation Is considered more complex and more problematic. 
Therefore, one predominant a rea  of interest in the field of intercuitural 
communication has been cultural strangers' adaptation to a  host environment. 
Social scientists are  interested In examining cultural strangers’ reactions to new 
environments (e.g., sojourners' "cultural shock" experiences, immigrants' identity 
crisis experiences), adaptation stages sojourners generally follow^ (Adler, 1975, 
1987; Gullahorn & Gullahorn, 1963; Oberg, 1960), theories to explain sojourners' 
intercuitural adaptation (Gudykunst & Hammer, 1988) a s  well a s  immigrants' 
adaptation (Kim, 1988; Kim & Ruben, 1988). Although each scholar views the 
phenom enon of intercuitural adaptation differently and  employs different research 
methods to exam ine the phenomenon, every one of them agrees on (presum es
Adler (1975) proposed cultural strangers go through five progressive phases through learning 
from culture shock; (1 ) a  contact phase. (2) a  disintegration. (3) a  reintegration phase. (4) an 
autonomy stage, and (5) an independent stage. While Oberg (1960) proposed U curve model of 
cultural strangers' (mainly sojourners') adjustment in a  host environment though four different 
stages; (1) a  honeymoon stage. (2) a  hostility stage. (3) a  recovery stage. (4) a final stage (in 
which adjustment is about to complete). Gullahorn and Gullahorn (1963) extended Oberg's U 
curb model to propose W curb trying to integrate re-entry shock (i.e.. the second U curb).
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without questioning) the importance of cultural strangers' successful adaptation to 
a  host environment, believing in a  guideline em bedded in by an ancient adage, 
"When in Rome, do a s  the Rom ans do." In spite of its apparent practical value, 
the phenom enon of adaptation presupposes several things which should 
manifest the predom inant values and norms in the field of intercuitural 
communication existing in modernity. Regarding th e se  presuppositions, Kramer 
(1992) claims adaptation is, first, a  linear prejudice, second, involves power 
inequality, and third, values homogeneity and conformity without recognizing the 
nihilistic tendencies m anifested in such values. His claims clarify the 
predominant values and norm s in our society as  well a s  in the researchers who 
have been examining the phenom enon of intercuitural adaptation. Intercuitural 
researchers assum e the necessity  of cultural strangers' linear adaptation (degree 
of the adaptation varies depending on conditions) to their host environments, and 
indigenous dwellers' (i.e., people living in their own country) legitimate right of 
maintaining power over intercuitural "strangers." S uch  theories consequently 
rationalize the appropriateness of strangers' conformity to their host 
environments in order to maintain order in the host environments through 
homogeneity. This rationalization must have been accomplished for the sake of 
another predom inant m odem  social value; that of efficiency. Tfiat is, adaptation 
should be successful, effective, efficient, and convenient in order to keep order in 
a  host environment and to keep the value of efficiency vital. Therefore, the 
phenomenon of adaptation h as  been examined clearly based  on the values of 
preserving order through homogeneity and of achieving efficiency. Similarly, the 
topic of intercuitural communication com petence/effectiveness presum es the two 
values.
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Intercuitural communication com petence and the presupposed values. The 
area  of (intercuitural and intracultural) communication com petence has been one 
of the most crucial issues in the a rea  of communication in general. Although no 
one has asked the reaso n s (people m ay simply presum e the reasons), 
communication com petence receives significant attention from researchers 
probably because being com petent is m ore or less equated with being successful 
in modernity. Becoming more com petent m eans to facilitate more efficient 
success (i.e., su ccess  within a minimal time frame). Becoming more com petent 
is always a  desirable s ta te  in modernity, which values efficiency and  convenience 
a  great deal. In modernity, possessing various kinds of com petence is a 
minimum and necessary  condition to be  able to reach a goal of one 's  own. 
Oftentimes, being judged a s  less com petent or incompetent m eans to becom e a 
loser. For instance, a  slow learner is usually labeled as incompetent or less 
competent com pared to a  fast learner. Therefore, it is evident that m odem  
people are ob sessed  with the value of efficiency in an attempt to becom e a  
winner. This partly explains why the a rea  of com petence in communication (i.e., 
communication com petence) is a  very popular a rea  in which many scholars and 
practitioners have b een  interested. Interesting enough, Spitzberg and Cupach
(1984), in one of the m ost influential and theoretically powerful books, 
"Interpersonal Communication Com petence", contend that the criteria and the 
critical dimensions of com petence are  effectiveness and appropriateness. 
"Effectiveness" is described a s  the social judgm ent of the degree of goal 
achievement, while "appropriateness" refers to the social judgment of the degree 
of conformity to social norms in a  situation. In other words, effectiveness refers 
to the degree of efficiency, whereas appropriateness indicates the degree  of
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homogeneity (or of conformity). In short, surprisingly, both criteria of 
communication com petence already presuppose the values of efficiency and 
homogeneity. A more important issue to realize is that th ese  are values that are 
unquestioningly presum ed according to a  combination of utilitarian and hedonistic 
world views within the intercuitural literature.
The sam e values (i.e., efficiency and conformity) a re  presum ed in the area  
of intercuitural communication com petence or effectiveness. However, because 
communication becom es m ore problematic due to the existence of culture 
differences, achieving efficient and appropriate communication also becom es 
much more difficult. Communication is. more or less, viewed a s  "abnormal" in 
any intercuitural interaction, com pared to that in any intracultural communication. 
Therefore, the primary role of intercuitural communication com petence is to 
recover "normality" in communication mainly by m eans of restraining, minimizing, 
or even canceling the existence of culture differences. Possession of intercuitural 
communication com petence should enable the communication participants to 
make "abnormal" communication more like intracultural communication, which is 
the appropriate communication process. Here, the abnorm al communication 
process should be replaced with a  more normal communication process, since 
"abnormality" is against the social values of efficiency and  homogeneity. 
Therefore, the phenomenon of intercuitural communication com petence (and 
intercuitural communication effectiveness) has received strong attention as a  
solution to the problem of cultural differences, and a s  the best and the most 
efficient m eans to conquer the abnormality of communication by overcoming or 
even destroying the existence of cultural differences, which are presum ed to be 
major sources of the abnormality. While incompetent and abnormal behavior still
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communicates something, its m essages a re  evaluated a s  "inefficient and 
(therefore) bad" according to the criteria of efficient and smooth communication 
process. Although many scholars view intercuitural communication com petence 
differently, most of them agree upon one thing. They agree that the possession 
of intercuitural communication com petence will facilitate the process of 
communication with strangers and help overcom e various challenges (e.g., 
intercuitural posture, misunderstanding, psychological stress and so on) derived 
from cultural differences; consequently, intercuitural communication com petence 
facilitates achieving communication participants' goals (Gudykunst, 1991, 1993; 
Hammer, 1989; Hawes & Kealey, 1981; Kim, 1991; Martin, 1987, 1993; Ruben, 
1976; Ruben & Kealey, 1979). Interestingly, Kim (1991) contends that 
adaptability, or in other words, self-altering capacity, is "the heart of intercuitural 
communication com petence a s  m etacom petence" (p. 268). She explains 
adaptability a s  follows:
In intercuitural encounters, therefore, adaptability m eans the individual's 
capacity to suspend or modify som e of the old cultural ways, to learn and 
accom m odate som e of the new cultural ways, and to creatively find ways 
to m anage the  dynamics of cultural difference/unfamiliarity, intergroup 
posture, and the accompanying s tress, (p. 268)
Here, Kim clearly presum es that possessing  intercuitural communication 
competence (as adaptability) helps solve and  overcom e challenges (problems) 
due to cultural differences. She also ap p ears  to presum e that communication 
participants actively conform to the host environm ent's intersubjective world^ by 
restraining the influence of their competing different intersubjective world (i.e..
5 Central or "core values" are established and presum ed to be somehow "attached to" a  
geographical local. So if you are here (e.g., Rome), you must act this way.
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competing social realities) when they are  interculturally competent. Moreover, 
recently, Kim (1993) contends that one of the most important factors in the 
behavioral dim ension of intercuitural communication com petence is 
"synchronization," which also obviously values homogeneity in successful 
communication. Gudykunst (1991 ), similarly, claims that a  com petent 
communicator can  m anage to avoid various pitfalls of communication (e.g., 
minimize misunderstanding) by overcoming and bridging cultural differences in 
his book "Bridging Differences: Effective Interorouo Communication." Here, 
again, consciously minimizing the effect of a  stranger's competing reality is 
presumed a s  a  solution to overcome cultural differences and is viewed as  an 
important condition of interculturally com petent communication. As Murphy and 
Min Choi (1992) point out, prudent persons (i.e., prudent interculturally competent 
communicators) try to adjust to a  predominant social reality rather than resisting 
it. Prudent persons are the persons who a re  willing to follow orders in a host 
environment. Following orders is presum ed to be an appropriate m eans to 
achieve maximal convenience. In short, interculturally com petent Individuals are 
people who can  achieve their goals efficiently and conveniently while they can 
avoid violating the norms in a host environment (i.e., they can interact and 
communicate normally in a host environment) so that they can keep the orders by 
trying to cancel the abnormality (i.e., the existence of culture differences). The 
conceptualization of intercuitural communication com petence itself seem s to be 
deeply rooted in the two major modern values, in short, major topic selections in 
the field of intercuitural communication are reflections of the modern values of 
conformity and efficiency.
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Ontological Dimension of Intercuitural Communication
intercuitural communication has been appearing a s  a  field for about at 
least forty years. Since the term "intercuitural communication" appeared in 
Edward T. Hall's "Silent Language" (1959), the phenom enon has been 
interpreted in different ways, yet with certain similarities. This section reviews 
prior interpretations of the existential status of the phenom enon of intercuitural 
communication. Stated differently, this section reviews the definitional issue and 
its referential reality. First, two major interpretations about the phenomenon are 
reviewed: then the similarities am ong the definitions of intercuitural 
communication are  explored.
Initially, there are two major interpretations about the phenomenon of 
intercuitural communication. First of all, intercuitural communication is 
interpreted a s  a  unique phenom enon which is different from other communication 
phenom ena (e.g., cross-cultural communication, intracultural communication, 
interracial communication, interethnic communication). Second, and by contrast, 
intercuitural communication is interpreted a s  a  phenom enon which involves a 
process similar to that of other communication phenom ena. The subsequent 
section discusses these two differing interpretations.
When intercuitural communication is interpreted a s  a  unique phenomenon, 
it tends to be defined a s  a  communication between people from different cultures 
(i.e., countries). This definition presum es that a  boundary between cultures is 
equated with a  political boundary between countries or nations. Culture is 
frequently presum ed to be a  national culture. As Sam ovar and Porter (1976) 
point out, intercuitural communication is treated a s  an international event where 
participants com e from widely diverse geographic a reas  which are separated and
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isolated. Therefore, this form of communication should be unique and different 
from other communication phenom ena, especially compared to any form of 
communication which takes place within the intracultural sphere. Stated 
differently, the referential reality that intercuitural communication signifies is 
presupposed to be unique and different from the referential realities that other 
types of communication phenom ena signify.
Many early scholars (e.g., scholars during 1960s and 1970s) who studied 
intercuitural communication tended to interpret intercuitural communication's 
existential status in the above manner. Hall, for instance, clearly defines 
intercuitural communication based  on the first interpretation. Hall and Whyte 
(1960) defined the phenom enon a s  "the actual communication process between 
representatives of different cultures" (p. 12). For them, especially for Hall, 
intercuitural communication is a  special a rea  which requires special attention and 
treatment that other communication phenom ena do not require. This is explained 
by the fact that Hall w as an officer of the Foreign Service Institute of the United 
S tates a t that time (1951 -1955). He needed to develop the area of intercuitural 
communication to train foreign service officers so  that they could effectively 
execute their assignm ents in assigned foreign countries®. Intercuitural 
communication, thus, represents communication between representatives of 
different countries, a s  Hall defined it. Ellingworth (1977), likewise, interpreted the 
phenomenon a s  did Hall. Ellingworth (1977), for instance, contends that 
"intercuitural communication is a  unique dimension of communication which
6 While Hail was in the Foreign Service institute, Chuck Berger was in military intelligence in 
Korea. Gudykunst, on the other hand, was in Japan for his Navy assignment. These conditions 
might force them to presume that communication is not for its own sake but that it is an instrument 
to be used to achieve some ulterior goal. Like Popper's (the logical positivist) conception of 
language as merely an arbitrary tool (1968), intercuitural communication is presumed to have 
instrumental value. Something exists (has value) only insofar a s  it serves utility.
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requires special labeling, attention, methodology, and instruction" (p. 101). in 
sum, this type of interpretation dominated the study of intercuitural 
communication until the late 1970s.
There seem ed  to be several reasons why the ontic status of intercuitural 
communication had been interpreted a s  a  unique phenomenon and a s  different 
from other communication phenom ena. First, after Edward Hall identified the 
phenom enon of intercuitural communication a s  an  academ ic field, the most 
noticeable and visible form of intercuitural communication w as communication 
between people from different countries. After World War II, for the first time, 
various forms of intercuitural interactions began to penetrate into people's daily 
lives around the  world. Intercuitural communication was also needed  to improve 
international relations. While many people gradually grew aw are of the 
phenom enon and  its necessity, not many people existed a s  experts or specialists 
of intercuitural communication. The historical context at that time required 
somebody to exam ine the special form of Intercuitural communication, which was 
perceived to be the most unnatural and the m ost problematic.
The second probable reason intercuitural communication w as treated a s  a  
special area  w as its premature status a s  an academ ic field of inquiry. As a  
subfield of communication, intercuitural communication has just forty years of 
history. Therefore, during its early stage  (during 60s and 70s), the best efforts 
tried to describe the structure of the newly nam ed phenomenon rather than to 
explain the phenom enon. Intercuitural communication w as still an  ambiguous 
phenom enon for many people a t that time. Therefore, describing the 
phenomenon, a s  som e (Asante, Newmark, & Blake, 1979; Stewart, 1978) 
argued, was the first priority in the early s tage  of the history of intercuitural
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communication study. As a  result, the phenom enon w as necessarily treated and  
studied a s  an independent and  a  unique phenom enon which is perceived to be 
different from other communication phenom ena. Intercuitural communication, a s  
a  unique phenomenon, had to be described thoroughly before explaining the 
relationship between the phenom enon and other communication phenomena. 
Nwanko (1979) summed up the  nature of the early s tag e  of intercuitural studies;
This variety of definitions (about intercuitural communication and other 
related phenomena) indicates that the field is still groping for an 
adequate description of its central focus and  that intercuitural 
communication analysis has been more descriptive than explanatory: its 
em phasis has been m ore on structure than on process, (p. 326)
Although such interpretation w as unavoidable to som e extent, the 
intercultural-communication-as-unique-phenomenon interpretation led to several 
serious problems. The first problem was that b ecau se  intercuitural 
communication was considered unique and thus w as studied in an isolated 
manner, the relationship betw een the phenom enon and other related 
communication phenom ena (e.g., cross-cultural communication, international 
communication) was ambiguous. The way each  scholar distinguished 
intercuitural communication and other related phenom ena w as inconsistent. For 
instance, while som e equated intercuitural communication with cross-cultural 
communication (Samovar & Porter, 1972), others contended communication 
becam e cross-cultural when it w as effective (Martin, 1976). In order to 
understand "what" intercuitural communication is, clarifying the differences and 
similarities betw een intercuitural communication and  related communication 
phenom ena in a  systematic way w as necessary. However, such a  systematic 
attempt had never been done. Therefore, people continued to define intercuitural
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communication and other phenom ena descriptively rather than explanatorily 
without clarifying its referential reality. Consequently, a s  Saral (1977) suggested, 
"the new ness of the field has attracted scholars from varying disciplines, who, 
while enriching and  broadening the area, have also  rendered the field so diverse 
and discursive that it defies definition." (p. 389)
The early intercuitural studies' descriptive tendency leads to the second 
problem. Since scholars of intercuitural communication tended to study the 
phenom enon in an  isolated m anner (based on intercuitural communication-as- 
unique interpretation), intercuitural communication did not have any clear future 
directions and consequently did not develop a s  a  field of academic inquiry. 
Moreover, the descriptive tendency of many intercuitural studies discouraged 
exploratory efforts of intercuitural communication, which could have lead to 
theoretical developments. There w as virtually no attem pt to theorize intercuitural 
communication a t that time. Consequently, intercuitural communication a s  a  field 
of communication studies did not develop. While the issue of whether theorizing 
about intercuitural communication is desirable or not w as a  crucial debate during 
late 1970s, the absence of theorizing in intercuitural communication (which w as 
based  on intercuitural communication-as-unique interpretation) clearly becam e a 
problem when intercuitural communication attem pted to gain a  higher academ ic 
status a s  a  field of communication. As Gudykunst and Nishida (1981) argue, "it 
is our contention that if the study of intercuitural communication is to develop 
further, it n eed s  to move —toward a  consistent theoretical framework for the 
analysis of communication betw een people from different cultures." (p. 88)
While such an  interpretation had been predominating for a  while,
Sarbaugh seem s to be the first person (with several solid reasons) to depart from
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the first Interpretation. Sarbaugh (1979) claimed intercuitural communication is 
not different in kind from other forms of communication. The phenomenon is 
interpreted a s  involving p rocesses shared by other communication phenom ena. 
This, intercuitural communication a s  a  general communication phenomenon, is 
the second interpretation. In this view, the referential reality of intercuitural 
communication is presum ed to be overlapping with other communication 
phenom ena's referential realities. This shift of this interpretation had some 
significance.
First, s ince intercuitural communication w as interpreted as a  general 
communication phenom enon, the relationship betw een intercuitural 
communication and other communication phenom ena was gradually clarified. 
Specifically, a s  many (Gudykunst, 1983: Gudykunst & Nishida, 1981 ; Kim, 1988; 
Sarbaugh, 1979) claimed, all communication w as perceived to be intercuitural to 
an extent. Sarbaugh (1979) argued: "we would not expect to find two persons 
who were different on every characteristic; nor would we expect to find two 
persons who w ere alike on every characteristic." (p. 7)
This sta tem ent is based  on an assumption that every individual is similar 
to and different from others to som e extent. Every one of us is similar a t least as 
a  human being to an  extent, yet is different to som e extent as  an individual.
When the communication betw een two people from different countries is 
compared to the communication between people from the sam e country, the 
former tends to be more heterogeneous than the latter form of communication. It 
is just a  m atter of the degree of similarities and differences. Therefore, as  
Sarbaugh and others proposed, all communication is intercuitural to an extent, 
which indicates that all communication is heterogeneous to an extent. The
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degree of heterogeneity Is the main difference among different forms of 
communication. For instance, intercuitural communication and intracultural 
communication are  distinguished in term s of the degree of heterogeneity. 
Intercuitural communication is m ore heterogeneous than intracultural 
communication is.
Sarbaugh here contended that while the degree of heterogeneity between 
communication participants is different, all communication phenom ena involve 
similar processes, such a s  encoding and  decoding, feedback and so on. In other 
words, through the introduction of the concept of heterogeneity, Sarbaugh started 
to focus on the process rather than the structure of intercuitural communication. 
Of particular significance is the fact that focusing on the process aspect of 
intercuitural communication allowed scholars of intercuitural communication to 
explore theoretical explanations. By that time, intercuitural communication had 
lacked theoretical dimensionality a s  a  field of communication studies. The 
intercuitural communication-as-a-general-communication view allowed scholars 
of intercuitural communication to apply other pre-existing communication theories 
to explain the phenomenon. Since intercuitural communication is a  general 
communication phenomenon, logically speaking, the theories of communication 
can be applied to explain intercuitural com munication a s  well.
The i ntercultural-com munication-as-a-general-com munication - 
phenomenon-view has yet another significance. People are  beginning to 
recognize similar communication phenom ena taking place in an intracultural 
context For instance, race and ethnic relations, especially in the United States, 
are similar to the process of intercuitural communication. Moreover, numerous 
co-cultures or subcultures have been  em erging and voicing their opinions against
28
dominant groups. As this movement h a s  becom e more noticeable, the scope of 
intercuitural communication has widened. People are  recently more aware of 
numerous intercuitural contacts within their home boundary (i.e., within the 
intracultural environment). Treating intercuitural communication a s  a  general 
phenomenon w as convenient for the inclusion of intercuitural communication 
taking place intraculturally. Even though the participants are from the sam e 
national culture, the interaction can be very intercuitural ("heterogeneous" in 
Sarbaugh's term).
While the intercultural-communication-as-a-general-communication view 
has several strengths, it also has several w eaknesses. First, the view might have 
difficulty explaining a  truly unique process "intercuitural communication" involves. 
Som e claim one of the unique processes of intercuitural communication is "third 
culture^" building (Broome, 1991; Casmir, 1978, 1993; Casmir & Asuncion- 
Lande, 1989; Gudykunst, Wiseman, & Hammer, 1977; Useem, Useem, & 
Donoghue, 1963). S ince the view treats intercuitural communication as a  general 
phenomenon of hum an communication, it has a  difficulty describing as  well a s  
explaining a unique phenom enon like "third-culture" building.
The second problem is the view can  not clearly distinguish between 
intracultural communication and intercuitural communication. Since all 
communication is intercuitural to some extent, all kinds of communication taking 
place intraculturally a re  intercuitural communication in a  sense. There was no 
clear boundary betw een intracultural communication and Intercuitural 
communication based  on this view. Gudykunst (1986) and Gudykunst & Kim
^When individuals from a  culture A and a  culture B interact, a  new culture (i.e.. the third culture) 
which is neither culture A nor B. is build through the  communicative process. In general, the third 
culture is interpreted a s  the creation derived from a  dialogue among intercuitural communicators. 
As a  result, a  new third culture which both interactants can belong to is build (Broome. 1991 ; 
Casmir. 1978.1993; and others).
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(1983,1992), realizing this definitional problems of intercuitural communication, 
contended "intergroup communication" (Gudykunst, 1986) or "communication 
with strangers" (Gudykunst & Kim, 1984, 1992) might b e  more appropriate terms 
than "intercuitural communication." They tended to use  the alternative term after 
that recognition.
Presuppositions About the Definitions of Intercuitural Communication. 
Regardless of the perceived definitional problem of intercuitural 
communication, there seem  to have been several shared  agreem ents about 
"what is" intercuitural communication. In other words, "what is" intercuitural 
communication has been presum ed as  a  kind of com m onsense. Some of the 
major definitions of intercuitural communication are the following;
Hall & Whyte (1960) 
Sam ovar & Porter (1972)
Jain, Prosser, & Miller (1974) 
Stew art (1974)
Maletzke (1976)
Prosser (1978)
Howell (1979)
the actual communication process between 
representatives of different cultures (p. 12)
the form of interaction that takes place when 
speaker and listener com e from different 
cultures (p. 1 )
communication betw een groups with different 
value structures (p. 33)
Intercuitural communication is communication 
under conditions of cultural differences, (p. 23)
an exchange of m eaning betw een cultures 
(p. 410)
interpersonal communication on the individual 
level between m em bers of distinctly different 
cultural groups (p. xi)
interaction with representatives of many 
cultures (p. 40)
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Collier & Thom as (1988) contact between persons who identify
them selves as  distinct from one another in 
cultural terms (p. 100)
Gudykunst (1988) the specific case  of intergroup communication
when participants com e from different cultures 
(p. 125)
Kim (1988) direct, face-to-face communication encounters
betw een or among individuals with different 
cultural backgrounds (p. 12)
Kincaid (1988) communication betw een m em bers of relatively
diverse cultural groups (p. 288)
As the above definitions of intercuitural communication indicate, a  shared 
(and maybe a  com m onsense) definition of the phenom enon is communication 
between individuals from different cultures. Although the perceived relationship 
with other related a reas  of communication is different, intercuitural 
communication has  been perceived a s  a  phenomenon which appears whenever 
at least two individuals from two distinct cultures communicate with each other. 
Of course, the secondary issue, at this point, is the definition of both "culture" and 
"communication." Many have seem ed to agree on this common definition 
including this secondary definitional issue.
Specifically, there seem  to be th ree  agreem ents at least regarding the 
requirements which constitute the phenom enon of intercuitural communication. 
The first agreem ent is that the channel of Intercuitural communication is 
interpersonal. The communication requires at least two individuals. In other 
words, communication in "intercuitural communication" is considered "human" 
communication (i.e., human to human) which is interactive in nature. Intercuitural 
communication a s  an academ ic area, in this sense, presum es humanism. The
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second agreem ent is that the communication requires significant cultural 
differences. Each participant in the communication event is culturally 
heterogeneous from the others. The third agreem ent is that animated beings 
(i.e., human beings) are presum ed to be  "the" manifestation of a  "culture." In 
other words, each participant in intercuitural communication has been 
presupposed to be the manifestation a s  well a s  the representation of each 
culture. This agreem ent leads to the requirem ent of two individuals' (or more 
than two) existence, which is the sam e requirem ent a s  the first agreem ent 
needed.
The crucial point is these three agreem ents were presum ed and have 
never been critically examined. While th e  phenom enon each scholar was 
referring to is intercuitural (i.e., a  phenom enon where two individuals from 
different cultures interact), it is still prem ature to decide whether those three 
requirements are necessary  conditions of "intercuitural communication" without 
critical examination. In other words, there might be a  possibility that the three 
presumed agreem ents are  not necessarily required conditions for intercuitural 
communication. Put othenwise, while the three presuppositions constitute certain 
referential reality (i.e., communication betw een people from different cultures) of 
intercuitural communication, there might be certain other referential realities of 
"intercuitural communication" which the three conditions do not constitute. The 
three conditions might be just metaphysical prejudices which could predetermine 
the nature of reality (i.e., the certain kind of reality intercuitural communication 
refers to). A strong argum ent can be m ade for the need to examine the 
necessary conditions which essentially constitute the phenomenon of intercuitural 
communication. Such an  attempt is so basic that its importance m ust not be
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underestimated. Without such  attempts, the foundation of intercuitural 
communication remains w eaker than it could be. Therefore, this study examines 
the necessary  conditions for a  phenomenon to ap p ear to be "intercuitural 
communication" as  such. This attem pt becom es necessarily a  phenomenological 
one; thus, phenomenology is the primary method for this investigation. 
Methodological Dimension of Intercuitural Communication
The next dimension of the review of the studies of intercuitural 
communication is methodological. How have prior studies problematized the 
phenom enon in order to gain knowledge about it? This section reviews the 
methodological approach(es) to the study of intercuitural communication.
Although intercuitural communication has been studied in various ways and in 
various traditions, there seem s to be a  predominant approach to problematizing 
the phenomenon. This section, therefore, shows a  predominant methodological 
approach to the study of the intercuitural communication.
In the beginning, the predominant methodological approach to intercuitural 
communication has been the "analytical-reductionistic-quantitative" approach, as  
Kim (1984) suggested. This approach, in a  broad sen se , can be equated with the 
variable-analytical approach. Gudykunst and Nishida (1989), likewise equated 
this approach with either an  objective approach, or a  nomothetic approach. In 
other words, traditional scientific methods, as Di Mare (1994) indicated, have 
dominated the study of intercuitural communication.
W hatever the nam e of this approach, this tradition tries to "abstract the 
reality under study by isolating and detaching sep ara te  elem ents and then 
somehow bringing them together." (Kim, 1984, p. 24) In essence, the 
researchers who took this approach believed intercuitural communication had an
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objective reality and its corresponding universally applicable laws and rules, 
which they (the researchers) could discover as  objective scientists in scientific 
manner.
In the sam e manner, a  subject, which is the very source of information^, 
becom es an impersonal object rather than a  subjective unique being. Scientists 
believe that, a s  disinterested observers, they can objectify (i.e., analyze, 
measure, and quantify) the subject in a  reductionistic and scientific way. Any 
personal elem ents and any subjective factors (e.g., the subject's personal 
opinion) were bound to be eliminated in the nam e of rigorous objective science. 
A subject should be a purified im personal object, while a  researcher is to be a 
disinterested observer. This very way of "observing" accom plishes a  valuated 
desire (i.e., to objectify and make all things equal, which is a  reductionism).
Moreover, this scientific approach  usually does not examine intercuitural 
communication a s  a  whole. Instead, the researchers in this approach frequently 
isolate variables (e.g., perception, attitude, stereotype, empathy, second 
language com petence, behavioral flexibility, et cetera), which relate to the 
process or the outcom e of intercuitural communication, in a  very reductionistic 
manner. Then, they (i.e., intercuitural researchers) attempt to exam ine the 
relationship among the variables for the purpose of discovering the potential 
causal laws among the variables.
Therefore, the intercuitural stud ies in this scientific approach choose 
systematic scientific m ethods to exam ine the relationship among the variables.
®. Intercuitural communication has been problematized by using individuals' intercuitural 
experiences a s  the sources of information. Since intercuitural communication is not like any 
substances which can exist by themselves, the individuals who have experienced intercuitural 
communication were bound to be the very source of problematizing intercuitural communication. 
Here, it is important to notice intercuitural communication Is equated with intercuitural interactions 
among people.
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Actually, for instance, m ore than half of the articles published in ttie journal 
International Journal of Intercuitural Relations (1981-1995). have attem pted to 
find out the relationship among several variables employing the scientific- 
anaiytical-reductionistic-quantitativeS approach.
The major method in this tradition, as  a  result, is a quantitative one, which 
is a  method to value the quantity of the information. Therefore, survey, including 
either questionnaire survey or inten/iew sun/ey, is one major method, while 
statistics is a  major tool for the analysis of the "quantity."
Indication of the predominance of scientific methodoloov to studv 
intercuitural communication. The predominance of the variable-analytical- 
quantitative-objective-nomothetic-scientific methodological approach to 
intercuitural communication is not only a  trend, but it signifies something. The 
predom inance of the use of this methodological approach indicates the 
predominant intercuitural researchers' belief in objectivity and the suprem acy of 
nomothetic science. They (i.e., intercuitural scholars who believe in objectivity 
and nomothetic science) blindly believe there is an objective reality and 
universally applicable (i.e., eternal or permanent) laws and rules "out there" which 
they can discover. Moreover, they believe the superior way to discover the laws 
of intercuitural communication should be rigorous "scientific" methods. The 
predom inant use of the objective-scientific-quantitative methodology clearly 
signifies the value placed on the certainty of knowledge, objectivity over
9. The other end o f this approach is holistic-subjective-qualitative-ethnographic approach. This 
approach, which is famous for ethnomethodology and conversational analysis, attempts to 
accomplish a  thick descnption of social reality. While the goal for this approach is different from 
that of the traditional scientific approach, this "qualitative" approach also presumes the existence 
of the reality and its corresponding rules and patterns the researcher can discover through the 
process of thick description (i.e., realism). While particular methods are different from each other, 
txjth "quantitative" and "qualitative" approaches try to be scientific presuming certain 
metaphysics.
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subjectivity, rationality over irrationality, and efficiency/convenience over 
inefficiency/inconvenience. It also m eans these  values are  shared values which 
are prevalent among m any intercuitural scholars^o.
Limitations of traditional scientific methodoloov. While such values are 
prevalent among many intercuitural scholars, the important point to notice is such 
belief in objectivity and the suprem acy of nomothetic science are nothing more 
than metaphysical speculations, which are objectivism and scientism in particular. 
The tendency to study intercuitural communication by isolating variables is based 
on yet another metaphysical speculation, namely, "reductionism." Without 
arguing whether the use of such methodology Is right or wrong, it is instructive to 
consider limitations inherent in the use of this methodological approach. In other 
words, the objective scientific methodology, which presum es metaphysics (i.e., 
speculations about what is real) can easily preempt, narrow down, and 
som etim es distort the investigation of intercuitural communication. Any 
metaphysical speculations force people to s e e  a  phenom enon in certain ways, 
presuming what is real and  what is not without recognizing the presumption.
They form a  "community" of scholars. Consequently, they (i.e., people who 
investigate a  phenomenon presuming metaphysics) automatically limit the source 
of information before even beginning their investigation. The traditional scientific 
methodology (presuming objectivism and scientism, for instance,) automatically 
eliminates subjective factors and personal elem ents a s  a  source of investigation. 
Di Mare (1994) similarly contended a s  follows;
In a  sense, this is not surprising. They (many intercuitural scholars) have been trained in the 
sam e Western academic tradition (culture). Thus, they tend to se e  or share the sam e "reality."
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My criticism of this method (and one that has been leveled by a  plethora 
of interdisciplinary scholars) is that It evolved from a model of 
mathematical reasoning that attem pted to provide a  model of clarity, 
certainty, and orderly deduction in regard to human behavior, thus the 
term "human sciences;" A method that is the right method and one which 
eliminates the personal elem ent and subjective factors so  that a  body of 
propositions, the truth of which is assu red , is built up. (p. 6)
Such eliminationii of personal factors and  subjective elem ents has been
perceived a s  indispensable for another reason. It w as indispensable for the
purpose of developing a  scientific theory of intercuitural communication which is
presum ed to b e  derived from systematic scientific research based  on rigorous
scientific m ethods.
While the presum ed elimination of subjective factors has been  done for the 
sake of scientific developm enf^. the act of attempting to eliminate any subjective 
elements itself is very uncanny. Fundamentally, the very source of 
problematizing intercuitural communication used  by objective scientists is the 
individual's direct personal intercuitural experiences. Even though they 
(scientists) problematize their subjects (i.e., people who have intercuitural 
experiences) a s  the objects of human knowledge in a  systematic scientific 
manner to m ake research more objective, the very nature of the "data" they 
collect rem ains in e ssen ce  subjective. Therefore, the fact the very source of 
objective science and scientific methodology is essentially subjective is ironic. 
Moreover, the way the researchers problematize and  m easure the phenomenon 
of intercuitural communication is based purely on their subjective decisions even 
though they follow a  system atic procedure. The choice of subjects, the choice of 
m easurem ents, and the choice of statistical analysis and procedures a re  all
 ^ . Logically speaking, this elimination of subjective factors leads to a strange consequence. 
When we eliminate the subject (e.g.. any subjective element), we eliminate culture. Only people 
(i.e.. subjects) have "culture" which differs from each other.
'*2. It is important to notice this scientific approach is based on values too.
37
based  on the researchers' subjective judgm ents and capabilities (i.e., subjective 
limitations) which are their prejudices. Traditional scientific methodology 
employed in the study of intercuitural communication and human communication 
is very subjective. What scientists m easure tells about the researchers rather 
than the objects of their interest.
In any case, in this study, the investigator tries not to limit the region of 
investigation derived from the  metaphysical speculations traditional scientific 
methodology presum es. Therefore, this study will stand In a phenomenological 
tradition and use  its corresponding phenomenological method which questiones 
and challenges the traditional scientific approach and its corresponding 
metaphysics.
Summarv. The predom inant m ethods for studying intercuitural 
communication presuppose that certain rules or laws regulate the phenom enon 
of intercuitural communication. Although som e argue the importance of multi­
method approaches (i.e., triangulation), very few studies attempt to incorporate a 
historical perspective into the  method of studying intercuitural communication. 
Leeds-Hun/vitz's (1990) historical account of intercuitural communication is one 
exception. S he attempts to unfold the origin of intercuitural communication by 
putting it in historical context. As Williams (1967) contends, considering a  
historical dimension seem s to be  necessary  in any cultural studies. This study, 
therefore, necessarily involves a  historical approach to examining the 
phenomenon of intercuitural communication. While this study follows in som e 
ways Leeds-Hurwitz's study, it also attem pts to unfold how the current study of 
intercuitural communication h as  been  dependent upon the origin, and how the
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current intercultural communication scholarship h as  been  transforming its 
appearance a s  a historical context has  been transforming.
Theoretical Dimension of Intercultural C o m m u n i c a t i o n ^3
The final area  of the review of prior studies of intercultural communication 
involves its theoretical dimensions. How have prior studies made sense  of the 
phenomenon of intercultural communication"'^? Examining the basis of each  
explanation may reveal som e hidden sedimentation they added to the 
phenomenon of intercultural communication. Again, the investigator can not 
review all kinds of theories to explain intercultural communication phenom ena. 
Rather he attem pts to review and clarify the predominant manner of explaining 
intercultural communication that h a s  been predominantly shared by the prior 
theorists in explaining intercultural communication.
After a  review of the predom inant metatheoretical approaches to 
intercultural communication, som e of the major theories used to explain 
intercultural communication phenom ena are discussed.
The major theories used  to explain various phenom ena of intercultural 
communication are grounded on a  shared metatheoretical approach labeled 
"traditional approach" Hall (1992) argued. Hall positioned the traditional 
perspective a s  one of the three prominent metatheoretical perspectives (i.e.,
It is important to remember that the selected theories in this section have contributed to the 
area of intercultural communication in many respects. The reader should be aware that the 
selected theories have use-values.
Intercultural communication presum es to involve at least two individuals from different 
cultures. This presumption implies any intercultural communication involves cultural differences. 
Therefore, cross-cultural theories (Hall. 1976; Hofstede. 1980. 1983) had been attempting to 
explain such cultural differences/variability prior to explaining the process of actual interaction 
among different people who are presumed to be a  manifestation of each different culture. Put 
otherwise, there are many theories of cross-cultural communication which attempt to explain 
culture differences. Despite their significance, the investigator does not review them in this 
dissertation. Again, the purpose of this section is not to review the various theories from various 
viewpoints in an exhaustive way. but to review the major metatheoretical approach and its 
corresponding major theories to unveil the hidden nature of intercultural communication.
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traditional, coordinated m anagem ent of meaning, and  ethnographic perspective) 
in term s of the fundamental issues of culture, communication, and intercultural 
communication. He, then, described the term "traditional" a s  follows:
The term traditional w as chosen for the first perspective because, 
although this perspective does not have one consensually accepted 
label, it is generally consistent and is the perspective reflected in the 
g reatest number of scholarly publications, including textbooks. The 
traditional perspective is largely modeled after work in the natural 
sciences, is basically neopositivist in nature, and is concerned with 
causal relationships among variables, (p. 50)
Although Hall (1992) contends that the traditional perspective is one of the 
three prominent metatheoretical approaches, the investigator argues that theories 
b ased  on this traditional perspective are particularly predominant in explanations 
of the very process of intercultural communication. Intercultural communication 
phenom ena have been presum ed to be problematic in essence; therefore, the 
researchers had to be concerned with practical ways to handle the various 
problems (e.g., intercultural misunderstandings, intercultural conflicts, culture 
shocks) derived from culture differences. Therefore, the ultimate theoretical goal 
w as to dom esticate and m anage the chaos and the wilderness (i.e., to effectively 
control the problems derived from the process of intercultural communication) 
effectively through prediction, just like natural scientists had been attempting to 
do to nature. That is why, in a  sense, it w as natural that the theories grounded 
on the traditional approach, with the major goal of prediction and control, becam e 
predominant.
The crucial problem of this approach is that any theories under the 
influence of this traditional perspective attempt to explain the intercultural 
communication phenom ena presuming what is desirable in the process. Since 
this desirability is grounded on the predominant value(s) of the current modernity,
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the theories are deeply em bedded In the modern value(s). The theories under 
the influence of traditional scientific perspective are not explaining intercultural 
communication objectively in a  value-free manner. Rather, they are  explaining 
intercultural communication phenom ena rather ideologically^^ presupposing 
certain values^® (e.g., effectiveness, conformity). Let's look at som e of the major 
theories of intercultural communication which belong to the traditional (i.e., 
"objective") perspective.
The major intercultural communication theories under the traditional 
perspective. There are many theories under the traditional perspective which 
attempted to explain intercultural communication phenom ena. Nevertheless, not 
many theories have been developed based on system atic lines of research. This 
section exam ines the two major theories of intercultural communication which 
have been  developed in a  system atic manner. Particular attention is given to the 
m anners in which each theory explains intercultural communication. O ne is a  
theory of anxiety/uncertainty m anagem ent that Gudykunst developed through a  
series of system atic studies (1988, 1993, 1995). The other is a  theory of 
intercultural adaptation Young Kim (1988) developed along a  separate  line of 
systematic research.
First, one of the most influential theories of intercultural communication 
phenom ena (e.g., communication with strangers, intergroup communication) is 
anxiety/uncertainty m anagem ent theory (Gudykunst, 1988,1993,1995). 
Gudykunst (1988,1993,1996) extended Berger and C alabrease's uncertainty 
reduction theory (originally this theory was generated to explain intracultural
'S. Therefore, intercultural communication ought to be explained in a  value-laden way.
Stressing and hyper-valuing efficiency and homogeneity seem s to be due to two major and 
essentially imperialistic reasons: (1) trade, and (2) diplomacy, including war.
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human communication in 1975) in order to explain intergroup communication 
(i.e., communication with strangers). He argued that cultural strangers need to 
reduce uncertainty and anxiety in (especially in initial interaction) interacting with 
people from a  host environment in order to communicate effectively (efficiently 
and conveniently) since the strangers encounter a  series of crises in a  host 
environment. This theory, first of all, rationalizes the necessity of uncertainty and 
anxiety reduction for the sake  of more effective communication. It is so because  
cultural strangers usually can not be  engaged in natural communication of their 
native culture, mainly due to the existence of relatively high uncertainty and 
anxiety derived from culture differences. Second, this theory clearly presum es 
the value of maintaining a  social reality in a  host environment by minimizing 
cultural strangers' social realities (through uncertainty and anxiety reduction). He 
also presupposed that similarities (especially cultural similarities) reduce 
uncertainty and anxiety and consequently lead to the strangers' intercultural 
adaptation and effective communication. As a  rationale to value cultural 
similarities over cultural dissimilarities (to maintain order), he offered Levine's 
(1979) assum ption that hosts (people interacting with strangers in their own 
country) feel anxiety, or and a t least latent antagonism,^8 a s  an initial response to 
the stranger (or to the stranger's strangeness). Another rationale is derived from
 ^^ Gudykunst often employed Schuetz’s  {l944)description of the strangers’ general lack of 
intersubjective understanding in a  host environment to rationalize this point. Gudykunst and 
Hammer (1988), likewise, contended "Because strangers lack "intersubjective understanding," or 
an understanding of the social world inhabited by the members of the host culture, their 
interactions in the host culture are experienced as  a  series of crises (pp. 107-108).
^8. This does not always happen. Not all cultural encounters are painful or antagonistic. Many 
are simply filled with curiosity and wonder. Sometimes uncertainty leads to curiosity and 
wonderment. Antagonism is common to colonizing aggression. Often in the past, explorers and 
anthropologists have been received with great excitement and ecstatic activity-not anxiety. 
Anxiety happens only if one fears the unknown, presuming it could be harmful. Anxiety also 
presumes a  fear of losing what one has as  private property. Private property is not known to all 
cultures.
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Stephen and S tephen 's (1985) study. Stephen and S tephen claim perceived 
cultural dissimilarity increases communication participants' anxiety in intercultural 
contact. Since Gudykunst (1988 ,1991 ,1993 ,1995) consistently argues the 
reduction of strangers' anxiety leads to effective communication, cultural 
dissimilarity (i.e., culture differences) must also be  reduced.
Therefore, Gudykunst seem s to view the cultural differences as the source 
of distraction, a t least to som e extent, to maintain order in a  host environment, 
assum ing an indigenous person becom es annoyed by the cultural differences 
that cultural strangers p o ssess . He also presum es two outcom es of 
communication with strangers: intercultural adaptation and effective 
communication, which evidently presum e the value of homogeneity and that of 
efficiency. Particularly regarding communication effectiveness, he equates 
effective communication with minimizing misunderstanding (Gudykunst, 1991 ; 
Gudykunst & Kim, 1992). Gudykunst (1991) argued:
W hether or not a  specific instance of communication is effective or not 
depends on the deg ree  to which the participants attach similar m eanings 
to the m essages exchanged. Stated differently, communication is 
effective to the ex tent that we are able to minimize misunderstanding 
(p.24).
He clearly encourages strangers to think similarly in their intergroup 
communication for the sak e  of accomplishing a  predom inant social value of 
efficiency by trying to avoid and minimize misunderstanding (I.e., minimize the 
effect of cultural differences). It seem s that maintaining communication 
homogeneity through uncertainty/anxiety reduction has been considered the best 
m eans to satisfy the value of efficiency. In other words, it is fair to say that 
Gudykunst's uncertainty and  anxiety reduction theory presupposes both values of 
homogeneity and efficiency. Actually, Gudykunst (1993) proposes a  theory of
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effective (i.e., efficient and convenient) interpersonal and  intergroup 
communication tfirougfi anxiety and uncertainty m anagem ent a s  a chapter in the 
book entitled, "Intercultural Communication C om petence" (Wiseman & Koester, 
1993). Gudykunst, here, again clearly connects the theory of uncertainty and 
anxiety with the value of efficiency (i.e., competence).
Another influential and  powerful theory, along with G udykunsfs A.U.M. 
(Anxiety/Uncertainty M anagement) theory, to explain intercultural communication 
phenom ena is Kim's intercultural adaptation theory (1988). This theory has been 
developed in order to explain immigrants’ adaptation in their new environment. 
She applies General System s Theory a s  a  theoretical basis  to explain strangers' 
(especially immigrants') intercultural adaptation. Unlike other scholars who had 
viewed intercultural communication a s  a  problematic phenom enon, Kim 
considered intercultural communication a s  a  learning experience or a  challenge 
to facilitate an individual's internal growth (For a  similar view se e  Adler, 1987). 
According to her, such internal growth often leads one to generate  his or her 
intercultural identity as  an outcom e. S he also contends that a  stress experience 
derived from cultural unfamiliarity is indispensable to the individual's internal 
growth. In other words, she  a ssu m es  that overcoming cultural differences and 
the accompanying stress is important and feasible for m ost human beings, since 
most of us are open system s and have internal hom eostatic drive to maintain the 
human system.
On this point, Kim presum es adaptation is the only way to maintain order 
(or various levels of system s; individual system s a s  well a s  various levels of 
group systems). Kim assum es cultural differences disturb the equilibrium of an
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individual system. The individual regains the internal balance by adapting^s to 
the stronger system through personal growth accompanying the process of 
déculturation. Déculturation w as necessary since promoting the existence of 
culture differences is presupposed to involve a  sort of risk to disturb the efficient 
and effective function of various system s of a  host environment as well a s  disturb 
the order there. It is fair to say, modernity more or less presupposes the values 
of homogeneity and efficiency over the importance of preserving the unique 
cultural heritage strangers bring into a  host environment. For that reason, Kim 
rationalizes the necessity of partial loss (i.e., unlearning) of original cultural 
identity as a  part of indispensable intercultural adaptation process.
Kim's (1988) argum ent seem s to be based  on an assumption, based  on 
system s theory, which states, "To regain internal equilibrium and reduce stress, a 
person adapts by altering his or her internal conditions" (assumption 4, p. 50). 
This assumption presum es that the only solution to overcome challenges of 
culture differences (i.e., internal disequilibrium and stress) is to adapt into a  
changed environment actively by altering cultural strangers' internal conditions. 
This implies the necessity of déculturation. Cultural strangers' efficient 
adaptation, including déculturation, is presupposed to be necessary for the sake 
of preserving order in a  host environment to keep the bigger system (i.e., a  host 
society) functioning smoothly, efficiently, and normally. In short, Kim's system s 
theory, on one hand, views culture differences a s  challenges to facilitate cultural 
strangers' internal growth and, on the other hand, it still views culture differences 
to be solved, overcome, and at least restrained presupposing the values of 
conformity and efficiency.
It is important to notice Kim equated learning and growth with adaptation.
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The above two theories explain intercultural communication phenom ena 
presupposing certain values (e.g., effectiveness, conformity). Therefore, these 
theories are not explaining intercultural communication a s  it is. Instead, they are 
explaining the phenom enon while making certain value judgments and aiming for 
certain goal achievem ents (i.e., effective and  conforming communication in AUM 
theory; effective adaptation and attaining intercultural identity in Kim's 
terminology) without recognizing it. Kincaid's (1988) convergence theory, 
likewise, explains the process of intercultural communication searching for the 
conditions which can  accomplish the goal of greater cultural 
conformity/convergence. Obviously, the theories which claim to be "value free" 
are heavily value-laden.
Therefore, th ese  theories do not com prehensively explain the intercultural 
communication phenom ena that are taking place in the real world. The various 
intercultural communication phenom ena that take place in the real world are 
much more complex than the theories^o acknowledge Actually, in reality, usually
20. Although the investigator did not review the theories of cross-cultural communication, they 
have problems explaining culture differences. The problems are complicated and can not be 
easily explained. However, one of the crucial problems in cross-cultural theory is its simplistic 
and rational explanation presuming linearity and two-valued dichotomy. Many of the dimensions 
of cultural vanability (e.g., Hall's Low- High context, 1976; Hofstede's four dimensions: 
individualism-collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity-femininity, power distance, 1980, 
1983; Okabe's East-West assumptions, 1983; Parson's pattern variables, 1951) represent this 
problem. These frameworks also manifested two-valued logics (e.g., high vs low context, 
collectivism vs individualism. East vs West, et cetera) which presume Cartesian dualism. 
Regardless of the content of the dimensions of cultural variability, each dimension is a  continuum 
which presumes each culture locates on somewhere between the extremes. For instance. Japan 
is more collectivistic than the United States is, while Japan is less collectivistic than Korea is. 
Although these cultural variability dimensions are indications of general tendency, such 
dimensions exclude the potentiality that some cultures might be highly collectivistic a s  well as 
highly individualistic at the sam e time. Such potentiality is presumed to be irrational; therefore, it 
is excluded from consideration. However, such a  decision itself is based on a  certain cultural 
perspective which is a  Western, linear and rational mode of awareness.
One of the principal characteristics of intercultural communication is the multiplicity of 
cultural differences. Western, linear, and rational explanations can only deal with Western 
rational cultures. Recently, many people have questioned the validity of the cultural variability 
dimension. Kumon and Hamaguchi (1983), for instance, argued Japanese culture can not be 
understood appropriately by the collectivism-individualism dimension. Nadamitsu (1996),
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intercultural communication phenom ena are not taking place in the ways the 
theories explain and  predict. In other words, the theories are only explaining the 
phenomenon of intercultural communication partially. Intercultural 
communication is a  very complex phenom enon which takes place rationally a s  
well as irrationally and  even pre-rationally. W henever we experience intercultural 
communication, not only do we rationally attempt to reduce anxiety and 
uncertainty and adap t to the situation, but also we irrationally avoid intercultural 
communication despite our curiosity. We even pre-rationally experience 
intercultural communication by hating or rejecting others without any rationality.
People experience intercultural communication very differently.
Intercultural communication is a  much more complex phenom enon than we think, 
just like the complex nature of human reality. While there are many theories to 
explain intercultural communication phenom ena under various perspectives, 
there are not any theories which can explain the complexity of intercultural 
communication comprehensively. Therefore, in this study, the investigator 
attempts to explain this complex nature of intercultural communication by 
employing Jean  G ebser’s  theory of consciousness mutation presuming Husserl's 
presuppositionless phenomenology. This theory allows an explanation of the 
complex process of intercultural communication in terms of communication 
participants' structures of consciousness. This theory can explain the diverse 
ways people experience intercultural communication without presuming any 
metaphysics or ideologies.
likewise, demonstrated the inadequacy of individualism-collectivism dimension empirically. It 
seems, for instance, non-Western cultures or the cultures of non-linear thinking can not be easily 
understood from the cultural variability dimensions which are the manifestation of the Western 
rational linear logic. Although there have been many attempts to create an etic-derived theory to 
explain cultural differences among different nations, such effort seem s to be still inadequate. In 
other words, the effort to establish a  cross-cultural communication theory to transcend one mode 
of cultural logic has not yet been done critically.
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Summary: Intercultural Communication a s  an Ideology.
In general, the area  of Intercultural communication has been deyeloping a s  
a  field of communication presupposing several things. First of all, the existential 
status of intercultural communication has never been critically examined. The 
fundamental ontological s ta tus of intercultural communication has been adopted 
and accepted uncritically and  blindly as-a-com m on-sense-phenom enon. As a 
result, the definition of intercultural communication becam e very ambiguous and 
w as and has been based on metaphysical speculations. In this sense, a critical 
investigation of the ontic sta tus of intercultural communication is necessary.
Next, the major topic selection, the major methodology, the major 
metatheoretical approach, and  its corresponding major theories that signified 
intercultural communication a s  a  field have been highly ideological a s  well a s  
metaphysical. For instance, the choice of intercultural communication 
com petence/effectiveness and intercultural adaptation a s  the two major topic 
a reas  in intercultural communication seem  to manifest the predominant modern 
value of efficiency and conformity in the topic selection. The major 
methodological choice of variable-analytical-objective-reductionistic approach, on 
the other hand, signifies several m etaphysics (e.g., reductionism, scientism, 
objectivism and empiricism) already presum ed in the methodology. Investigating 
a  phenom enon of intercultural communication, therefore, might be preem pted or 
distorted even before its investigation. Phenomenology, which attempts to 
suspend metaphysical speculations, is the appropriate m ethod for this study.
In term s of the major choice of metatheoretical approach and its 
corresponding theories to explain intercultural communication, they signified 
value-laden nature rather than value-free. The traditional scientific approach
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presupposes prediction and control a s  the two major goals. These two goals are 
the manifestation of the value of efficiency. The corresponding theories under 
this approach also are transforming a  subtle form of ideology by presuming 
effective communication a s  the desirable goal of intercultural communication.
In summary, the field of intercultural communication has been presuming 
certain metaphysics and ideologies without recognizing and without questioning. 
It is not known why this p rocess of ideological formation took place.
N onetheless, it is indispensable to search for the origin that constituted this 
metaphysical and ideological nature of intercultural communication a s  a  
discipline. In other words, a  sort of historical investigation to unfold the origin of 
intercultural communication should be done. At the sam e time, intercultural 
communication is taking place in life. We are experiencing "intercultural 
communication" in our own lives. However, the true appearance of intercultural 
communication has never been  critically exam ined. Therefore, this study 
attem pts to examine the existential status of intercultural communication. In 
order to accomplish this task, the investigator necessarily engages in an eidetic 
analysis, which elucidates the necessary  conditions that constitute a  
phenom enon of intercultural communication. The next chapter describes two 
m ethods appropriate for this study.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Method
In this section, several ways to exam ine the above research questions are 
explained. It is inappropriate to employ any traditional scientific methods (e.g., 
survey, experiment) to answer these research questions. Such traditional 
scientific m ethods can not escape from their inherent metaphysical 
presuppositions (e.g., objectivism, reductionism, empiricism, scientism) which 
prevent them from answering the investigator's research questions. Therefore, 
this analysis em ploys phenomenology, which challenges scientific 
presuppositions. The investigator applies Edmund Husserl's archeology a s  a 
way to unfold the origin of intercultural communication a s  an academ ic area 
established in the US. He also employs Husserl's eidetic analysis a s  a  primary 
method to decipher the necessary conditions that constitute the phenomenon of 
intercultural communication we (as historical beings in this present historical 
epoch) experience "as such." Both archeology and eidetic analysis are parts of 
phenomenology.
This chapter first describes the general characteristics of phenomenology 
a s  an approach. Since phenomenology is not only an approach but also a 
method of investigation, the chapter next explains the general characteristics of 
phenomenology a s  a  method. Then, this chapter describes two specific methods 
of phenomenology (i.e., archaeology and eidetic analysis) in term s of the general 
characteristics and the specific procedures involved in each method. The 
chapter also dem arcates the domain in each  method.
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Phenomenology
Phenomenology is the first requirement for this study. It is indispensable 
b ecau se  what this study attempts to accomplish is in e ssen ce  a phenomenology 
of intercultural communication. A phenomenology of something is only 
accom plished through phenomenology as  a method. Therefore, phenomenology 
should be  the first methodological concern for this study. This section describes 
phenom enology a s  a  method, and applies Edmund Husserl's archeology and 
eidetic reduction to investigate a  phenomenon of intercultural communication. A 
brief explanation of the origin of the term and an overview of three different 
attitudes serve a s  an introduction of the method.
Phenom enology a s  a  Presuppositionless Inquiry.
Phenomenology is derived from two Greek words: phenom enon and 
logos. Phenom enon m eans appearance which is anything of which one is 
conscious. Logos, a s  Stewart and Mickunas (1974) contend, m eans " 'reason' or 
'word,' hence a  'reasoned inquiry' " (p. 3). Phenomenology is a  reasoned inquiry 
of anything of which one is conscious. As long a s  one is conscious of something, 
it becom es a  legitimate area  of investigation for phenomenology. This statem ent 
is very important to remember. Phenomenology does not presuppose what real 
is. S tated  differently, phenomenology tries to avoid any metaphysical 
speculations (i.e., any speculations of the nature of reality). When a  study is 
b ased  on a  metaphysical speculation, the nature of reality is necessarily limited. 
For instance, the nature of reality in empiricism is limited to anything which can 
be verified through sen se  perceptions (e.g., seeing through eye, hearing, 
touching). In this case, the experience of dreaming is excluded from the a re a  of 
investigation, since a  dream is not empirically experienced. However, the
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experience of dreaming is a s  real a s  the experience of any empirical thing. The 
reason a dream  is excluded from the area of investigation is purely based  on a 
metaphysical prejudgment (i.e., empiricism). Empiricism, for instance, like all 
philosophical schools of m etaphysics, is bracketed by the phenomenological 
method. Phenomenology, therefore, can widen the a rea  of its investigation by 
avoiding any  metaphysical speculations. As w as mentioned before, anything of 
which one is aw are can  becom e a  legitimate area  of investigation for 
phenomenology, regardless of w hether it is a  dream, a  memory, an  empirical 
thing, a  past history, e t cetera. In other words, phenomenology attem pts to 
investigate a  phenom enon without any prevaluations (i.e., without any 
metaphysical presuppositions). This becom es a crucial issue when the 
investigator attem pts to do a phenomenology of intercultural communication. 
What is intercultural communication (the nature of intercultural communication) is 
obviously b ased  on several metaphysical speculations pointed out in the 
literature review section. Intercultural communication has been investigated as  a 
presupposed phenom enon; therefore, it has been viewed in certain ways, 
examined presum ing several metaphysical (or ideological) requirem ents which 
may be unjustified. So called, "intercultural communication" is a  phenom enon 
which involves a  certain origin and certain historical sedimentation. Nonetheless, 
very few studies have attem pted to unfold the origin of intercultural 
communication. Moreover, there is no study which tries to unveil the e sse n c e  of 
intercultural communication without presupposing metaphysical speculations. 
Although it is controversial w hether a  presuppositionless investigation is truly 
possible, phenom enology is the only method designed a s  a  presuppositionless 
inquiry.
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For this study, therefore, the Investigator employs Edmund Husserl's 
archeology and eidetic reduction a s  the two specific methods to do a 
phenom enology of Intercultural communication. The two methods have different 
roles and require different procedures. Preceding an explanation of the specific 
procedures, however, the next section describes the general characteristics of 
phenomenology a s  a  method.
Phenom enology a s  a  Method 
W hen we wake up In the morning and w ash our faces, brush our teeth, are 
we thinking about what we are  doing? Probably we are not. When we a re  living 
In our world, we just accept everything existing In our world rather than 
questioning each  existence. Our house, our teeth, our book, our friend, our 
school, everything surrounding us Is a  part of our dally lives. As long a s  
something Is a  part of our world, w e never question It. We just simply and 
naturally accept the existence In our world as  It Is. Edmund Husserl called such 
an attitude the "natural attitude." Husserl describes "natural attitude" in his book, 
"Ideas" (1913/1962) as  follows:
I am  aw are of a  world, sp read  out In sp ace  endlessly, and In time 
becoming and become, without end. I am aw are of It, that m eans, first of 
all, 1 discover It Immediately, Intuitively, I experience It. Through sight, 
touch, hearing, etc.. In the different ways of sensory perception corporeal 
things somehow spatially distributed are forme simply there. In verbal or 
figurative sen se  "present," w hether or not I pay them special attention by 
busying myself with them, considering, thinking, feeling, willing, (p. 91)
The natural standpoint, nonetheless, "constitutes the most basic web of all
human relationships to the world and  to other persons" (Stewart & Mikunas,
1974/1990, p. 24). While the natural attitude is the m ost basic human attitude,
we are presupposing many things under Its Influence. For Instance, we are
presupposing everything that surrounds us Is real. For Instance, a  woman Is
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walking down the street. We just presum e the person  is a  woman. However, in 
principle, we actually do not know whether the person is she  or he. We just 
presume the person is she, because  the person ap p ears  like a  woman. Although 
this might be a  natural observation, this belief is a  m ere metaphysical 
speculation. The person might be a  transvestite. We never know. This example 
illustrates that there might b e  many presuppositions a s  we speculate about the 
nature of reality without recognizing and questioning. We just blindly believe and 
accept everything surrounding us a s  belonging to our natural world a s  it is.
Husserl, on the other hand, argued that such natural attitude might distort 
and sometimes preempt our investigation of a phenom enon if we wish to 
understand it rigorously. The natural attitude does not force us to question the 
blindly accepted presuppositions. We call such blindly believed presuppositions 
"commonsense." While such  com m onsense might be true, it might be wrong. At 
least, it can be questioned until more firm evidence is available. Husserl, 
therefore, argued the importance and  the necessity to shift attitude if we wish to 
investigate a  phenomenon decently and seriously.
Phenomenological Reduction a s  the Shift from the Natural Attitude to the 
Philosophical Attitude. Such a  changed attitude is basically the one which asks a 
philosophical question without presupposing anything. Philosophy developed 
when men began to question the world around them and  to search for rational 
explanations about it. Such an  attitude, therefore, is called the "philosophical 
attitude." It is the attitude to question the reason why about everything rather 
than presuming many things. It is an unnatural attitude in a  sense, since the 
attitude asks questions which are presum ed to be com m onsense. Yet, Husserl 
contended the shift from the natural attitude to the philosophical one was
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indispensable if w e wish to know a  phenomenon seriously. It is indispensable, 
because the philosophical attitude allows one to open up the region of 
investigation by bracketing one's natural attitude and  consequently by 
questioning all presuppositions about the world. Som eone investigating a  
phenomenon without the philosophical attitude, in other words, might 
automatically se e  the phenom enon in a  certain way, presuming something even 
before the investigation^ Husserl, therefore, argued in favor of this operation a s  
the indispensable first methodological concern for any  phenomenological 
investigation. He specifically called this attitudinal shift, which involves a  
questioning of all one 's  presuppositions about the world, "phenomenological 
reduction." According to Stewart and Mikunas (1974/1990), the 
phenomenological reduction "involves a  narrowing of attention to what is 
essential in the problem while disregarding or ignoring the superfluous and 
accidental" (p. 26). In order to accomplish this task, disconnecting one from his 
or her naturalistic assum ptions is necessary. Suspension of all kinds of 
naturalistic assum ptions/presuppositions is an operation called "epoche" 
originally employed by the Greek skeptics to refer to abstention (i.e., suspension 
of judgment). Husserl also used a  mathematical metaphor, "bracketing," to 
explain phenomenological reduction. By bracketing a  mathematical equation, 
mathematicians merely place it out of question for a  while until the larger context 
of the equation is fully investigated. Likewise, by bracketing (i.e., parenthesizing) 
naturalistic assum ptions em bedded in one's natural world, a  phenomenologist 
merely places his or her naturalistic prejudices out of question (i.e., disregard or 
ignore accidental and  superfluous) for a  while until the phenomenon of interest is
^. Husserl labeled a  scientist's reductionistic attitude as the "scientific attitude."
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more critically investigated. In any case, Stew art and Mickunas (1974/1990) 
contend that phenomenological reduction, epoche, and bracketing are 
synonymous term s which can be employed interchangeably.
According to Husserl, investigating the e ssen ce  of a  phenom enon (i.e., the 
second step of phenom enology a s  a  method, specifically called "eidetic analysis") 
is possible after epoche is completed. The more important issue is to identify a  
concrete way to accomplish "epoche", which is the first phenomenological 
operation.
Proceeding from epoche (i.e., suspending judgment about all kinds of 
presuppositions about life-world) is an extremely difficult task. It is extremely 
difficult, since w e are  not aw are of what we are presuming. Therefore, the 
historical investigation Husserl proposed is a  concrete method of unfolding 
deeply sedim ented presuppositions. In other words, the historical investigation 
Husserl called "archaeology" is a  process of critically reflecting on the  historical 
horizon of the phenom enon, and is a  form of epoche. In the next section, the 
general characteristics of an  archaeological historical investigation are  outlined.
Archaeoloov
General Characteristics
Something appears  a s  a  phenom enon in a  certain historical context with 
certain motive. Likewise, intercultural communication showed itself a s  an 
independent academ ic field in a  certain historical context with certain motives. In 
other words, intercultural communication has  its origin and its history. The prior 
studies (i.e., texts) of intercultural communication have certain shared  
presuppositions (e.g., certain metaphysics). S tated differently, the way each  prior
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study of intercultural communication manifested itself w as very similar, regardless 
of the obvious differences in its content. This becam e so  because each prior 
study (of intercultural communication) is a  product of historical sedimentation.
The origin and the history of intercultural communication have been always 
already presupposed in each  text of intercultural communication a s  historical 
sedimentation. Therefore, unfolding the history and the origin of intercultural 
communication is indispensable not only to understand the meaning of 
intercultural communication and its potential transformations, but also to clarify 
how the metaphysical speculations about intercultural communication have been 
established.
Such historical investigation is necessarily an  archaeological one. 
Archaeology is a  search for the origin a s  S tew art and Mikunas suggest. It is a 
form of historical investigation. Edmund Husserl engaged in this archaeological 
historical investigation in his work, The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology (1954/1970). He clearly indicated that this form 
of historical investigation is "not that of a  historical investigation in the usual 
sense" (p. 70). A traditional historical Investigation, for Husserl, is one which 
examines history "from the outside, from facts, a s  if the temporal becoming in 
which we ourselves have evolved were merely an external causal series." (p. 71) 
History, in this view, is treated  a s  a  mere recorded past which is already gone in 
a  physical sense. Conventional history tends to presum e a  line connecting 
different historical events. Conventional history categorizes and isolates 
historical events chronologically, much like isolating variables in hypothesis 
testing. Any investigator who engages in historical investigation in a  traditional
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se n se  exam ines history a s  a  disinterested observer detached from "the past 
history."
On the other hand, Husserl's historical investigation is an archaeological 
one. The investigation treats history a s  a  living tradition which has been 
accumulating a s  historical sedimentation like archaeological layers. In this 
archaeological investigation, "we are  heirs and cobearers" (p. 71) of history. It 
indicates we are a  product and a  producer of history a t the sam e time. History is 
essentially our history which is an archaeologically accumulated sedimentation 
rather than a  bunch of mere recorded factual past. History is like a  sedimentation 
of multiple layers which has been archaeologically accumulated as  well as  
accumulating. History is a  product a s  well a s  a  process simultaneously. History 
always already has a unity which integrates past, present, and future. Therefore, 
in this archaeology, as  Husserl (1954/1970) argued, "we are attempting to elicit 
and understand the unity running through all the [philosophical] projects of history 
that oppose one another and work together in their changing forms" (p. 70). In 
other words, the archaeological historical investigation attempts to decipher the 
relationship between the past and present which encom passes the future.
History is, for Husserl, a transcendental and synthetic phenomenon which 
transcends time.
In another important role, archaeology leads to self-understanding. The 
most difficult task on the way to achieving epoche (i.e., suspending judgments) is 
to clarify and understand our own prejudices. W henever we are living in our 
natural world with our natural standpoint, w e never realize what we really 
presuppose. The presuppositions em bedded in our natural attitude a re  part of 
our life and can not see  them selves. Therefore, a s  Gadamer (1960/1989)
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pointed out, these are blind prejudices (i.e., presuppositions) which are 
historically sedim ented. Similarly, Husserl argued that "all the things he takes for 
granted are prejudices, that all prejudices are obscurities arising out of a  
sedimentation of tradition" (p. 72). In order to bracket these historically 
sedim ented blind prejudices, the investigator must unveil and see  these blind 
prejudices. Otherwise, he can  not bracket his prejudices. In order to bracket 
something, it is necessary  to know what that something is. We can not bracket 
something without knowing it. Therefore, it is necessary  to enable blind 
prejudices, since any blind prejudices are  "unknown" prejudices which can not be 
bracketed.
While such blind prejudices necessarily are clarified, these  kinds of 
prejudices are ambiguities that are so deeply sedim ented in ourselves (in our 
historical traditions) that we can  not easily reflect and s e e  what they really are. 
Therefore, the investigator m ust engage in the archaeological historical 
investigation Edmund Husserl proposed. As Husserl contended, the 
archaeological historical investigation is "actually the deepest kind of self­
reflection aimed at a  self-understanding in terms of what we are truly seeking as  
the historical beings we are" (p. 72). Put otherwise, through historical self­
reflection, the archaeology gives us an opportunity to s e e  our historically 
sedimented blind prejudices for what they really are; consequently, we can 
suspend those prejudices by bracketing them. The archaeological historical 
investigation, therefore, is a  form of epoche. However, it is also important to 
remember epoche is a  dialectic and a  continuous never-ending process. The 
archaeological historical investigation gives the investigator just such an 
opportunity to reflect upon his historically sedim ented prejudices and to see  what
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he really is a s  a  historical being through a  historically reflected dialogue. 
Nonetheless, this does not guarantee he can successfully accomplish this task.
All he can do is to critically and sincerely try to challenge and question his deeply 
blinded prejudices.
Procedures
Basically, there is no pre-determined procedure to carry out the 
archaeological historical investigation. While Edmund Husserl m ade some 
comments and suggestions about the method of his archaeological-teleological 
historical investigation in his The Crisis of European S ciences^, he did not 
describe the method in a  specific step-by-step way. Therefore, the investigator 
must describe the procedure of this historical analysis considering Husserl's 
suggestions. It Is important to notice, however, the proposed procedure is a 
preliminary one  and far from complete. Others might a lso  do the archaeology in 
a  different way. The procedure the investigator p roposes is merely a  version of 
his own which is designed to investigate the origin of intercultural communication. 
The only thing the investigator can do is to try his b est to reflect Husserl's 
fundamental attitude em bedded in his archaeology on the procedure the 
investigator proposes.
Another important point to rem em ber is his historical analysis is not only 
archaeological, but also hermeneutic^. A hermeneutic principle of the text- 
context relationship suggests that in order to understand the meaning of a  text 
(i.e., a  phenomenon), it is indispensable to know the m eaning of the context in 
which the text is situated. Therefore, the investigator follows his investigation by
2. 'The Crisis" is an archaeology or genealogy a s  are Foucault's work (e.g.. The Order of Things, 
1966/1970; The Archaeology of Knowledge. 1971/1972).
3, The Crisis had a  great impact on subsequent hermeneutics like Gadamer, Habermas, and 
Ricoeur. So. Husserl is in a sense setting the phenomenological basis for a  new hermeneutic.
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following this principle. Particularly, in order to understand the original meaning 
of a  phenom enon (i.e., a  text) of intercultural communication, he attem pts to 
identify the original context w here the phenom enon took place originally through 
necessary  m eans. Then, h e  tries to unveil the m eaning of the original context in 
which the phenom enon is originally situated. Third, he attempts to interpret the 
original m eaning of intercultural communication by situating it in the original 
context. Finally, he deciphers the presuppositions em bedded in the original 
meaning of the phenom enon.
In a  similar manner, carrying out the task of unveiling the transformation of 
the meaning of intercultural communication is the second part of archaeology.
The section first identifies the  shift of context, followed by clarifying the m eaning 
of the shift of the context. Then, the investigator interprets the meaning of 
intercultural communication by situating it in the shifted context. Fourth, he 
unveils the implications of th e  transformations of the text (i.e., intercultural 
communication). Then, the study reveals the uncanny nature of the foundation of 
intercultural communication. Limitations of the p resent attempt of archaeology 
are suggested  in the end. The general procedures of this version of herm eneutic 
archaeology are  outlined below.
1. Searching For the Origin
A. Identifying the original context where the text originally appeared;
B. Clarifying the meaning of the context;
C. Interpreting the original m eaning of the text situated in the context;
D. Deciphering the presuppositions em bedded in the original meaning of the  text;
2. Clarifying the transformation of intercultural communication
A. Identifying the shift of the context;
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B. Clarifying the meaning of the shifted context:
0 . Interpreting the meaning of the text by situating it in the shifted context;
D. Unveiling the implications of the transformation;
Each step  is described below.
(A-1 )Identifying the original context w here a phenom enon (i.e.. a  text^ 
originally ap p ea rs . Phenomenologically speaking, something appears a s  a  
phenom enon when one is conscious of it in a  certain historical context with 
certain motives. In order to understand the original meaning of a  phenomenon 
(i.e., a  text), identifying and understanding the meaning of the original context is 
necessary. There is an intimate relationship between the birth of a  phenomenon 
and (the teleology of ) the original context. In fact, a  text (i.e., a  phenomenon) 
can not exist by itself. When there is a  text, there is always a  context where the 
text is situated. This version of archaeological historical investigation attempts to 
understand the original historical context w here a  text is situated. Clarifying the 
meaning of the original historical context will lead to the original historical 
meaning of the text (i.e., a  phenomenon). Therefore, clarifying the historical 
epoch which brought something into existence for the first time a s  a  phenom enon 
is the first task  the investigator engages in. In order to understand the meaning 
of the text (i.e., a  phenomenon), unfolding the context which is the background of 
the text is necessary.
There a re  several ways to identify the original historical context where a  
phenomenon originally took place. The use  of the historical docum ents about a 
phenom enon is one way. It is important to u se  multiple docum ents and find out 
the correlation am ong different docum ents in this stage. In any  case, a  hasty 
decision should be avoided. Another way to identify the original historical context
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is the use of dictionary. Som e dictionaries indicate the original historical epoch 
where the word (i.e., the word which refers to the phenomenon) originally 
appeared (e.g., Random H ouse Dictionary of the English Language) or even the 
original reference or the way the word was originally employed (e.g., Oxford 
English Dictionary). An etymological dictionary might also help in identifying the 
original context by going back to the word origin, although the choice of the 
etymological dictionary requires great care. Again, a  crucial point to remember is 
to use multiple methods and multiple resources and to find out the correlation 
among them in order to identify the original historical context. Through this 
careful process, we can identify the original historical context. More importantly, 
through this careful process, w e can  find a  way and a  path to dig in the origin of a  
phenomenon.
(A-2). Clarifying the m eaning of the original historical context where the 
text originally w as situated. The second step  of this version of hermeneutic- 
archaeological historical investigation is to clarify the original historical meaning 
of the context where the phenom enon originally appeared. Unfolding the 
meaning and teleology of the original historical context is the second necessary 
task to interpret the original (historical) meaning of the phenomenon of 
investigation.
One of the useful ways to clarify the meaning of the original historical 
context and the teleology of the historical epoch is to examine the shift of the 
historical context. In other words, logically speaking, there should be a  historical 
context where the phenom enon had not taken place. In other words, the context 
shifted between the original historical context and the prior historical context. 
Therefore, comparing the two historical context particularly in term s of the
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historical teleology will clarify the meaning and the teleology of the original 
historical context.
For instance, there w as a  historical context in which intercultural 
communication had not been  recognized a s  such^. People recognized 
something a s  Intercultural communication a s  such after one historical context 
(i.e., pre-intercultural communication era) shifted to another historical context 
(i.e., intercultural communication historical era). Comparing the two historical 
contexts will clarify the uniqueness and the essential differences between the two 
historical contexts (in term s of the historical teleology), which leads to an  
unfolding of the sedim ented original meaning of intercultural communication. 
Comparison is necessary  to clarify the uniqueness and the meaning.
In this stage, of course, before interpreting the original m eanings of a 
phenom enon, we can  unfold the specific process of the birth of the phenom enon 
by clarifying the more specific context where the phenomenon originally took 
place. When we en g ag e  in this task, the process of the investigation is usually 
called a  biographic investigation. Although this might be very useful, it should not 
be forgotten that it is necessary  to pay attention to the relationship betw een the 
historical teleology hidden in the original historical context and the specific 
context where a  phenom enon originally took place.
It is important to notice intercultural communication is not defined by apparent physical 
conditions. Some may argue intercultural communication has been taking place for more than a 
thousand years, since physical interaction between people from different cultures had taken place 
thousands of years ago. While this is true, it is unsure whether the people a t that time recognized 
the interaction as  "intercultural communication." The point, here, is that a phenomenon of 
intercultural communication is not defined by the apparent physical interaction, but defined by 
people's consciousness. In a  way, intercultural communication (especially as  a  discipline) is a  
cultural creation just like other cultural artifacts such as  music, painting, ways of thinking, etc. It is 
a  manifestation of the creator's consciousness. Intercultural communication as  such first assures 
communication as a  reflectively identified phenomenon.
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(A-3). Interpreting the original meaning of a  text (i.e.. a  phenomenon^ bv 
situating it in the original historical context within which it ap p eared . In this stage, 
the investigator is finally able to interpret the original meaning of the phenomenon 
of interest by putting it in the original historical context. The hidden meaning of 
the phenom enon will be unveiled when the intimate and inseparable relationship 
between the phenom enon (i.e., a  text) and the context where the phenomenon 
originally appeared  is clarified b ased  on the prior two procedures.
(A-4). Unveiling the presuppositions em bedded in the original meaning of 
a  text. W hen the original meaning of the text becom es obvious, the 
presuppositions which constituted the original meaning of the text will usually 
reveal them selves. Although th ese  presuppositions could be revealed when we 
decipher the historical teleology em bedded in the original historical context (A-2), 
the investigator finds it more appropriate to do this a s  the final procedure of the 
first part of hermeneutic-archaeological historical investigation. The 
presuppositions hidden in the original meaning of the text are the ones which 
keep the unity of th e  text or the phenom enon running throughout the history of it. 
In this stage, we might want to unfold the relationship betw een the 
presuppositions and the history of a  phenom enon in order to clarify the historical 
sedimentation (i.e., to clarify the ever present origin of the phenom enon 
throughout the history).
Basically this procedure concludes the first part of the archaeological 
historical investigation. The second part, which unveils the transformation of a 
phenomenon, goes through similar procedures. Particularly, the first three 
procedures are alm ost identical. Nonetheless, brief descriptions of the four 
procedures follow.
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(B-1 )■ Identifying the shift of the context. Sometimes, the meaning of the 
text or the phenom enon transforms along with the shift of the context where the 
text is situated. The meaning of the text is always shifting slightly since the 
context is always shifting in one way or another. An important point is when the 
shift is too significant to be ignored, especially when the significant historical 
context shifts for some reason. In this case, investigating the meaning of the 
phenom enon is necessary b ecause  of the significant shift in the historical context. 
Although the  original meaning of the  text might be still present, another layer of 
new meaning is added. It is important to clarify the transformed meaning derived 
from the addition of the new layer. This applies to the phenom enon of 
intercultural communication. Although nobody has explicitly indicated so before, 
the meaning of intercultural communication transformed when the historical 
context shifted significantly (i.e., the end  of Cold War). Therefore, the first 
procedure the investigator must en g ag e  in is to identify the  shift of the historical 
context. It might be difficult to determ ine the shift. The investigator m ust attem pt 
to identify the historically significant event which might change the nature of the 
text or the phenom enon of interest. Such historically significant events usually 
correlate with certain historical changes.
(B-2T Clarifvinq the meanino of the shift of the context. This procedure is 
similar to (A-2). The comparison betw een the two historical contexts is 
necessary to reveal the meaning of the shift by deciphering the meaning and the 
uniqueness of the new historical context in terms of the historical teleology.
(B-3T Interpreting the transform ed meaning of the text bv putting it in the 
shifted new context. In this stage, just like the (A-3) stage, the investigator may 
interpret the transformed meaning of the  text by situating it in the shifted context.
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(B-4). Unveiling the implications of the meaning of the transformed text. 
The concluding procedure of the second part of the hermeneutic-archaeological 
historical investigation attem pts to unveil the implications derived from the shifted 
meaning of the text (i.e.. the phenom enon). Specifically, in this stage the 
investigator tries to indicate som e of the consequences the transformation of the 
meaning of the text leads to. The consequences are either explicit or implicit. In 
either case, the investigator, a s  a  co-bearer of our history, must decipher the 
consequences. It is important to notice we are co-bearer as  well a s  bearer of our 
history. We are not only inheriting a  history, but also creating our history. 
Therefore, deciphering the consequences which are derived from the meaning- 
transformation of the phenom enon (i.e., the text), in a  critical manner, is our 
responsibility as  co-bearers of our history.
Demarcation
Before the investigator m oves to explain "eidetic analysis," it is important 
to delimit the domain of the present archaeological attempt. The domain of the 
investigation is "Intercultural communication" as  an Independent academ ic area 
which belongs to the field of communication. Intercultural communication a s  a  
conscious effort to understand other cultures might have been taking place since 
the dawn of human civilization a s  a  form of diplomacy, missionary activities, 
trading, etc. While it is significant to understand the history of such "intercultural 
activities," such an  attem pt is obviously impossible to achieve in just one 
dissertation. The investigator, therefore, delimits the domain to the examination 
of "intercultural communication" a s  an  independent academic area of 
communication studies, which w as cultivated in the United States.
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Limiting the scope of "intercultural communication^" to a  field of 
communication studies cultivated in the US is necessary  because fields which 
are similar to "intercultural communication" might have taken place in different 
places outside the US and in different historical epochs. In this study, the 
investigator does not determine this issue. Sources of information are limited to 
docum ents that are  available in the US and are  written in English. Therefore, the 
investigator delimits the scope a s  "intercultural communication" cultivated in the 
US in this study.
Delimiting intercultural communication as  an independent academ ic field 
cultivated in the US has another motive. The investigator is interested in 
evaluating the movement of the field of "intercultural communication" and its 
implications; the  investigator has been  studying intercultural communication in 
many respects (e.g.. presenting papers on intercultural communication, reading 
"intercultural" related articles, teaching "intercultural communication," thinking 
about the future of the field, e t cetera). As a  m em ber of the field and a s  a  co­
maker of its history, the investigator is motivated to understand why (in what 
motive), how, and in what (historical) context "intercultural communication" 
becam e an independent academ ic field in the US. Such an attempt leads to a 
clarification of what he is and what he presum es a s  a  co-bearer of the history. As 
he contended in the introductory chapter, the history is ever-present history. 
Without understanding an original motive and its historical movement, he can not 
understand w here he stands and what he is doing a s  a  member who cares about 
the field (which has been cultivated in the US). In order to re-evaluate the field, 
he needs to do an  archaeological investigation of the field; such an investigation
5. "Intercultural communication" may also mean the name of an academic curriculum (usually 
within university-level institutions).
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motivated him to delimit the scope to "intercultural communication" a s  an 
independent academ ic field which has  been  cultivated in the US.
Up to this point, the general characteristics and the procedures involved in 
the hermeneutic-archaeological historical investigation have been described.
The previous sections also dem arcated the  domain of the  study. The next 
section explains the general characteristics and the specific procedures required 
in the next phenomenological method, "eidetic reduction." Then, delimiting the 
domain of eidetic analysis follows.
Eidetic Reduction 
While an  archaeological historical investigation is a  critical way of 
exercising phenomenological epoche, eidetic reduction, Edmund Husserl 
proposed, attem pts to decipher the necessary  conditions for intercultural 
communication to take place as  a  phenom enon. In this section, the focus is on 
the general characteristics of eidetic reduction, the specific procedures of the 
method, and demarcation for analysis.
General Characteristics
"Eidetic" is the adjective of the noun, "eidos." "Eidos" is a  Greek word for 
"idea." However, the "eidos" which Husserl meant w as not the usual meaning of 
idea as  a  subjective mental process. Rather, eidos is, in a  Husserlian 
phenomenological term, the e ssen ce  of what a  thing is. The next question is 
what "essence" is. In order to understand what essen ce  is, let's take a simple 
example. Assume that there is a  pen in front of you. Som ebody asks you, "what 
is it?" You immediately answer, "it is a  pen." The person continues to ask you, 
"how do you know what you are seeing is a  pen?" You m aybe simply answer like
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this, "I know what I am seeing is a  pen because I know what a  pen is." A more 
sophisticated answer might be, "I know this is a  pen  based  on my previous 
experiences." Or you respond, "I know this is a  pen  because I have been using 
it." W hatever the content of the  response, the above dialogue illustrates several 
important points about eidos or essence.
First of all, in the above example, the m om ent you se e  the thing, you 
immediately know it a s  a  pen before somebody a sk s  you what it is. You just 
instantly know this is a  pen without reflection. But again, critically speaking, how 
do you know exactly that this is a  pen. One of the answ ers illustrated above 
gives an important clue. You said, "I know what I am  seeing is a  pen b ecau se  I 
know what a  pen is." This is a  very important statem ent. You know this is a  pen 
because  you know the e ssen ce  of what a  pen is intuitively®. You have 
experienced the essen ce  of pen, which might be called, "penness." Knowing 
"penness" through personal direct experiences m eans knowing the structures 
and the meaning of the phenom enon of pen. Any experiences are fundamentally 
eidetic experiences regardless of whether this is recognized or not. W henever 
we experience something, we are  experiencing the e ssen ce  of what the thing is. 
Without knowing the essen ce  of what a  thing is, it is impossible to experience and 
com prehend it. The e ssen ce  necessarily constitutes the structures and 
m eanings which are m anifested by the all worlds. Put othenwise, the e ssen ce  is 
a  necessary  condition for som ething to manifest a s  a  phenom enon of something 
a s  such. It may be an essentially empirical or an essentially fantastic thing or an 
essentially logical phenom enon.
®. Intuition, in this sense, is not mythical. It means one's direct aw areness (i.e., experience) of 
something. Nothing Is more obvious than Intuition. According to Husserl, to intuit simply m eans 
to be aware.
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Eidetic reduction, therefore, is a  m ethod by which we grasp the essence of 
a  phenomenon. In other words, eidetic reduction is a  method to grasp  the 
necessary condition(s) for something to em erge as  a  phenom enon of something 
a s  such. In order to carry out this task, phenomenological reduction (i.e., epoche, 
which is a  process of bracketing naturalistic assum ptions by reflecting those) is a 
prerequisite. This study is an attem pt to en g ag e  in the task of epoche through 
archaeology (i.e., archaeological historical investigation), which is a  critical 
historical reflection (i.e., critical historical self-understandings). While an attempt 
to carry out an epoche is a  most difficult task, Husserl contended that after 
epoche one is further able to systematically reduce consciousness to its 
essentials by eliminating accidental conditions which constitute a  phenomenon.
In the end, the e ssen ce  or the necessary  conditions which constitute the 
phenom enon are  supposed to be grasped. Husserl called this particular process 
eidetic reduction. The next section describes the specific procedures of the 
method.
Procedures
Edmund Husserl explored the method of achieving the science of essence 
or eidetic reduction in his work. Experience and  Judgment (1948/1973). Although 
he suggested a  specific operation nam ed "free imaginative variation" to carry out 
eidetic reduction, his explanation w as not very specific. Spiegelberg (1982), 
therefore, proposed a  phenomenological method which is com posed of a  seven- 
step  procedure. His phenomenological m ethod may be the only detailed 
description regarding phenomenology a s  a  method. This study offers a  five-step 
adaptation of Spiegelberg's procedures in the following order;
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1. Suspending metaphysical speculations about the existential status of a  
phenom enon (suspension):
2. Describing a  phenom enon (description);
3. Apprehending the necessary  conditions for a  phenomenon to take place 
(comparison);
4. Clarifying the investigator's prejudices about the ontic status of a  phenomenon 
(another suspension);
5. Interpreting the meaning of a  phenom enon (interpretation);
( 1 ) Suspending metaphysical speculations about the existential status of a  
phenom enon. The first step  of eidetic analysis is suspending metaphysical and 
ideological speculations about a phenom enon's existential status. Whenever we 
are conscious of something, we are aw are of it within certain a  socio-cultural 
context from certain a perspective a s  a  historical being who belongs to certain a 
historical epoch. W hat it m eans here is that our consciousness of something is 
already always contaminated by the naturalistic assum ptions about the ontic 
status of a  phenom enon. Since those assum ptions are historically em bedded 
sedimentation, we usually can not even see  them. As a  result, it becom es very 
difficult to reflect them so  that the assum ptions can  be bracketed until more solid 
evidence em erges. Nevertheless, suspending such metaphysical and ideological 
speculations about the ontic status of a  phenom enon is indispensable. Retaining 
those speculations might distort or even preem pt the investigation. Kramer and 
Mickunas (1992) point this out by using a  phenom enon of voodoo as  their 
example:
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For instance, to appreciate voodoo as  a  different mode of being and 
aw areness from som e other cultural phenom enon, one m ust first be willing 
to accept it a s  it is and not immediately seek  to explain it in terms of som e 
other ontological basis, such a s  reducing it to brute physicalism (behavior 
patterns or neurophysiology). This is not to say  that a  physical 
description is invalid, but rather to make a  commitment not to presume 
that a  physical description is the only way to m ake valid statem ents about 
voodoo. To reject a  priori—that is, to exclude any  phenomenon (like spell- 
casting) from the field of investigation simply on  the basis that it is deem ed 
nonempirical— is to commit an unwarranted prejudice, based  on a narrow 
metaphysical faith in materialism, (xiii-xiv)
Therefore, metaphysical and ideological speculations about the ontic 
status of a  phenom enon should be unveiled through a  series of critical self­
reflections and temporarily suspended. In this study, both a  semiotic literature 
review of prior studies of intercultural communication and archaeological 
historical analysis of intercultural communication should facilitate an elucidation 
of the metaphysics of the existential status of intercultural communication. 
Regardless of the effort, it is important to notice a  com plete epoche is impossible, 
a s  Merleau-Ponty (1962) contended. Rather, epoche is a  continuous process. 
Epoche is, in essence, a  process of self-understanding (i.e., understanding one's 
own prejudices) which is a  never-ending hermeneutic process. What the 
investigator attempts to do here is to do his best to try to challenge and question 
the prejudices about the  phenom enon's ontic status including his own prejudices, 
in a  critical manner.
(2) Describing a  phenom enon. The second step  of the eidetic analysis in 
this study is phenomenological description. Phenomenological description is 
basically the procedure of classifying and naming a  phenom enon of interest. The 
major purpose is to locate a  phenom enon within a  pre-existing classification 
system. Spiegelberg (1960/1982) contended this might be enough for familiar 
phenom ena, while describing by negation, or through analogy or metaphor might
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be more adequate in order to describe unfamiliar phenom ena or new asp ec ts  of 
familiar phenom ena. In any case, the main function of phenomenological 
description is, a s  Spiegelberg (1960/1982) mentioned, "to serve a s  a  reliable 
guide to the listener's own actual or potential experience of the phenom ena" (p. 
694).
Another important issue to notice about phenomenological description is 
the very nature of the  description. The description, in essence, is not descriptive, 
but interpretive. Any description is basically vour description according to your 
consciousness. Your perception and your p ast experiences about the 
phenom enon you are  trying to describe inevitably constitutes the very way you 
describe the phenom enon. Critically speaking, any attem pt to describe 
something is always already interpretive and prejudiced in nature. Any 
description signifies the describer's prejudice in one way or another rather than 
purely describing a  phenom enon of interest. An important point is that describing 
a  phenom enon produces a  prejudiced description am ong many potentially 
different descriptions. W hat we can do is to attem pt to recognize our way (i.e., 
our prejudiced way) of describing a  phenom enon. Moreover, the description 
essentially can not go deeper than the surface level and never truly penetrates to 
the e ssen ce  of the phenom enon. Therefore, phenom enology does not stop  at 
this point. It is not acceptable to be satisfied with your description and stop 
entering into the next step  regardless of the thickness of the description7. Similar 
to the process of epoche, phenomenological description is also an on-going 
process.
No matter how thick the description Is, it Is the describer's version of description which is a  
reflection of his or her prejudice. Kramer and Mickunas (1992) argue regarding this matter a s  
follows. "Description of surface behavior, no matter how 'thick.' is ontologically and 
phenomenologicaily different from that which is described." (p. xii)
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(3) Apprehending n ecessary  conditions for a  phenomenon to take placeQ. 
The third step of eidetic analysis is apprehending necessary conditions for a 
phenomenon to appear. Spiegelberg (1982) indicates this step a s  "apprehending 
essential relationships." This s tep  is an essentially comparative one which is one 
of the most important steps in eidetic analysis. Comparison essentially 
elucidates necessary  conditions for something to show itself a s  a  phenomenon. 
For instance, com pare a chair to a  desk. We experientially know what a  chair is 
and what a  desk is. Stated differently, we know the meaning of both "a chair" 
and "a desk." More specifically, not only do we know the meaning of both 
phenomena, we already know how the two are similar and different from each 
other based on our direct experiences with them. When we know what "a chair" 
is, we already always presuppose the knowledge of numerous existences which 
are not a  chair. Comparison already presupposes a  process of elucidating 
similarities and differences am ong phenom ena. Comparison clarifies identity. A 
chair can maintain its identity b ecau se  there are numerous non-chair 
phenomena. If only a  chair existed in our world, the chair could not be identified 
a s  a  chair. A chair is only identifiable in relation to other existences which are not 
a  chair. A chair can only be meaningful and unique because it is different from 
other phenomena. When we a re  living in our world with a  natural attitude, we 
presume knowledge of num erous phenom ena. We blindly accept each 
phenomenon in our world pre-reflectively. Stated differently, we merely 
experientially understand the e s se n c e  of each  phenomenon and essential 
relationships between each phenom enon pre-reflectively. Besides, without
®. There is a  step called "apprehending general essences" in Spiegelberg's (1982) 
phenomenological method. This step attempts to illuminate the general essences which 
constitute a  phenomenon by comparing several series of particular phenomena in a  systematic 
manner. This process necessarily requires comparison: therefore, the investigator attempts to 
include this step as a  part of comparison step.
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recognizing it, we are comparing numerous phenom ena; consequently, we can 
m ake sen se  of them pre-reflectively (or mindlessly). However, since this 
com parison takes place pre-reflectively, we usually can  not clarify what the 
e ssen ce  of each phenomenon is, although we know the essence experientially.
In other words, in order to elucidate the e ssen ce  of one phenomenon, conscious 
comparison is necessary. This conscious and system atic comparison is the task 
of this stage.
Particularly, Spiegelberg (1960/1982) suggests  two kinds of comparison in 
order to elucidate necessary conditlon(s) for something to show itself a s  a  
phenom enon. The first is comparison within the sam e phenomenon, while the 
second is comparison between a  phenomenon of interest and other different 
phenom ena. The first comparison exam ines an  "internal relations within one 
essence" (p. 699). For instance, comparing one chair to other different kinds of 
chairs applies to this process. By comparing num erous different kinds of chairs, 
the necessary  components which constitute a  chair regardless of the kind a re  
clarified. Spiegelberg (1960/1982) explains this p rocess illustrating "triangle" a s  
an  exam ple a s  following:
Thus, in the case of the triangle we shall have to determine whether three 
sides, three angles, and certain shapes and sizes of these sides and 
angles are necessary to them or required by the essence  "triangle," or 
whether they are merely compatible with it. Questions like the following 
would arise: Can a  triangle without these elem ents still be a triangle rather 
than another figure? Or would a  figure without them be an essential 
impossibility, since it would include incompatible ingredients? (p. 699-700)
In order to accomplish this task, Edmund Husserl suggested "free
imaginative variation" (fre/e Variation in der Phantasie) a s  a  specific operation. A
process of free imaginative variation is, as  Kramer and Mickunas (1992) contend,
a  thought experiment comparing imaginatively created  numerous kinds of the
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sam e phenomenon. Therefore, in essence, our past experiences of the 
phenomenon are actively employed a s  the source of information. A systematic 
procedure is indispensable for this task. The major goal is to clarify the nexus 
among com ponents within a phenom enon in its necessity, possibility, or 
impossibility revealed a s  a  consequence of the free imaginative variation. 
Therefore, the investigator first lists all kinds of potentially necessary  components 
which constitute the phenom enon of intercultural communication by imaginatively 
creating different kinds of intercultural communication. Second, he leaves off 
each  of the com ponents one by one completely or replaces each  of them with 
another component. As a  result, the two procedures allow the investigator to 
decide which elem ent is necessary and which one is not necessary  to constitute 
the phenomenon of intercultural communication. When an omission or 
substitution of one com ponent changes the ontic status m eant by the nam e of 
intercultural communication in an essential manner, the com ponent is a  
necessary  one to constitute the phenom enon of intercultural communication. On 
the other hand, when an omission or substitution does not change the ontic 
status of intercultural communication in an essential manner, the com ponent is 
not an essential elem ent for the phenom enon to appear a s  intercultural 
communication.
Finally, it is important to notice that this process, particularly the process of 
the free imaginative variation, requires caution and reservations since the 
investigator is bound to rely on his past experiences about intercultural 
communication alm ost entirely.
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(4) Challenging the investigator's prejudices about the ontic status of a  
phenomenon^. Although eidetic reduction h as  an outcome, it does not m ean it is
3 Spiegelberg (1982) offered two other steps (watching the mode of appearing and constituting a  
phenomenon in consciousness) between comparison and suspension. In this study, these two 
steps are omitted despite their significance, although watching the mode of appearing will be 
considered. Constitution is omitted since it can be considered another analysis by itself although 
it is interrelated with eidetic analysis. For the sake of convenience, the two procedures will be 
briefly explained.
Watching modes of aooearino. Phenomenology not only is concerned with what appears, but 
also is concerned with the way things appear a s  phenomena. People often experience 
phenomena in different ways. The way they come into contact with essences is a  fundamental 
aspect of determining what they are perceiving. Therefore, clarifying modes of givenness in a  
critical manner can considerably help clarify the question of direct or indirect verification.
Moreover, watching the modes of givenness might serve a  role similar to epoche, since 
investigating "how" something appears can avoid the preoccupation with "what" appears. 
Spiegelberg indicats there are at least three possibilities to clarify the mode of givenness. The 
first possibility is watching how an aspect (i.e.. a  side) of the whole is given with the synthetic 
whole. The wholeness of a  phenomenon is perceived through the side or aspect of a  given 
phenomenon. For instance, we recognize a  whole pencil by just perceiving the front of it. The 
moment we saw a  side of the pencil, we transparently see  the whole pencil. Watching 
perspective deformation is another possibility. For instance, any one of the appearing sides of a  
cube, except the side we are facing, is perspectively deformed, while the deformed side is 
transparent toward the square shape of the side of which it constitutes the perspective aspect. In 
other words, a s  Spiegelberg stats, "such perspectival deformations are the very m eans by which 
the identical size and shape of the object are maintained." (p. 704) While the above two 
possibilities regard the type of givenness, the third possibility is about the clarity (I.e., layers of 
clarity) of givenness. We may experience the sam e experience appearing with the sam e sides 
and in the same perspective yet very differently. More specifically, we may possibly experience 
the sam e phenomenon very differently because the phenomenon is given with very different 
degrees of clarity and distinctness. Investigating this aspect of the mode of givenness is 
particularly important in revealing our prejudices, since the clarity of givenness seem s to be 
connected with our (prejudiced) perception. Judging the degree of clarity of givenness is always 
already a  prejudiced judgment in one way or another.
Exploring the constitution of phenomena in consciousness. Constitution is a process by which 
things gradually appear in consciousness. In other words, constitution determines the way in 
which a  phenomenon establishes itself and takes shape in our consciousness. As Spiegelberg 
(1982) stats, "the purpose of such a  study is the determination of the typical structure of a 
constitution in consciousness by m eans of an analysis of the essential sequence of its steps." (p. 
706) The investigator must describe how things appear a s  a  phenomenon in his consciousness 
step by step, analyzing its sequence. It is important to remember that how things constitute 
themselves is a  process. As Stewart and Mickunas (1974/1990) mentioned, one cannot 
experience something by merely perceiving it. Rather, experiencing something requires "the 
synthesis of different phases of the experience such a s  perception, retention, expectation, 
memory, imagination, and so forth." (p. 44) They continue to argue that things gradually 
constitute themselves showing varied sides only in and through these different phases of 
experiences. Therefore, in this constitutional analysis, the investigator must describe all the 
modes (therefore, watching modes of appearing can be a  part of constitution) and activities of 
consciousness and the process of the merging perceptions of the things to which these  activities 
are correlated and directed. The process of constitution becomes more clear by this dual 
analysis.
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a final outcome. Eidetic reduction is an ongoing project, and like phenomenology 
itself is continuous in nature. Epoche as  suspending judgment (i.e., 
phenomenological reduction) p o ssesses  a  similar nature. Merleau-Ponty (1962) 
once stated; "The m ost important lesson which the (phenomenological) reduction 
teaches us is the impossibility of a  complete reduction" (xiv). As he mentioned,
"it is an  ever-renewed experim ent in making its own beginning" (p. xiv).
Therefore, before interpreting the meaning of a  phenomenon, the investigator 
once again attempts to su sp en d  what he discovered in his eidetic analysis by 
trying to reflect and clarify his prejudices manifested in his discovery. Such an 
attempt also reveals the limitation of the outcome the Investigator discovered 
through reduction.
(5) Interoretina concealed  m eanings. The final step in the 
phenomenological method is a  post-Husserlian addition influenced both by 
German philosophers such a s  Heidegger and G adam er, and French 
philosophers such a s  Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Ricoeur. An attempt to 
interpret the concealed m eaning or hidden "sense" of a  given phenom enon is 
called hermeneutics. Husserl did not explicitly mention this procedure. 
Nevertheless, hermeneutics is an extremely important process and is inseparable 
from phenomenology. As Spiegelberg (1982) contends: "the whole study of 
intentional structures consists largely in an interpretive analysis and description of 
the m eanings of our conscious acts" (p. 712). Phenomenology, particularly 
eidetic reduction, is always already directed to search  for the meaning of a  
phenomenon. Therefore, phenom enology is, critically speaking, always 
hermeneuticio.
lOsee Palmer's (1969) Hermeneutics for detailed information about hermeneutics.
79
The particular purpose of this step , on the other hand, is to interpret the 
meanings of a  phenom enon which are  not immediately manifest in description. 
For this reason, the investigator has to go beyond what is directly given in order 
to interpret concealed m eanings of a  phenom enon. Although this step  tends to 
become speculative and rely on the Investigator's insight in nature, deciphering 
concealed m eanings of a  phenom enon is indispensable, especially in the c a se  of 
investigating any  communication phenom enon. Communication phenom ena are 
always already directed to the process of meaning generation and interpretation. 
Demarcation
Just a s  the study delimited the domain of archaeological analysis, it also 
dem arcates the domain for the current eidetic analysis. The domain of eidetic 
analysis is neither intercultural communication a s  an academic field nor 
intercultural communication a s  an  academ ic curriculum. Rather, the study 
delimits the domain a s  "intercultural communication" a s  a phenom enon we 
directly experience "as such." Basic efforts to examine what "intercultural 
communication" is and to examine the necessary  conditions which constitute the 
ontic status in a  critical and systematic m anner have not been conducted. 
Therefore, the present eidetic analysis which relies on our direct experience a s  
the major source of analysis, delimits th e  domain as  "intercultural 
communication" a s  phenom ena we directly experience.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Theoretical Basis for This Study 
Before outlining the theoretical basis for this study, we look at "intercultural 
communication" in life, in other words, we go back to our direct experiences of 
intercultural communication in real life. How do w e experiene so called 
"intercultural communication?" It is important to go back to look at our direct 
experiences in reality, since a  theory is supposed to explain what is happening in 
reality, at least based  on an original meaning of theory.
When we recall our past experiences of intercultural communication, we 
might notice that the manner in which we experience intercultural communication 
varies. People experience intercultural communication differently. One person 
might engage in intercultural communication rationally by asking questions to his 
or her communication partner in order to understand the differences and 
similarities betw een him or her and the other party. The other person might 
experience intercultural communication rather irrationally and paradoxically by 
avoiding contacts despite curiosity. Yet another person might experience 
intercultural communication pre-rationally by rejecting or attacking others 
emotionally without thought. Different people experience intercultural 
communication in very diverse m anners. At the sam e time, people also 
experience different intercultural episodes very differently. People might even 
experience the sam e intercultural event very differently every time they 
experience it. This is so because people are complex and different from each  
other. Not only are people different from each  other, but people also change, just 
like each culture is different from each  other and each  culture is transforming a s
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time goes by. Therefore, people's experiences of intercultural communication are 
naturally very different and complex. One can intuitively verify this by recalling 
and analyzing all past intercultural communication experiences. Experiences of 
intercultural communication taking place in real life contain more complexity than 
the prior theories of intercultural communication attem pt to explain. More 
specifically, the diverse m anners of intercultural communication people 
experience has not yet been explained in an adequate  manner.
In order to explain this diversity, the investigator necessarily thinks about 
the m eaning of human diversity itself, since the differences in Intercultural 
communication experiences a re  derived from hum an differences. What does it 
m ean to say, "people are different" ? Some might attribute this to the notion of 
relativity. People are different from each other, since everything is relative. 
Likewise, people are all different because people are  relative too. This seem s to 
be half right and half wrong. While people are  different from each other, people 
are similar to each other. People are indispensably similar to some extent in 
term s of basic human similarities. People are different from each other to som e 
extent and  similar to each  other to som e extent a t the sam e time. People 
experience and make sen se  of the world in different ways, while sometim es 
people s e e  the world similarly, still understanding each  other. People are  not 
totally different from each  other, but they are relatively different. Som e are more 
rational than others, w hereas som e people are  more emotional than others. Yet, 
som e are more irrational than others.
Regardless of these  differences, everybody can  be rational, irrational, and 
pre-rational. In other words, while people experience things in a  diverse manner, 
they share the  basis of understandings. Jean  G ebser (1949/1985) called the
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basis of all kinds of sense-m aking activities "structures of aw areness." G ebser 
found people to be making sen se  of the world differently based  on different 
structures of aw areness. He also discovered that people experience the world in 
multiple m odes of aw areness. According to Gebser. the concrete manifestation 
and the specific function of each structure of aw areness are very different for 
different people and different cultural groups, while the different structures of 
consciousness are shared among different people and different cultures. G ebser 
also discovered there are a t least four structures of consciousness which bring 
about a  different way of sense-m aking activity. People are relatively different 
because of the relative number of the structures of human consciousness.
Therefore, different people experience intercultural communication 
differently because  their structures of consciousness work differently. They might 
experience intercultural communication differently because they experience it in 
multiple m odes of aw areness. People can  be rational, irrational, a s  well a s  pre- 
rational. Obviously, G ebser's theory of consciousness mutation allows for 
explaining the complex nature of intercultural communication comprehensively 
and realistically. It explains the manner by which different people experience 
intercultural communication differently, and the m anner by which the  sam e 
people experience intercultural communication differently, without presuming 
ideological and metaphysical speculations.
Therefore, this theory sen /es the original function of theory, which 
distinguishes reality from appearance, wisdom from opinions (or doxa), 
consequently accomplishing the practical efficacy Oieoria aims for, a s  Bernstein 
(1976) and H aberm as (1965/1968) point out. Applying this theory to explain the
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complexity of intercultural communication unveils the still hidden reality of 
intercultural communication in the  long run.
That is why this study em ploys G ebser’s theory of consciousness 
mutation. G ebser's theory of consciousness mutation explains the origin and the 
transformational process of intercultural communication a s  an academic study 
and accounts for why different people experience a  phenom enon of intercultural 
communication differently. It serves, therefore, a s  the major theoretical 
framework of archaeology (chapter 5) and of phenomenology (chapter 6).
This section clarifies the nature of G ebser's project in the beginning.
Then, a  theory of consciousness mutation is offered a s  a  specific theoretical 
basis  for this study. Finally, three structures of consciousness will be described 
for the theoretical framework for this project.
G ebser's Proiect.
Jean  G ebser (1905-1073) was born in Posen, P russia in 1905. What he 
did in his project was a  m assive work of comparative cultural-historical analysis of 
human civilization across different epochs and different cultures. His work is no 
doubt one of the greatest (maybe by far the greatest) comparative cultural 
analysis in term s of its scope, complexity, and depth.
The scope of his work is unbelievably wide. He investigated a  diverse 
range of cultural creations including poetry, music, painting, architecture, 
language, literature, science, philosophy, and ways of thinking regardless of the 
kind. What he investigated w as not only the content of each  cultural creation, but 
also the form of manifestation of the artifact. G ebser called any artifacts hum ans 
created "civilizational expression." For Gebser, every cultural creation expresses 
something. As Shimode (1975) contends, cultural artifacts a re  not mere lifeless
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objects, but the concrete manifestation of the creator's consciousness. Any 
cultural phenom ena, regardless of the  kind, signify and express certain structures 
of the creator's consciousness. This is "civilizational expression." Any 
civilizational expressions (i.e., cultural creations, cultural artifacts) are forms of 
expression which are the concrete manifestation of certain consciousness 
structures. In this sense, G ebser's project w as a  cultural-historical investigation 
of civilizational expressions across different epochs and different civilizations and 
cultures.
G ebser's project presumed phenomenology, particularly Husserl's 
nonmetaphysical phenomenology. G ebser se t aside metaphysics and just 
followed the clues discovered am ong a  variety of civilizational expressions (i.e., 
cultural creations and phenomena). His method of analysis was very similar to 
the eidetic analysis Husserl proposed. G ebser compared and contrasted diverse 
cultural creations (e.g., forms of thought, writings, paintings, language, e tcetera) 
in terms of the form of manifestation of each  creation. Then, he eliminated what 
w as accidental and unessential through comparison. Through the process of 
comparative elimination, he delineated five structures of consciousness a s  an 
outcome of the reduction. Throughout th e  process, G ebser described and 
compared diverse domains of cultural artifacts without presupposing 
metaphysical speculations. His findings are  not based  on abstracted 
speculations, but a re  based purely on a  vast am ount of concrete evidence. What 
m ade his project rigorous is revealed through the way he conducted his 
investigation. In other words, his non-metaphysical phenomenological attitude 
m akes his investigation very convincing.
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In the end. the vast amount of evidence in G ebser's investigation 
dem onstrats the correlation among diverse civilizational expressions and their 
correlative consciousness structures. His investigation also dem onstrats, to 
G ebser's own surprise, that vast periodic transformations of th e  structures of 
human aw areness took place across the history of human civilizations. His 
investigation suggests "such mutations not only yield novel structures of 
aw areness but also integrate and position other m odes of aw areness within the 
requirements of the currently predominant structure (whenever that may be).” 
(Kramer & Mickunas, 1992, p. xii) "Past" m odes of aw areness still continue to 
serve a dominant role in the current modernity. People are living in the world in 
multiple modes of aw areness including "past" modes. The process of human 
consciousness mutation is always "plus-mutation" rather than "minus-mutation." 
This is a  theory G ebser proposed in his monumental work. Ever Present Origin 
(1949/1985). The next section clarifies a  theory of consciousness mutation 
(specifically called a  theory of "plus-mutation") which serves a s  a  theoretical 
basis for the present study.
A Theory of Plus-Mutation
Gebser, based on his comparative cultural phenomenology, discovered 
that human civilization experienced periodic transformations of human 
consciousness structures across different historical epochs and different cultures. 
W hat Gebser found interesting from his investigation was that "past" m odes of 
human consciousness were presum ed rather than destroyed or going extinct. 
This phenomenon G ebser called the process of "plus-mutation" which is an 
alternative to the Darwinian notion of "minus-mutation."
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Minus-mutation is biological, restrictive, and deterministic. It presupposes 
linear progress and, consequently, it negates an old and deficient existence for 
the sake of stronger new existence. When a  new mutation occurs, a  new 
existence em erges and an old existence becom es extinct. Darwin's Origin of 
Species argued this, contending that the evolution of species presupposed 
deterministic, linear, and biological changes from deficient species to stronger 
ones for the sake  of survival.
On the other hand, "plus-mutation" is phenomenological and 
overdeterministic. G ebser mentions that "consciousness structure, by contrast, 
unfolds toward overdetermination; toward structural enrichment and dimensional 
increment; it is intensifying and inductive— plus-mutation." (p.38) Hidden 
potentialities, which have been presen t since origin, suddenly em erge and are 
recognized and integrated, forming a  new consciousness. As a  consequence, all 
hidden potentialities becom e transparent and ever-present. Origin is ever­
present. Kramer and Ikeda (1994), based  G ebser's theory of plus-mutation, 
contend that "the previous structure remains so that the new is not an entirely 
new species but an additional variant." (p.27) Therefore, the "past" modes of 
aw areness still serve a  dominant role in our present times. Each mode of 
aw areness serves a  different role, while the "present" mode of aw areness serves 
a  predominant role in our "present" time. Likewise, even when the "present" 
mode of consciousness mutates toward a "new" mode of consciousness, the 
existence d o es not cease, but serv es a s  a  prerequisite. As Kramer and Ikeda 
(1994) contend, "all new developm ents [mutation] are integrated into the 
'previous' structure and even rely on the old as  a  prerequisite being." (p.27) In 
other words, new consciousness mutation serves to revitalize previously deficient
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consciousness through plus-mutation, which is a  p rocess of enrichment. G ebser 
delineated five structures of consciousness based  on his investigations, which 
are archaic, magic, mythic, perspectival, and integral.
Three Structures of Human Consciousness
Although G ebser delineated five m odes of aw areness, the archaic 
structure and the integral structure are not explained in this section. The archaic 
structure does not have m uch correlative evidence, while integral structure is a  
still potentially emerging structure which has not yet com e to our aw areness in a  
solid form. In any case , modernity belongs to the perspectival world in that 
perspectival consciousness is a  predominant structure, while both magic and 
mythic structures still function in their own way. T hese three structures of 
aw areness will serve a s  the major theoretical framework for this study. Different 
structures of aw areness correlate with the different ways people experience 
intercultural communication. Each structure of aw areness is distinguishable in 
terms of its own way of perceiving space, time, and self-identity. The next 
section describes th ese  three different kinds of structures of aw areness; the o n e ­
dimensional pre-perspectival magic-prerational structure; the two-dimensional 
unperspectival mythic-irrational structure; and the three-dimensional perspectival 
mental-rational structure. Each structure is explained in terms of its own way of 
perceiving space, time and self-identity.
The one-dimensional pre-oersoectival maoic-orerational structure. The 
representational symbol of one-dimensional magic aw areness is the "point." The 
point suggests an expression of the spaceless and tim eless one-dimensionality of 
the consciousness. G ebser (1949/1985) argued: "Because of this spaceless- 
tim eless unity, every 'point' (a thing, event, or action) can be interchanged with
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another 'point,' Independently of time and place (like the hunting scene) and of 
any rational causal connection." (p. 48) Every point is identical with every other 
point. One can  replace the other completely. There is no dissociation between 
each point. Moreover, each point is identical with the whole, since there is no 
dissociation betw een the part and the whole. Therefore, each  point can possess 
vitality and power magically. Each point takes over the power of the whole. The 
very term "magic" correlates to "make," "machine," "Macht (might/power-German 
term)," and "Moegen (want-G erm an term) " a s  G ebser (1949/1985) and Kramer 
and Mickunas (1992) pointed out. Magic is essentially making things happen out 
of nothing. Magic is the vital want which is a  source of will to m aster and control, 
and desire to obtain power. Magic is striving for power. In this respect, any kind 
of technology is magic including m odern materialistic magic. Every making is 
essentially magic.
In terms of the issue of identity, in the magic aw areness, one can even 
become others, because  there is neither "you" nor "I" since there is no symbolic 
distance betw een them. Therefore, in magic aw areness, there is no personal 
identity. Only group-ego or tribal and communal identity exists. Even in our 
current modernity, we experience this magic aw areness once in a  while. For 
instance, during every football season , som e of us go to the stadium to see  a  
football game. While we are watching the gam e in the stadium with other fans, 
we experience this magic aw areness. We identify with the gam e and with other 
fans. We get emotional since we are emotionally and pre-rationally involved in 
the game. The magic aw areness is pre-rational and emotional in nature. If the 
home team wins, we feel good, b ecau se  it m eans we won. We want the home 
team to win b ecau se  we are a part of it. There is a  vital want. We (a part) are, in
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a  sense, identical with the team  (a whole) during the gam e. There is no symbolic 
distance betw een us and the team . During the gam e, there is no "I" or "you." We 
identify with other fans and the gam e as, for example, "Oklahoma University" or 
"OU" in a  point-for-point manner. Only a  group-ego, an  Oil identity in this case, 
exists during the ball game. We, as  OU group-ego, strives for power by winning. 
When OU wins, we possess  the power. During the ball-game, everything we 
experience is the OU ball-game magically and pre-rationally. The world except 
the ball gam e magically d isappears during the ball-game.
The magic aw areness happens to a  good actor when he is acting. In fact, 
when he is acting, he is not acting any more, but becoming the role. During the 
play, there is no symbolic difference between him and the role. As Kramer and 
Mickunas (1992) illustrate, "Richard Burton disappears and Hamlet appears" (p. 
xviii). The actor, Richard Burton, becom es Hamlet during the play. He w as 
magically identical with Hamlet at that moment. He is making Hamlet by being 
him. As a  result, he takes over the power magically without reason because he is 
Hamlet during the play.
We also experience the magic aw areness in intercultural experiences. 
When people stay in other cultures, they sometimes experience the so-called 
"honeymoon" s tage—particularly early in their stay. W hen people experience this 
"honeymoon" stage, they experience this in the magic m ode of awareness. 
Whatever they experience, they magically, pre-rationally and  emotionally connect 
each event with other events regardless of the content, with point-like 
identification a s  "sweet honeymoon." For them, everything they experience is 
vital and identical with "honeymoon" experience. For instance, when they 
experience this "honeymoon" in the US, every event they experience is identical
90
with the US. which is identical with honeymoon. Each event and each  person 
they encounter is pre-rationally identical with the US. Each event and each 
person they m eet does not symbolize the US. Each event and each person they 
m eet is magically America when they are experiencing magic consciousness. 
Each point, regardless of the event or person, has a  vital and magic power which 
is identical with America itself. There is no symbolic distance between each 
event, person, and the US. The opposite magic experience is culture shock. 
When people experience culture shock, everything they experience, regardless of 
the kind, is a  shock experience. They emotionally and magically identify each 
event with every other event or person they encounter through a  point-for-point 
identification without any rational thinking. G ebser (1949/1985) described magic 
in this respect as  "doing without knowing." (p. 60) Therefore, the magic 
aw areness Is always pre-rational.
The two-dimensional ambivalent mvthic-irrational structure. The second 
structure is the mythic mode of aw areness. Its representational symbol is 
"circle," which indicates a  dynamic m ovem ent of polarity, while that of the magic 
aw areness w as "point." One-dimensional point becom es two-dimensional circle 
with polarity a s  its characteristic. While the magic aw areness Identifies every 
vital event with every other vital event in a  point-for-point manner, the mythic 
mode of aw areness relates events in a  polar manner. Kramer and Mickunas 
(1992) described the mythic aw areness a s  follows:
—polarity m eans the dynamic m ovem ent of one event, image, or feeling 
that provokes, attacks, and requires ano ther event. The appearance of 
the sky is also the appearance of its polar aspect, the earth; the 
appearance of love is likewise the appearance  of hate, while the 
appearance of high, dem ands the polar p resence of the low. One is 
never given without the other, and one  m ay replace the other. Thus, 
gods and  dem ons may exchange their positions through various deeds.
(p. xix)
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The mythic events are not taking place in a  dualistic manner, but 
ambivalently, polarly, or complementary taking place. Each event is relating to 
each other in a  polar, ambivalent, or com plem entary manner rather than relating 
to each other in an  abstracted, arbitrary, and  dualistic manner. When there is 
one, there is always another half just like men and women, and Chinese yin and 
yang. G ebser argued the very term "myth” itself indicates an ambivalent nature. 
He described this ambivalent nature of the  word "myth" by investigating its 
etymology a s  following;
The corresponding verb for mythos is mytheomai, meaning 
"to discourse, talk, speak"; its root, mu-, m eans "to sound." But another 
verb of the sam e  root, myein- am bivalent because  of the substitution of a  
short "u"-means "to close," specifically to close the eyes, the mouth, and 
wounds. From this root we have Sanskrit mukas (with long vowel), 
meaning "mute, silent," and Latin mutus with the sam e meaning. It recurs 
in G reek in the words mystes, "the consecrated," and mysterion, 
"mysterium," and later during the Christian era, gave the characteristic 
stamp to the concept of mysticism: speech less  contemplation with closed 
eyes, that is, eyes turned inward, (p. 65)
G ebser contended that these contradictory meanings are not actually 
contradictory, but indicated the ambivalent nature of the mythic structure. It 
becom es contradictory only from a  rational standpoint. From an ambivalent and 
mythic standpoint, there is no contradiction. "Myth" is essentially and originally 
polar and am bivalent in natureT A word (or speech  or talking) and silence do not 
contradict, rather they complement each other. G ebser indicated, "the word is 
always a  mirror of inner silence." (p. 67)
In terms of the  self-identity, in the mythic aw areness, we becom e 
conscious of ourselves in reflection. It is like we s e e  ourselves in a  mirror and
T it is important to emphasize the "mythic" structure has little to do with "storytelling or fables, 
although stories and fables usually manifest the ways, images, sayings, and human relations in 
which the mythological structure appears." (Kramer & Mickunas. 1992. p. xix)
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becom es conscious of ourselves symbolically with imagination. An important 
point is we only identify ourselves in reflection^ in the mythical mode of 
aw areness. For instance, when a  Mexican male se e s  his national flag, he 
becom es conscious of his national identity in the Mexican flag a s  a  symbol of 
Mexico in a  reflective manner. It is important to notice that in this case he and 
the Mexican flag are  not exactly identical. Since the flag stands in for Mexico, 
there is a  symbolic distance betw een the flag and Mexico. Although we s e e  our 
national identity in our national flag a s  a  symbol of our nation, the way of 
identification is not the one of point-for-point identification, but the one of 
ambivalent and polar identification.
For another example, som e of us might believe in God. This belief or 
speculation is based  on the mythic aw areness. In a  sense, people needed the 
God so that they can be conscious of them selves through the reflection of the  
God mythically and ambivalently. In this case, people see  them selves in the 
God. People needed  the God in order to secure their position. Although there  is 
a  symbolic difference between the two existences, people identify them selves 
symbolically, ambivalently, and polarly a s  the offspring of God. People see  
themselves a s  a  reflection of God in the mythic aw areness.
Similarly, som e athletes perform in the mythical mode of aw areness. 
Marathon runners, for instance, run to challenge them selves. They find 
them selves through running, a s  a  reflection of themselves. Aging basketball 
players Michael Jordan and Magic Johnson  returned to basketball after retiring 
from the sport. Both of them cam e back in the mythic mode of aw areness. Both
2. This reflective nature of the mythic consciousness also implies the imaginatory nature of the  
consciousness. Gebser (1985) contended the  mythic structure has an imaginatory 
consciousness, reflected in the imaginastic nature of myth and responsive to the soui and sky of 
the ancient cosmos.
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of them, in fact, lacked any rational reasons for coming back. Jordan had proven 
his suprem acy by winning several championship titles. Johnson, at another 
extreme, was stricken with a  deadly d isease . Both of them, in the mythical 
aw areness mode had com e out of retirement to find, prove, and secure their soul 
and identity again by being basketball players. They could becom e conscious of 
their symbolic Identity and  soul through returning to basketball. The decisions 
w ere not rational, but Irrational In nature.
Therefore, the mythic aw areness Is not rational In nature, since the 
aw areness presum es am bivalence and polarity. W hen we engage In Intercultural 
communication, we som etim es experience Intercultural communication In the 
mythical mode of aw areness. For Instance, people avoid Intercultural 
communication despite their curiosity. They are curious about the event. At the 
sam e time, they are anxious Imagining the unsuccessful Interactions (e.g., being 
misunderstood by the other). Therefore, they avoid the event for ambivalent and 
paradoxical reasons. It is not rational to avoid the communication, but they 
mythically avoid the Interaction. Intercultural communication can be experienced 
In the mythic mode of aw areness. For example. It Is easy  to Imagine a  situation 
where a  noisy neighbor c rea tes  inner conflict or ambivalence. Som ebody from 
Jap an  might experience this ambivalence. On one hand, he might want to ask 
the noisy neighbor to be more quiet. On the other hand, he might not want to 
create a  potential conflict; therefore, he just Irrationally keeps being patient. In 
this case, the Japanese  experience this Incident In the mythlc-amblvalent mode 
of consciousness.
The three dimensional oersoectlval mental-rational structure. Perspectlval 
consciousness, which has been  part of modernity since the fifteenth century
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R enaissance era. is characterized a s  spatial aw areness and emergence of ego, 
which makes it (spatial aw areness) possible. G ebser mentions the way of 
perceiving sp ace  in perspectival consciousness: "the basic concern of 
perspective, which it achieves, is to 'look through' sp ace  and thereby to perceive
and grasp space  rationally  It is a  'seeing through' of space  and thus a
coming to aw areness of space (p. 19)." Likewise, about the way of perceiving 
self-identity, he s ta tes  that "besides illuminating space, perspective brings it to 
man's aw areness and lends man his own visibility of himself (p. 18)." Namely, 
the em ergence of "I" identity was n ecessary  in order to make perspectival man 
an observer of sp ace  and thus able to grasp space rationally and objectively. 
Perspective "locates the observer a s  well a s  the observed (p. 19)." For G ebser. 
the positive result is "a concretion of m an and space" (p. 18). while the negative 
result is "the restriction of man to a  limited segm ent where he perceives only one 
sector of reality (p. 18)." Perspective, in other words, not only allows hum ans to 
strive for various kinds of material power, but also allows human to engage In "a 
process of establishing and systematization of the external world (p. 18)." The 
history of the "frontier" in the United S tates is a  good exam ple of successful 
spatial exploration and exploitation derived from perspectival consciousness.
Deficient s ta te  of perspectival consciousness. However, as the desire for 
both spatial expansion and the resultant power becom es extreme, the weak side 
of perspectival consciousness also becom es evident. It not only leads to 
confined human vision in a  fixed single reality, but also leads to anxiety about 
time which implies the end of perspectival world. G ebser contends as  follows:
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As we approach the decline of the perspectival age, it is our anxiety 
about time that stands out as  the dominant characteristic alongside our 
ever more absurd obsession with space. It m anifests itself in various 
ways, such a s  in our addiction to time. Everyone is out to "gain time," 
although the time gained is usually the wrong kind: time that is 
transformed into a  visible multiplication of spatially fragm ented 'activity,' 
or time that one has 'to kill.' " (p. 22)
The addiction to both time and sp ace  characterizes the recent late- 
modernity (i.e., the deficient perspectival age). Particularly, addiction to time 
seem s to transform into social values of efficiency and convenience which are 
predominantly accepted in modernity. Efficiency is, in a  sen se , an attempt to 
spatialize time so that it can be quantified and m easured objectively. It is, 
essentially, a  pursuit of accomplishment with minimum time. Although the value 
of efficiency is practically important in modernity, G ebser views the perception of 
time a s  false and not valid in its own right. He continues to s ta te  that this spatial 
attachment (of time) prevents contemporary man from finding an escap e  from 
spatial captivity. Although the accomplishment of spatializing time (e.g., 
accomplishment of efficiency and convenience) expanded m an’s horizons, it 
m ade perspectival m an's world "increasingly narrow a s  his vision w as sectorized 
by the blinders of the perspectival world view." (p.23) G ebser implies that the 
addiction to time and sp ace  (i.e., hypertrophy of perspectival consciousness) is 
an indication that we are  reaching the decline of the perspectival age. It is an 
obvious indication of the decline of the consciousness structure when it c reates 
the condition which destroys itself and consequently m akes it deficient and self­
destructive. Kramer and Ikeda (1994) dem onstrate a  devastating consequence 
of deficient perspectival consciousness prevalent in late modern American 
society by explaining the "freeze" case  of Yoshi Hattori in 1992. They concluded
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that late modern ego-hypertrophy, which Indicates the deficient perspectival 
consciousness, might have cau sed  the Hattori tragedy. According to Gebser, 
w hen the consciousness structure/world becom es obviously deficient, mutation 
toward new consciousness Structure/World occurs in order to retain viability. At a  
minimum, phenom ena of deficient consciousness imply the transition from the old 
to new consciousness mutation.
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CHAPTER FIVE
An Archaeology of Intercultural Communication a s  an Independent Field: 
The Origin and its Transformation
If intercultural communication refers to deliberate interactions betw een 
people from different cultures with certain motives, the history of intercultural 
communication is as  long a s  the history of human civilization. Since the  dawn 
of hum an civilization, people have been interacting with each other with various 
motives such as  political (e.g., diplomacy}, religious (e.g., missionary), or 
commercial (e.g., trade) reasons. The point is that people have been making a  
conscious effort to interact and learn about each other (e.g., learning different 
languages and customs) throughout the history of human civilization. Clarifying 
the origin of intercultural communication is, thus, the attempt to unveil the  history 
of hum an civilization and various forms of human activity (e.g., diplomatic 
activity, missionary activity, trading activity, e t cetera). Such an attempt is, no 
doubt, beyond the scope of this dissertation, although acknowledging such 
"intercultural" activities throughout the history of human civilization is very 
important^ (See Appendix).
Therefore, this dissertation limits the scope in an  attempt to unveil the 
original motive which m ade intercultural communication an in d ep en d en t
Tit is also important to acknowledge because what "intercultural scholars" have been doing is 
neither original nor new. People have been making a  conscious effort to learn (just like a  modern 
anthropologist) and explore new world and different cultures throughout human history, in a  way, 
intercultural communication a s  a  field already owes a  lot to these  people (e.g., monks, 
missionaries, diplomats, em issanes. ambassadors, traders, explorers, to name a  few) and their 
activities. In this sense, acknowledging such "historical intercultural" activities is important. See 
Appendix for this acknowledgment.
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area of acad em ic s tu d ie s  cu ltivated  in the United S tates ^ This 
attempt is similar to investigating the origin of sociology. Like other a reas of 
academ ic studies (e.g., sociology, anthropology, econom ics etc.), it is difficult to 
imagine that intercultural communication was accidentally established without 
any motives or interests. Rather it w as established with certain motives and 
interests. Therefore, this chapter takes account of such original motives and 
interests. The task is necessary  because  current intercultural scholars presum e 
such original motives and interests in one way or another. As Jean  G ebser 
(1949/1985) indicated, origin is ever-present, although such original motives 
and interests have never been  questioned. Because the original motives and 
interests are revealed when they are  situated^ in the corresponding historical 
context, this chapter tries to clarify in what historical context, why, how, and by 
whom did intercultural communication com e into existence as  an independent 
area of academ ic study.
While it is indispensable to unveil the origin of intercultural 
communication, it is also necessary  to examine the process of transformation of 
intercultural communication. S ince intercultural communication has a  history, it 
might be constituted of multiple layers of meanings, which are the consequence 
of historical sedimentation, while the origin is ever present. Therefore, after 
revealing the origin of intercultural communication, the transformation of 
intercultural communication (i.e., a  text) m ust be traced. Since the
2.ln this chapter, from now on, the term "intercultural communication" refers to intercultural 
communication a s  an independent area  of academic studies which was cultivated in the United 
States.
3.Since a  text and a  context are coconstituting, understanding the meaning of a  text necessitates 
its corresponding context. Put otherwise, understanding the meaning of a  text by situating it in 
the corresponding context is indispensable. Therefore, by putting intercultural communication in 
the original historical context where it w as originally established as  such, the meaning and the 
original motives of intercultural communication may be revealed.
9 9
corresponding transformation of soclo-cultural-historical context m ust also be 
considered, the investigation is necessarily archeological'^ in nature.
This chapter carries out the archaeological historical investigation of 
intercultural communication by following the s tep s  explained in the method 
section;
1. Unveiling the  origin of intercultural communication
A. Identifying the historical context where intercultural communication was 
originally established (i.e., Identifying the context where the text originally 
appeared);
B. Clarifying the meaning of the historical context where intercultural 
communication originally took place (i.e., clarifying the meaning of the context 
where the text was originally situated);
C. Unveiling the meaning of intercultural communication (i.e., interpreting the 
meaning of the text situated in the context);
D. Deciphering the presuppositions em bedded in the original meaning of 
intercultural communication (i.e., deciphering th e  presuppositions em bedded in 
the original meaning of the text);
2. Clarifying the m eaning transformation of intercultural communication
A. Identifying the shift of historical context;
B. Interpreting the hidden m eaning of intercultural communication by situating it 
in the shifted historical context (i.e.. Interpreting th e  meaning of the text by 
situating it in the shifted context;
'^.The history of intercultural communication is not like a  layer cake. A cake may have many layers 
and as 1 add icing the previous layers remain essentially unchanged. Instead the history of 
intercultural communication is like layers of rock whereby as  upper layers are added they cause 
heat and pressure which change the essential nature of the earlier layers making coal, diamond, et 
cetera. The point is each layer of the history of intercultural communication changes as each new 
layer is added reinterpreting the past as  "past." as  “out-of-date." as "obsolete." etc. The current 
"pressure" or "layer," therefore, changes the earlier layer of intercultural communication.
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c. Unveiling the implications of the meaning-transformation of intercultural 
communication;
Unveiling the Origin of Intercultural Communication 
This section attem pts to unfold the origin of intercultural communication 
follows the steps mentioned on the above. While this section basically following 
the steps, it also attem pts to clarify the specific p rocess of the appearance of 
intercultural communication before unveiling the original motive of intercultural 
communication (i.e., 1-B). Clarifying the specific process by putting the 
phenom enon into the specific background context (i.e., the US Foreign Service 
Institute) helps us to interpret the meaning of intercultural communication. 
Therefore, the  task follows the following modified steps:
1-A. Identifying the historical context where intercultural communication 
originally took place (i.e., identifying the context w here the text originally 
appeared);
1-B. Clarifying the meaning of the historical context where intercultural 
communication originally took place (i.e., clarifying the meaning of the context 
where the text was originally situated);
1-C. Clarifying the specific p rocess of the appearance of intercultural 
communication (i.e., clarifying the specific p rocess which a  text originally 
appeared)
1-D. Unveiling the meaning of intercultural communication (i.e., interpreting the 
meaning of the text situated in the context);
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1-E. Deciphering the presuppositions em bedded in the original meaning of 
intercultural communication (i.e., deciphering the presuppositions em bedded in 
the original meaning of the text);
1-A. Identifying the Original Historical Context W here "Intercultural 
Communication" Originally Appeared
As many (Leeds-Hurwitz, 1990) have implied, intercultural 
communication is a  rather recently established independent a rea  of academ ic 
studies cultivated in the  United States. Before the 1940s, the phrase 
"intercultural communication" did not appear to be employed by laymen. It was 
not popular enough am ong scholars to m ake an independent academ ic field.
While such scholars argue that the historical epoch "intercultural 
communication" is established, such prejudgment is suspended  in this stage  
(regardless of its being valid or not). As a  starting point, therefore, we search for 
the historical epoch in which the phrase "intercultural communication" is born. 
More specifically, we w ant to know when the phrase "intercultural 
communication" w as created, accepted, and employed a s  a  common phrase.
A Short Dictionarv Analvsis of the Word "Intercultural". As people are 
born, live, and change throughout life, words are  also born, live, and change. A 
word has its life and its history. Of "intercultural" and "communication," the 
crucial word is "intercultural." As the phrase indicates, "intercultural 
communication" is a  specific form and area  of communication among other 
forms and areas. The history of the phrase "intercultural communication" relies 
on the history of the word, "intercultural."
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"Intercultural" does not seem  to have a  long history, although 
"communication" and "culture" have a  history of m ore than five hundred years^. 
"Intercultural" a s  we know it does not appear in any English dictionaries before 
the 1960s. W ebster's Third New international Dictionarv of the English 
Language (1966) seem s to be the first English with the word "intercultural."
More interestingly, many of the English dictionaries treated the word 
’intercultural" a s  having a totally different meaning. The Second Edition of 
W ebster's New International Dictionary of the English Language (1944), for 
instance, indicates "intercultural" is "(Agrl.) a. cu ltivated , a s  a crop, 
between th e  rows of so m e other crop. b. pertaining to or 
d esign atin g  a system  of tillage in which the so il is stirred while the  
plant Is grow ing, a s  with any h oed  crop. " (p. 1293) The New "Standard" 
Dictionarv of the English Language (19491. Oxford English Dictionarv 
(1933/1961), and A New English Dictionarv (1901) treated "intercultural" the 
sam e way. The word "intercultural" w as considered a  highly specialized 
agricu ltural term before 1960s. Other major dictionaries, such as  the first 
edition of W ebster's New World Dictionarv of the American Language (1951), 
the first edition of The American Heritage Dictionarv of the English Language 
(1969), and the first edition of the Random House Dictionarv of the English 
Language (1973) did not even have the word "intercultural" until newer editions 
came into existence. The third edition of W ebster's New International Dictionarv 
(1966) added "existing betw een or relating to tw o or more cultures" (p. 
1177) a s  the third meaning of the word "intercultural." "Intercultural contact".
&The Random House Dictionary of the English Language: Second Edition (1983), for instance, 
suggested the origin of "communication" is around the fifteenth century, while that of "culture" is 
around the fourteenth century.
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"intercultural tension" and "intercultural education" are  the three exam ples in 
W ebster's third edition. This implies that the word "intercultural" that w e are 
familiar with becam e recognizable and w as adopted  a s  a  word in the dictionary 
between 1944 (the second edition of W ebster's New International Dictionarv) 
and 1966 (the third edition of W ebster's New International Dictionary). It seem s 
to indicate that the word "intercultural" (as in "intercultural communication") is a  
post-war concept® under post-war post colonial e ra  when 100 new nations were 
born. Let's look a t other major dictionaries.
W ebster's New World Dictionarv of the American Language a dopted 
"intercultural" a s  "between or am ong p eo p le  o f different cultures" (p. 
734) in its second college edition (1970) for the  first time. Here, the agricultural 
"intercultural" does not exist. The Oxford English Dictionarv treated 
"intercultural" a s  an  agricultural term in its first edition (1933. reprinted in 1961), 
while volume II of A Supplem ent to the Oxford English Dictionarv (1976) 
terminated the agricultural meaning, replacing it a s  others did. The Random 
House Dictionarv of the English Language (the first edition In 1967, the second 
edition in 1987) and  The American Heritage Dictionarv of the English Language 
(the first edition in 1969, the 2nd in 1982, the 3rd in 1992), on the other hand, 
did not adopt "intercultural" until the 1980sT
While the word "intercultural" (as in "intercultural communication") began 
to appear in English dictionaries after the late 1960s, two of the dictionaries
® World War II gave rise to a  new International consciousness, which was reflected in the League 
of Nations and the United Nations. Before this new consciousness, for instance. European 
colonizers did not see  Indian tribes as  being "nations." They were more or less viewed a s  
wilderness to be tamed.
7.1he Random House Dictionarv of the English Language: Second Edition (19871 defined 
"intercultural” as "pertaining to or taking place between two or more cultures, 
~exchange in music and art" (p. 993). while The American Heritage Dictionarv of the English 
Language: Third Edition (19921 defined "intercultural"" a s  of. relating to, involving, or 
representing different cultures, ~marriage, ~ exchange in the arts." (p. 940)
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suggested the origin of the word. The second edition of Random House 
Dictionarv (1987) indicated the origin of the word was around 1935-1940 (p. 
993, no specific reference). A supplem ent to the Oxford English Dictionarv 
(1976, Vol. II), on the  other hand, implied the origin of "intercultural" a s  1937 
(with references^).
Although the first recognized use  of "intercultural" might be during the 
World War II period, the word "intercultural" a s  in "intercultural communication" 
becam e a  noticeable phenom enon after the post-war period. It seem s to be the 
late 1960s or 1970s when "intercultural" becam e a  common word^. The word 
"intercultural" did not show up in any English dictionaries until the late 1960s. 
This suggests that people were not aw are of "intercultural" phenom ena a s  
reflectively identified phenom ena until the post-war period.
Correlation to the secondary sou rces. "Intercultural communication" 
seem s to be widely accepted  during the post-World War II period. This 
argument correlates with scholars' views of Edward T. Hall a s  a  crucial figure in 
the field of intercultural communication.
As many (Condon, 1981; Dodd, 1982; Gudykunst, 1985, 1988; Klopf, 
1987; Leeds-Hurwitz, 1990; Rogers, 1994; Singer, 1987) have suggested, a 
starting point for "intercultural communication" as  a  them e of study is Edward T. 
Hall’s (1959) "Silent Language." As Leeds-Hurwitz (1990) points out, although
8 There were three references: "1937 Theology XXXV. 347 Our present consideration of 
intercultural contacts. 1955 Sci. Amer. Apr. 84/2 In the interest of intercultural understanding 
various U.S. Government agencies have hired anthropologists. 1972 Ibid. Nov. 82/1 If pictorial 
recognition is universal, do pictures offer us a  lingua franca for intercultural communication?" (p. 
327)
3.Even though the two dictionaries suggested that the original use of "intercultural" was around 
1935-1940, all English dictionaries published after 1940 until 1966 did not treat "intercultural" as 
in "intercultural communication," or did not even have the word in the dictionaries. That is why it 
seem s reasonable to think of "intercultural" a s  a  post-war phenomenon. However, the validity of 
this argument is still pending until the use of "intercultural" in other foreign languages is 
investigated.
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Hall w as not the first person  who employed the te rm jo  many (Condon, 1981 ; 
Dodd, 1982; Gudykunst, 1985, 1988; Klopf, 1987; Leeds-Hunwitz, 1990; Rogers, 
1994; Singer, 1987) credit Hall a s  the father of intercultural communication. 
More specifically, Hall s e e m s  to be the first person who "problematized" and 
repeatedly employed the  term  a s  we know it now. Certain historical context 
motivated him to be able to problematize the phenom enon of intercultural 
communication. As Leeds-Hurwitz (1990), based  on her (traditional) historical 
analysis of the origin of intercultural communication, argued, the Foreign 
Service Institute of the US Department of S tate (where Hall w as an officer 
during 1951-1955) that w as established right after the World War 11 seem s to be 
a  background context for th e  em ergence of intercultural communication. Her 
biographic analysis confirms that the post-war context appears to correlate with 
the birth of intercultural communication as  an independent academic institution. 
The next section clarifies th e  relationship between the historical context and the 
birth of intercultural communication.
1-B. Clarifying the Meaning of the Post-War Historical Context Where 
Intercultural Communication w as Originally Established
While the historical change  due to the impact of the World War 11 was 
very complex and can not b e  easily illustrated, a  crucial historical change 
obviously took place. This is evident from the world map before World War 11 
and the world map after World War 11. The crucial difference between the two 
world m aps is the em ergence of decolonized nations (see  Roberts' (1995) 
world map, p. 546, for instance). Before World War 11, there were no
0. Leeds-Hurwitz suggests Ruth Benedict (1941) used the term before Hail. She also points out 
"in his earlier writings Hall used several vanants of the phrase ("intercultural tensions" and "inter­
cultural problems" in Hall ( 1950) clearly refer to the same topic) (p. 275)
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independent nations in the African continent and very few in Asia. On the other 
hand, there were many em ergent independent nations in Asia between the end 
of World W ar II and the early 1950s, while many African nations becam e 
independent during 1960s. This century is, in a  sense, a  story of struggles for 
independence (e.g., Viet Nam, South Africa, India, Congo, Taiwan, Korea,
China, e t cetera).
The crucial historical change after the post-World W ar II period is the end 
of colonialism, especially the end of European colonialism and the 
consequential em ergence of the independent nations. Concerning this change, 
Roberts (1995) states:
The m ost revolutionary change in world politics after 1945 was the end of 
European empires. At the end  of the war, the British, French, Dutch, 
Portuguese, and Belgian em pires were still there (the Italian disappeared 
betw een 1941 and 1943). Thirty years later, Europeans ruled less of the 
world than they had done even  four centuries earlier. The confusion and 
tensions of the process of dismantling empire were bound to make heavy 
dem ands on those who had to m anage it, and presented huge potential 
dangers. It is one of the m ost remarkable achievements of our century 
that the era  of decolonization should have been navigated without world 
war or huge regional conflicts, (p. 531)
The independent movem ent of Asian nations, African nations, and Latin 
American nations not only signifies th e  end of colonial system s which had 
continued since the sixteenth century, but also signifies the potential 
em ergence of new world powers. The decolonizing movement and the end of 
colonialism m eant a  significant ch an g e  of power relations am ong nations 
during the post-World War II period. It also implied a  necessity to re-evaluate 
the m eans of maintaining dom estic and especially international order.
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After World War 11, the end of colonialism as an ideology definitely began 
the questioning of military powers a s  the only m eans to maintain world order^^. 
Since one asp ect of the World War II w as ideological, between fascism (e.g., 
Germany, Italy, Japan) and anti-fascism (e.g., the United States, G reat Britain, 
France), the victory of anti-fascism helped people re-evaluate the m eans for 
maintaining new world order. More specifically, democracy, a s  a  major 
ideology of anti-fascist nations, w as becoming a dominant ideology in the world 
during post-World War II era. The em ergence of dem ocracy a s  a  predominant 
world ideology w as another crucial transformation in the post-World War II 
historical context.
While totalitarianism was another world ideology, dem ocracy becam e a  
predominantly accepted ideology am ong the United S tates, W est European 
nations, and  many of the new independent nations. Democracy as  an  ideology 
helped a  great deal to promote the decolonizing movement. As Watabiki (1993) 
argues, during the post-World War II period, liberalism, democracy, and 
humanism, a s  the United Nations^^  Charter and the Declaration of World 
Human Rights imply, becam e a  world ideology. This ideological transformation 
led to a  search  for the new m eans to maintain world order. Because the United 
States w as the only major unharmed nation economically and geographically, 
the US had to help many devastatingly dam aged European nations and newly 
independent nations (e.g., Asian and African nations) recover from the 
aftermath of the World War II. Since the United S tates w as a  leading
 ^  ^.Nonetheless, military power served as  a  m eans to maintain world order even after World War II. 
The Cold War. for instance, saw the greatest build up of military power ever-huge nuclear arsenals 
to maintain an order via "containment" of Russia and China.
 ^2.U.N. is a  version of the League of nations founded by US President Woodrow Wilson and 
based on US humanism. In the U.N. all nations have a  vote.
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dem ocratic nation and a  leading superpower along with the Soviet Union, she 
had to be considerate about how to help other nations and how to maintain 
international order to hold onto her superpower status. As Roberts (1995) 
implies, the nature of the aid had to take a non-military and unaggressive form. 
The aid had to be done in a  more or less democratic and humanistic way so that 
world order was maintained, not with military powers, but with d e m o c r a c y ^ ^  and 
humanism. The United S ta tes  might have m ade dem ocracy a  predominant 
world ideology to maintain her influential power over the world and to win the 
power relationship with the  Soviet Union (a fascistic nation and the only rival as 
a  superpower).
Within this historical context, the United S ta tes  needed m eans to aid 
other nations and to maintain world order in a humanistic way considering 
"others" a s  "other humans." Such m eans were bound to be a communication 
that is democratic and humanistic and takes a  non-military form. The 
communication required a  minimum level of understanding and resp ec t for 
various culture differences existing among different nations. The United States 
needed  a  humanistic m eans like "intercultural communication," which w as also 
a  practical'*^ political m eans in order to maintain her power and sta tu s  a s  a  
superpow er in the world during the post-colonial period. "Intercultural 
communication" presum es humanism. In the next section, the investigator 
clarifies the relationship betw een humanism and intercultural communication 
m ore specifically by tracing the beginning of humanism.
 ^3 .Democracy is in principle a  m eans to maintain world order. However, in reality, democracy as a 
m eans to maintain order was always under threat of force. This century has seen literally dozens 
of small wars which expressed Cold War tensions (e.g.. Korea, Vietnam. Cambodia, Laos, 
Indonesia, Ethiopia, Zaire, Panama, et cetera).
"I ^.The m eans should be practical and efficient in nature. Another traditional American value was 
pragmatism.
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Humanism and intercultural communication. While colonialism virtually 
ended after World W ar II, the beginning of decolonization appeared  to take 
place much earlier, probably with the US revolution. The essential shift of the 
colonial attitude (the superior "culture" discovering and taming "savages") to the 
new attitude of respect and equality based  on humanism (which is necessary 
for human communication) was already presum ed well before World War II in 
many scholastic studies of comparative cultures in Germany (Evans Wintz, Carl 
Jung, Scheler, etc.). Anthropological6 works also presum ed this new attitude.
It is obvious that the  new attitude did not begin during th e  post-war post 
colonial period. The new attitude due to humanism, in fact, can  be  traced back 
to the Enlightenment (Neo-classical-post R enaissance historical epoch), as 
historians such a s  Toynbee (1957) and Durant (1961) contend. Enlightenment 
humanism rose to challenge the church and royal authorities. Then, after a  
period of time, the colonizers cam e to recognize the slaves and colonized 
people as  hum ans (as other kind of hum ans). As a consequence, the process 
of decolonization started  with the US revolution, the Declaration of 
Independence (July 4, 1776), and its constituting Enlightenment bill. The 
recognition of ethnically different people a s  full citizens (a dom estic struggle) 
gradually took place. Humanism com es from all humans. Culture differences 
cam e to be seen  a s  only contingent in the face of transcending and shared 
humanity. E ast can m eet W est b ecau se  essentially we are  all human. 
Therefore, intercultural communication, which w as established during the post-
 ^®.lt is also important to notice that the dissemination of information, which took prior to the post 
colonial era. affected the process of decolonization. For instance. Ho Che men w as a  student in 
Paris, while Sun Yat-sen was a  student in England and in the US. Gandhi, similarly, was a  student 
in England. All of them learned a  new way of thinking about their "intercultural" experiences; as a 
result they disseminated information to their home later.
®.The word, "anthropology," was originally invented by Max Scheler to describe a  new field.
1 1 0
colonial period, essentially p resum es humanism and that we can communicate 
with others.
In summary, intercultural communication essentially presum es 
humanism, which is necessary  for hum an communication, and its 
corresponding respect and equality for other humans. Intercultural 
communication is, in this sen se , always already presum ed to be hum an  
com m u n ication .
On the other hand, the context where the United S ta tes was situated 
during the post-World W ar II period (i.e., the post-colonial period) appeared to 
make "intercultural communication" a  practical means^^ to help other nations 
recovering from post-war destruction. The em ergence of dem ocracy as  a  
predominant world ideology allowed "intercultural communication" to appear 
a s  a  them e of academ ic study in the US. Metaphorically speaking, the public 
face of "intercultural communication" should be democratic and humanistic in 
nature to com pete with other ideologies (e.g., socialism and communism).
Under such a shift of the historical context after the World War II, the shift 
seem ed to motivate the US Foreign Service in particular to consider the new 
m eans (i.e., intercultural communication) to win converts without bullets or a s  a 
supplem ent to them. The US Foreign Service Institute seem ed  to be the first 
organization to perceive "intercultural communication" a s  a  new appropriate 
(which is humanistic) and convenient m eans to maintain American power.
While intercultural communication essentially presum es humanism, it tends to 
becom e highly instrumental in nature due to the US's another major value (i.e., 
pragmatism). Therefore, the next section attempts to unfold the  specific process
 ^7 .It might be practical because it potentially persuades other nations to be like the US and 
therefore expand US market for global trade.
111
of the em ergence of intercultural communication a s  a  highly effective tool for 
achieving ulterior motives. The specific background of the US Foreign Service 
during the post World War II period (i.e., post colonial period) provides context 
for the birth of intercultural communication as  a  field.
1-C. Clarifvino the Specific P rocess of the Establishment of Intercultural 
Communication in the United S ta tes: Situating It In the US Foreign Service 
Institute as  the  Specific Background
While the term "intercultural communication" seem s to have appeared in 
the US during the post-colonial period, the specific process of its establishm ent 
as an independent academ ic institution is still unanswered. This section 
attempts to m ake clear the specific process of the appearance of the academ ic 
area, considering the US Foreign Service Institute as the  specific background of 
the appearance. The original motive which established intercultural 
communication a s  an academ ic institution is more clearly elucidated when the 
process of the appearance is considered.
When something em erges a s  an  academ ic institution, usually it does not 
appear accidentally. Rather, it usually takes place with som e needs derived 
from the aw areness of problems. Intercultural communication is such a  case. 
Intercultural communication m ade the democratic post-colonial period possible. 
In other words, intercultural communication a s  a  field necessarily em erged a s  a 
solution from an aw areness of problem s (e.g., tyrannical colonialism.) There 
might be a  correlation between aw areness of problems due to culture 
differences and the aw areness of th e  need for intercultural communication. 
Therefore, this section attem pts to unveil the process of the appearance of
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intercultural communication by explaining how the aw areness of the problems 
of understanding culture differences built up.
The United States' role in the post-World W ar II period and the initial 
aw areness of the need to solve intercultural problems. While communication 
study becam e a  useful tool for the US government during World War Ips 
(Rogers, 1994), intercultural communication finally becam e recognizable after 
the World W ar II, although the aw areness was still vague. Blanche (1969) 
describes the post-war context:
The magnitude of wartime destruction and dislocation made it clear that 
world recovery-both econom ic and political- would involve the United 
States even more than it had after World W ar I. There would be new 
duties and tasks related to the  administration of occupied areas, relief, 
rehabilitation, and refugees. At the sam e time, it w as evident that som e of 
the activities of the special wartime agencies should be carried on, 
notably in the fields of economics, intelligence, information, and culture.
(p. 24)
Barnes and Morgan (1961) specifically sta ted  the role of the Foreign 
Service a s  follows:
As the end of hostilities cam e within the sight, it becam e clear that the 
post war Foreign Service would inevitably be confronted with a  
considerable increase in its tasks. Postwar reconstruction would im pose 
new duties in connection with the administration of occupied areas, relief, 
and refugees, (p. 254-255)
The above two descriptions indicate the US's crucial role in world 
recovery. Therefore, indispensably, the US needed to send  many foreign
 ^^.Before intercultural communication had been problematized. the study of communication had 
become a discipline of social sciences during 1940s. more specifically during World War II. As 
Rogers (1994) explaind the origin of communication as a  field of study. "World War II had a 
tremendous impact on the field of communication." (p. 10) He continues: "World War II thus 
created the conditions for the founding of communication study." (p. 11) In short. Rogers (1994) 
contends that the governmental demand m ade "communication" (m ass communication, mainly) a  
member of social sciences. "Communication" w as accepted and w as useful/practical for the US 
government during World War II.
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service personnel to various nations to help each  nation's recovery. Although 
each task w as technical in nature, it w as obvious each foreign service 
personnel needed to engage in "intercultural communication" in one way or 
another. The post World War II context (i.e., the post colonial historical context) 
dem anded that US foreign personnel engage in more contacts with foreign 
nationals.
However, many foreign diplomats during the postwar period did not seem  
to be effective enough to accomplish their overseas assignm ents successfully. 
Fortune m agazine (1946) indicated: "the Foreign Service m ade virtually no 
preparation for the problems that World W ar II thrust upon it, although the 
brewing of the war had been well reported in its own dispatches from the field" 
(p. 83). Fortune reported ten specific stories which indicated the terribly 
ineffective perform ance of the Foreign Service of the United S ta tes (p. 83-84). 
Then, Fortune contended: "the foreign representation of the US m ust be judged" 
(p. 83) As Fortune (1946) argued, the US governm ent started to be concerned 
with the effective representation of the US abroad. The US government finally 
seem ed to recognize the necessity of the  minimum "intercultural" type training to 
enhance the effective representation of the  US abroad, consequently to 
enhance a  positive image of the US as  a  world leader. Barnes and Morgan 
(1961) similarly stated  the importance of "intercultural" related training during 
the postw ar period.
Effective representation of the United S tates abroad requires that 
m em bers of the Foreign Service know and understand the people with 
whom they work. Thus, area training is offered to acquaint officers with 
the manifold political, economic, and  social aspects of the various 
important a rea s  of the world, (p. 315)
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Effective representation of the United S tates, here, implies dealing with 
the people of different cultures a s  equal "humans." The world order should be 
maintained through dem ocracy (and humanism), which represents and 
symbolizes the United S tates. This m eans that to deal with the people of 
different cultures (and consequently to maintain international order in this 
manner) w as "intercultural communication," which required a  minimum 
understanding and respect of other cultures. More specifically, intercultural 
communication m eant a  political m eans to maintain international order through 
active behavioral conformity which was based on an ancient rule: "in Rome, do 
a s  the Rom ans do." A way to m anage cultural differences in a  democratic way 
leads to maintaining world order democratically. "Intercultural communication" 
w as an active behavioral conformity. An active behavioral conformity w as 
perceived to be  democratic a s  well as to be the m ost practical ^  and efficient 
m eans to achieve the US's goals in foreign nations under the post colonial 
historical context. The United S tates of America, virtually, becam e another form 
of empire, with imperial problems.
The creation of the US Foreign Service Institute a s  an indication of the 
fundamental aw areness of the need to solve problems due to culture 
differences. Along with the minimum recognition of the necessity of intercultural 
understandings, finally, with the passage of the Foreign Service Act (1946), the 
Foreign Service Institute (FSl), which is a  specialized training institute, w as 
established under the US Department of S tate (DOS) on March 13 ,1947  a s  an 
item of the Act. The US government considered the regular training of the 
Foreign Service Officers essential to their effective representation of the United
 ^9. It is more convenient and cheaper than war.
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States abroad. The training institute w as created to train each trainee to 
conform his or her behavioral pattern to those of foreign nationals to achieve 
efficiency (i.e.. fulfilling his or her ov ersea  assignm ent within allocated time 
limitation).
The foundation of this training institute was significant in term s of the birth 
of intercultural communication a s  an academ ic study. The FSl was not 
established without the aw areness of the problems derived from contact with 
foreign nationals. Under different historical contexts in different political 
ideologies (e.g., colonialism, imperialism, authoritarianism, and many others), 
the contact with foreign nationals w as not considered an "intercultural" contact, 
but a  political contact. On the other hand, the post-colonial context and  its 
consequential ideological shift forced the  US to see  the contact a s  an equal 
human contact -  an "intercultural" one. The US government becam e aware 
that the problems of "the contact" with foreign nationals were derived from the 
culture differences between the Am ericans and foreign nationals, although the 
culture differences were perceived a s  language differences. The aw areness of 
intercultural communication began  to em erge despite its partialness. Therefore, 
the US governm ent hired many anthropologists and linguists to train the US 
diplomats after the  World War II. Moreover, the new training institute w as 
founded on an aw areness of the lack of training. They needed a way to deal 
with "culture differences" (i.e., language differences a t this stage) and 
consequential "intercultural" p r o b le m s ^ o . This need becom es more obvious 
when the contents of the training in the FSl are  clarified.
20.One of the crucial issue here is the reason the US government established the specialized 
training institute. Even though there were training programs and training schools prior to the 
World War II. how come the new training institute was established? The US is very rational and 
goal-oriented nation. She does not do an unnecessary thing. If the US decided to train foreign 
diplomats more extensively including intensive foreign language training, that was an evidence
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The Training program contents a s  an  indication of aw areness of the need 
for intercultural communication. While the US governm ent realized the 
importance of training Foreign Service Officers for the sake of enhancing their 
representation of the US abroad and enhancing the effective goal achievement 
of their oversea assignm ents, the nature of the training program in the FSl did 
not seem  to be "intercultural" enough. The FSl consisted of two schools; the 
School of Foreign Affairs and the School of Language. The School of Foreign 
Affairs offered "courses for junior, midcareer, and senior officers and training for 
selected officers a t university graduate schools in language and area  studies, 
economics, and political science" (Barnes & Morgan, 1961, p. 314-315).
The School of Language might be the biggest success in the FSl. Based 
on the Army method developed and successfully executed during World War II, 
the language training in the FSl offered full time intensive instruction in eleven 
foreign languages and part time intensive instruction in thirty-one different 
languages. Based on the theory of descriptive linguistics, many excellent 
Linguists who had been recruited successfully developed a  very practical 
linguistic training (Hall, 1992; Leeds-Hurwitz, 1990).
An important point is the nature of the training. The training purpose was 
to allow each trainee to be able to use  a  foreign language practically in actual 
situations, with minimum training period, so that he or she could successfully 
achieve his or her oversea assignm ent a s  quickly a s  possible. The crucial
which indicated the US government was aware of the problems which disturbed foreign officers' 
efficient goal achievements. The introduction of the intensive foreign language training in the 
new training institute seem s to be an evidence the US government (or at least some of the 
powerful members) was aware there was a  problem derived from language differences when 
foreign personnel contacted with foreign nationals. In short, the decision of establishing new 
training institute and of introducing new training programs was implicitly or explicitly based on the 
aw areness of the contact with foreign nationals a s  "intercultural contact" based on the existence 
of culture differences.
117
issue w as that training should be technical, efficient, and, above all, should be 
practical for the purpose of achieving oversea assignm ents within the allocated 
time limitation. The program necessarily offered a  practical linguistic know-how 
to each trainee. Therefore, each instructor of foreign languages w as 
necessarily a  native speaker of the language. O ne underlying prem ise of this 
practical training was derived from an aw areness that the most crucial problem 
each trainee would face in a  foreign country w as language differences. An 
effective goal achievem ent was believed to depend on the successful 
acquisition of the foreign language of the country to which each trainee was 
assigned. The various problems derived from "intercultural communication" 
seem ed to be reduced to problems derived from the language differences 
rather than culture differences. The nature of the language-based training 
signifies the partial aw areness of the problems of culture differences. Culture 
differences are reduced to language problems. Other aspects of culture 
differences such a s  value differences and nonverbal differences w ere excluded 
in this training.
It is also important to notice that the training was based  on a  strong 
beliefzi that such language barriers can be  overcom e technically. Although 
highly specialized technical training w as indispensable and appropriate, it 
lacked a  cultural aspect (what Hall called "cultural know-how") which always 
goes with a  language aspect. Learning a  foreign language m eans learning the 
whole culture behind the language. Hall seem s to be the first person who 
realized the shortcoming involved in the program.
.This belief seem s to be reinforced by the great success of "the Army method." which was a 
technical language training process during World War II. The language training, based on a 
linguistic model, emphasized appropriate use of the spoken language rather than the traditional 
focus on learning to read and write a language and on grammar as the key to a language. Again, 
the great success of this technical language method appears to reassure this belief.
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Edward T. Hall's participation in the FSl: Hall a s  the first individual who 
recognized the need for "intercultural communication" training in the FSl in a 
clear and  a  complete m anner. Edward T. Hall is a  cultural anthropologist. He 
w as teaching a t Bennington College before participating in the FSl. According 
to his autobiography (1992), he w as  chosen to head up a  new program at the 
FSl. Following Harry Truman's inspiring speech in 1949 which called for the 
US to encourage various kinds of technical assistance for third world countries, 
the US C ongress enacted a  law establishing the Technical Cooperation 
Authority (TCA) in 1950. Dr. Henry Bennet, its director, hired Hall to design a s  
well a s  conduct the training program  for the technicians in the TCA.
In addition to language training. Hall had in mind "intercultural not 
intracultural, and the concentration w as on what people took for granted and did 
not verbalize" (Hall, 1992, p. 201). Hall pointed out the importance of specific 
cultural know-how as  an indispensable part of the training program in addition 
to the language training. Hall realized the necessity of "intercultural" training, in 
a  very clear manner, to solve the problems due to culture differences. Hall 
understood verbal language differences, but also the implicit nonverbal 
language (i.e., proxemics, chronemics) differences. The aw areness of culture 
differences and of their consequential problems clearly connects to his 
aw areness of the need of intercultural communication.
Hall seem ed to be the first p e r s o n ^ z  who claimed the need  of 
"intercultural communication (training)" in a  clear and decisive m anner in the 
FSl and in the S tate Department (although the State Departm ent remained
22 Although Hall Is the first person who claimed the need of "intercultural" training in the FSl and 
the State Department, this does not mean he  was the first person who recognized the need of 
"intercultural communication." If other anthropologists such as Mead or Malinowski had been 
hired instead of Hall, they might become recognizable as  the departure of "intercultural 
communication" as  an Independent institution.
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blind to this new dimension). Hall was the first person who realized "such skills 
[cultural know-how] still constituted a  mandatory tool in the kit of th e  foreign aid 
technician and were therefore necessary  ingredients in the training for Point IV"
(p.202).
While Hall clearly recognized the need for "intercultural" training, he 
seem ed to be aw are of "intercultural communication" specifically in this context 
a s  a  useful and an important cultural know-how to train the TCA technicians. 
However, when Hall participated in the FSl, there were no suitable orientation 
materials. As Hall (1992) recalled, "all that w as available was the usual 
economic, political, and historical texts based  on European intellectual needs" 
(p. 202). But, specifically, what kinds of orientation material was Hall looking 
for?
The birth of intercultural communication: Hall's microcultural training as 
the manifestation of his aw areness of "intercultural communication". Hall 
himself suggested the necessity  to consider five issues before creating his 
"intercultural" training program:
First, it was important to make the culture concept as real a s  possible. 
Second, the anxiety aroused by leaving hom e and going out into a  new 
and strange world m ust be recognized and dealt with. Third, there must 
be an opportunity to work with the language of the country of assignm ent. 
Fourth, the technicians needed basic and simple formulas for staying 
healthy in the tropics a s  part of the background information on the 
country. Fifth, they needed experience with som eone (a living, breathing 
model) from the country to which they w ere assigned. In building my 
program I tried to view the world a s  seen  through the eyes of the  
technician and then reinforce and strengthen what I already knew about 
work with other cultures. (Hall, 1992, p. 203)
Although the content of each suggestion is different, each consideration 
attem pts to enhance the trainees' practical goal achievement. Hall’s  training
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program, m ost importantly, was supposed to be a  practically useful m eans to 
making the m ost of real intercultural encounters by actively conforming their 
behaviors to those  of foreign nationals. Well aw are of the dem ands of the US 
government, Hall also knew the complexity and difficulty of any intercultural 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g s ^ ^  Therefore, he had to create  a  training program which was 
practical in nature as  well as  an enhancem ent of the trainees' intercultural 
understandings.
In the long run, the training program Hall created and which satisfied the 
two criteria w as "microcultural" training. A "microculture," for Hall, meant a 
smaller unit of culture which is reflected in tone of voice (i.e., paralanguage), 
gestures (i.e., kinesics), time (i.e., chronemics), and spatial relationships (i.e., 
proxemics) a s  a  smaller units of culture respectively. Hall considered each 
aspect a  manifestation of microculture.
This "microcultural" training seem ed to be crucial. Hall knew difficulties 
were not only derived from language difference, but also from differences in the 
hidden languages (i.e., the differences in the various aspects of nonverbal 
communication), which were the manifestations of smaller units of culture 
existing among different cultures. Hall argued that such hidden/silent 
languages take place a t the level of out-of-awareness; therefore, people do not 
even recognize the existence of the hidden dimension. However, Hall also 
contended that the silent languages^'^ do differ across different cultures, as  do 
the (verbal) languages. In other words. Hall appeared to imply the necessity of
23.He understood the difficulty and richness of intercultural communication based on his past 
expenences. It seem s his entire life is full of intercultural experiences. For instance, he spent 
years in the Navajo and Hopi reservations in Arizona in his youth.
24giient languages involve several dimensions of nonverbal communication such as 
paralanguage, spatial relationships, perception of time, and kinesics.
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learning "silent nonverbal languages" a s  well a s  learning manifested verbal 
languages in intercultural situations. For Hall, the "silent languages" have their 
own vocabularies and rules used in different contexts. It was Hall's belief that 
nonverbal languages can be learned systematically, a s  can  verbal languages, 
although learning nonverbal languages requires more conscious effort due to 
the nature of its out-of-awareness.
The way to learn the "silent nonverbal languages" w as microcultural 
training which taught specific rules of each dimension of the  "silent languages" 
(e.g., appropriate nonverbal behaviors) in concrete situations. Hall seem ed to 
believe that if som ebody m astered a  verbal language a s  well as  a  silent 
nonverbal language, he or she could communicate effectively with foreign 
nationals. Therefore, microcultural training which teach es  silent languages was 
a  necessary part of his training foreign personnel.
Hall created this microcultural training for three interrelated reasons.
First, the audience of the training w as government em ployees who only wanted 
to know how to behave in certain contexts and how to interpret cues in the 
country to which they were assigned. Hall's trainees w ere people who needed 
to know specific information to get their jobs done efficiently (i.e., as quick as 
possible). Microcultural training, in which people w ere drilled concretely in a 
systematic manner, satisfied their practical need to successfully managing 
intercultural problems.
Second, Hall wanted to design intercultural communication training that 
focused on actual contact/interaction with different cultures. Rather than 
learning abstract and  general notions of culture (e.g., ethnocentrism, prejudices, 
culture relativism, etc.), for Hall, the m ost practical way to enhance the trainees'
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intercultural understanding w as by making them grasp  concrete and specific 
cultural know-how (i.e., specific nonverbal behavioral rules in specific 
situations). The microcultural training could not only satisfy the trainees' 
practical needs, but could also allow the trainees a s  laymen (not as 
anthropologists) to understand the p rocess of intercultural communication^^.
While the above two reasons for Hall to choose microcultural (i.e., 
intercultural) training w ere for the sake of the trainees, the third reason seem ed 
to be personal. As Hall and Whyte (1960) clearly suggested, examining "the 
actual communication process betw een representatives of different cultures" 
had been a  lacking a rea  in traditional (cultural) anthropologyzs. Hall 
understood that communication w as a  necessary  counterpart of culture^^ due to 
his anthropological insight and rich intercultural experiences. Since one of 
Hall's strong and consistent contentions had been an interdependent and 
inseparable relationship (1959, 1966, 1992), the process of creating and 
enacting microcultural (i.e., intercultural) training itself through the trial and error
25.Hall recognized that the microcultural training could enhance the trainees' intercultural 
understanding but also it could "broaden knowledge of ourselves by revealing some of our 
unconscious communicative acts." (Hall & Whyte, 1960. p. 5) Hail realized intercultural 
communication could make the trainees concretely realize their unconscious communicative 
behaviors that were ethnocentric in nature. Hall believed it was essential to understand our own 
ethnocentric tendency concretely to communicate effectively in any intercultural situations.
26.it is unsure whether this argument is valid or not. It is difficult to imagine that the 
anthropologists before Hall had been ignoring this dimension of human interaction.
27.The idea of the mutual relationship between communication/language and culture already 
existed well before Sapir and Wholf. von Humboldt seem s to be the first person who matured the 
idea. For instance, in his book Linguistic Variability and Intellectual Development (first published 
1836), he argued the significance of human languages a s  mirrors of the individual mentalities of 
the nations. It is also important to notice this idea (culture=communication) can be traced back to 
the ancient Greeks. Isocrates equated language with thinking-thought patterns with group 
identity.
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appears to have becom e a  strong motive to prove his contention's and to enrich 
the field of anthropology^^, accompanying much stress  with it^o (Hall, 1992).
While the above three reasons were different yet interrelated, obviously 
Hall invented microcultural training a s  Intercultural communication training to 
effectively deal with potential problems the trainees might face in their oversea 
assignments. In short, m icrocultural training w a s the co n crete  
m anifestation o f the aw aren ess o f intercultural com m unication. Hall 
was aware that the  contact with foreign nationals w as problematic not only 
because of linguistic differences, but also  because of differences in nonverbal 
languages existing am ong different cultures.
Hall, in short, labeled th is problem atic con tact derived from  
culture d ifferen ces  a s  "intercultural com m unication" since it is in a  
communication process that different cultures interface. He foregrou n d ed  
"intercultural com m unication" as an independent and worthy th em e  
in a sy stem a tic  and deliberate manner^i. His w as a new  way of 
problem atizing a phenom enon  of intercultural in teraction .
Intercultural communication was essentially problematic; therefore, 
studying and solving (here, by training) intercultural problems becam e a 
necessary conclusion. Intercultural communication, in other words, appeared
28. If you read his "silent language" (1959) and his autobiography (1992). you will feel Hall's strong 
motivation, enthusiasm, and excitement to create his microcultural training and its consequential 
"map of culture."
28.As Leeds-Hurwitz (1990) implies Hall did not seem  to create a  new academic discipline such a s  
intercultural communication. Rather. Hall seem ed to enrich the discipline of anthropology by 
integrating the notion of communication into the concept of culture so that anthropology might 
have a  practical veilue and deal with intercultural communication in a  concrete manner.
80.Dealing with government employees seem ed to bring much stress to Hall. S ee Hall's 
autobiography for details.
81.lt is possible that similar efforts might have taken place in European cultures. European 
cultures are very close, yet very different. And over the centuries they have noted the 
differences making fun of and fearing each other. Therefore, strictly speaking, this statement is 
limited to the United States.
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as  a  phenom enon to solve the problems Intercultural communication 
necessarily involves.
1-D. Interpreting the M eanings of Intercultural Communication
This section attem pts to decipher the hidden meaning(s) of the origin of 
intercultural communication considering the role of the historical context and the 
specific process of its appearance.
The post World War II historical context forced the United S tates to 
engage in much more contacts with foreign nationals than ever before.
Although efficient goal achievem ent w as crucial, not all US representatives 
could achieve their assignm ents within the expected time limit. Analyzing the 
reasons for the inefficiency w as necessary. A crucial reason was perceived to 
be culture differences which existed between the US representatives and 
foreign nationals. In other words, whenever the US representatives contacted 
with foreign nationals, the contact w as problematic and the source of the 
problems was perceived to be  the existence of culture differences. Here, many 
m em bers of the US government began to recognize that what the US 
representatives were dealing with w as not just a  usual political contact, but an 
in tercultural contact. Namely, the aw areness of intercultural communication 
necessarily took place here a s  a  problem.
The US government had to think about ways to deal with culture 
differences which were the genesis  of the problems. A very important point to 
remember is that the US governm ent had to consider the shift of historical 
context which took place after World War II in order to solve the problems of 
culture differences. Since the post World War era was the  post colonial era, the 
US also had to maintain world order in a  democratic manner. Maintaining
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international order in a  dem ocratic way w as an important consideration in the 
post colonial period. The US also had to consider the effectiveness of the 
m eans to solve culture differences. The solution had to be practical and 
efficient. Efficiency w as another important value for the US.
The m eans the US government chose w as active behavioral conformity 
or adaptation. The active behavioral conformity w as effective a s  well a s  
appropriate. Conforming and adapting the US representatives' behaviors to 
those of foreign nationals w as the most effective m eans under a  post colonial 
period. It also could maintain international order in a democratic and 
humanistic m anner since the US representatives w ere the conforming party.
Therefore, the US created  a  new training institute focusing on foreign 
language training a s  a  concrete method of behavioral conformity to deal with 
intercultural problems. Practical linguistic training w as the initially perceived 
solution. Intercultural communication em erged a s  a  solution to deal with culture 
differences effectively and appropriately. An ideal of training for the purpose of 
solving the problems of culture differences already necessitated the aw areness 
of intercultural communication. The them e of intercultural communication w as 
clearly foregrounded.
Intercultural communication, in short, took place when the US 
government was aw are of contact with foreign nationals as a  problem derived 
from culture differences. Such aw areness of culture differences as  the genesis 
of the problems dem anded intercultural communication to appear a s  a 
phenomenon to deal with the problems effectively. Ideological shifts in the post 
colonial period also dem anded intercultural communication to em erge a s  a  
phenomenon in order to maintain world order in a  democratic manner.
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Intercultural communication w as essentially a  problem derived from culture 
differences a s  well as  a  necessary  solution a s  behavioral conformity^z to deal 
with the "intercultural" problems In an  effective and  appropriate way.
In summary, intercultural communication is essentially Western 
presuming W estern ideologies (e.g.. efficiency, conformity). It is originally a 
political creation in order to retain US political power in the post-colonial 
historical epoch and in order to spread American ideologies (e.g., democracy).
It is also fundamentally technicaps.
Although this section sum m arized the birth of intercultural communication 
and interpreted the origin, the fundamental presuppositions which created and 
are maintaining the unity of the  phenom enon remain unclear. The next section 
attempts to clarify the presuppositions em bedded in the origin of intercultural 
communication a s  a  field.
1-E. Unveiling the  Fundamental Presuppositions Em bedded in the Origin of 
Intercultural Communication
As Nietszche (1887/1974), G adam er (1960/1989), and Kramer (1992) 
contend, a  perception is already always interpretive. Every time we see  
something, actually we do not s e e  the thing, but we can  not help but interpret 
the meaning. For instance, when som ebody s e e s  a  woman walking down a  
street, he is not seeing an object that is a  blob of moving color, but he 
sees/interprets a  woman (e.g., pretty, charming or attractive.) Likewise, 
intercultural communication did not appear a s  a  physical phenomenon 
composed of two people from different cultures. Rather, it appeared a s  a
32.This is the great myth of Darwinian assimilation. To communicate does not equal to conform.
33.As intercultural communication is taught, it is behavioral. It attempts to teach new behaviors 
that are "better." This is the reason for the em ergence of behavioral social science. To maintain 
order, social engineering is strictly concerned with behavior.
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problem which w as supposed to be  solved effectively and appropriately. More 
specifically, culture differences that involve intercultural communication were 
interpreted to be  problematic. The important issue to clarify here is the 
reason(s) culture differences (consequently intercultural communication) were 
presum ed to be problematic.
W hereas the foundation of intercultural communication (as a  discipline) 
has been established based  on this culture differences-as-problem view, the 
reasons behind this view have never been questioned. It has been a  deeply 
em bedded presumption that culture differences (consequently intercultural 
communication) were supposed to be solved. However, there seem  to have 
been at least two presuppositions which were even m ore deeply em bedded in 
this view.
Incomoatibilitv betw een culture differences and maintaining order. The 
first presupposition is that culture differences are problematic because they are 
presupposed to disturb the order in a  host environment. Particularly, 
intercultural scholars tend to view culture differences a s  a  problem to preserve 
the order in a  host environment^^. Here, it is crucial to be  aw are of the 
presupposition of the incompatibility between culture differences and 
maintaining order. The logic is a s  follows: each culture already has an 
established social reality (i.e., an intersubjective world) b ased  on its own 
values, rules, norms, etc. before an  intercultural stranger en ters into the host 
environment. Current histories teach  us that cultures a re  and always have been 
dynamic and perm eable. In order to maintain each social reality within each 
culture, competing social realities (e.g., an intercultural stranger's different
3 4. However, it is also true that many great cities throughout history have been bom on the cross­
roads of trade where cultural diversity is simply a  fact.
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social reality) have been viewed a s  Irresponsible. Regarding the relationship 
betw een differences and maintaining order, Murphy and Min Choi (1993) sta te  
a s  following:
Actually, once social realism begins to gain acceptance, promoting 
difference Is viewed a s  Irresponsible. Prudent persons do not ac t 
Impulsively and resist authority but instead tiy to adjust to reality. Due to 
this predisposition to  acquisition to reality, difference becom es an 
impediment to rational behavior. Hence, difference is either eliminated or 
associated with viewpoints that have been dom esticated and do not 
illustrate the frail nature of reality (p.204).
Murphy and Min Choi claim also that "repression (to promoting difference) is 
thus not cruel, but rather logical and necessary" (p.204). The above Is a  logic to 
rationalize the incompatibility betw een culture differences and preserving order 
with its corresponding reality. Therefore, the United S ta tes  government could 
not disturb world order by enhancing culture differences in a  foreign nation, 
particularly under post colonial historical context. A fundamental rule, "in Rome, 
do a s  the  Romans do," should be applied. The US government had to deal with 
the problems of culture differences by adapting their behaviors to those of the 
foreign nationals. Conformity w as the presum ed solution to maintain o rd er^ s.
3 ^ Culture differences were bound to be problematic. However, prior to World War II, culture 
differences could not manifest a s  obstacles to domestic and international order. Prior to the World 
War II, domestic and world order had been predominantly maintained through power, usually 
through military power. Therefore, there had been no room where culture differences could 
manifest a s  problems, particularly in the colonial era. The powerful party always made the 
powerless party conform through military power. Therefore, as a  natural consequence, the 
powerless party's culture had been repressed or sometimes exterminated whenever the powerful 
party invaded the powerless party's environment. On the other hand, in the post colonial period, 
minimum consideration of culture differences was to be included to maintain world order. 
Particularly, the US, a  chief democratic nation, had to maintain world order in a  democratic way. 
Therefore, whenever the US was aware of culture differences in a foreign environment, the  US 
had to conform to the foreign environment in principle. However, in fact, many US 
representatives had been disturbing the order in a  foreign nation, especially right after the  World 
War. It took some time for the US representatives to adjust their attitude and behaviors.
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Incompatibility between culture differences and efficiency: Efficiency as a  
predominant value in the United S ta te s . While maintaining order through 
similarities h as  been, more or less, a  sort of historically applicable 
com m onsense prem ise (transcending time a s  the old famous adage, "In Rome, 
do as  the Rom ans do", implies), the second reason seem s to reflect on one of 
the predominant values of modernity. That is, culture differences have become 
a  problem b ecau se  the differences are  bound to be a suppressive factor 
mitigating against efficiency or convenience.
Promoting culture differences is presupposed to be incompatible with 
facilitating efficiency, which m eans wish-fulfillment in the quickest manner. For 
example, even a  small daily conversation may not flow smoothly because  the 
cultural stranger may not speak fluently. In this case, the conversation may be 
judged Ineffective, inconvenient, and inefficient by either participant or both. It is 
so mainly because  of an attitude which s e e s  conversation as  primarily a 
process of information exchange for ulterior motives, not a s  relationship 
maintenance or friendship building.
Although this is one example, obviously culture differences create many 
problems for efficiency. The logic of this matter appears to relate deeply to the 
concept of "normality" in the modern industrial West. Culture differences, which 
non-indigenous people represent, tend to generate  abnormal and inconvenient 
situations (e.g., implicit and explicit m isunderstandings in rather simple daily 
conversations), which seldom occur in normal interactions with other 
indigenous individuals. This em ergent abnormal circumstance, due to culture 
differences, tends to disturb efficiency greatly. Because of the culture
In any case, throughout the history of mankind, maintaining order through conformity and 
similarity has been a  historically embedded presupposition regardless of the ways of its 
conformity.
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differences, a  simple daily conversation becom es a  problem. B ecause such a 
problem does not occur usually, a s  a  natural consequence people obsessed  
with convenience or speed  presuppose that culture differences are  supposed to 
be solved, overcom e, bridged, restrained, minimized, or even destroyed for the 
sake of this predom inant social value in modernity. As Kramer and Ikeda 
(1994) suggest, "at least som e modern 'problems' are problems only because 
they are perceived a s  obstacles to efficiency and convenience" (p.28-29). 
Likewise, it can b e  said that culture differences m ay have becom e crucial 
problems only b ecau se  they were perceived as  totally incompatible with the 
modern value of convenience.
Perspectival consciousness a s  the essential reason creating the above 
mentioned two presuppositions: Persoectival consciousness as  the origin which 
maintained the unity of intercultural communication. As the investigator pointed 
out before, culture differences are  presum ed to be problematic because they 
are  presum ed to b e  incompatible with maintaining (domestic and international) 
order. Culture differences are presum ed to be problematic because they are 
presum ed to be incompatible with the  predom inant modern value of efficiency.
The culture-differences-as-problem presumption is derived from the two 
presuppositions. It is important to notice that th e se  two presuppositions are 
naively and unquestionably accepted beliefs reflecting a  certain structure of 
consciousness, which G ebser (1949/1985) labeled "perspectival" 
consciousness (i.e., mental-rational consciousness structure, see  Chapter 2 for 
details) which functions dominantly, particularly in W estern modernity.
Regarding th e  first presupposition about the  incompatibility between 
maintaining order and  culture differences, the aw areness of the incompatibility
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is based on perspectival consciousness. The social reality and the 
corresponding pre-existing order in a  perspectival world are to be maintained 
linearly through conformity in order to avoid chaos. It Is the foreigners' 
responsibility to linearly ad ap t into the social reality pre-existing in the host 
environment. The linear conformity for the sake of maintaining order indicates 
the directional and purposive aw areness (which is a  characteristic of 
perspectival consciousness) toward certain goals. This aw areness is very 
perspectival, which is directional and goal-oriented. The manner of the way of 
maintaining order is essentially one-directional. Therefore, maintaining order 
through enhancing culture differences are considered irrational and 
irresponsible. The "best" way and the "most rational" way to deal with the 
competing social realities derived from different cultures is to prioritize the pre­
existing social reality over the competing realities by linearly suppressing them. 
The order is maintained b ased  on the host's social reality. The aw areness of 
incompatibility between culture differences and maintaining order clearly is a  
manifestation of perspectival consciousness, which is the unilinear goal- 
oriented mentality.
Efficiency (i.e., a  modern value judgment which desires and values one's 
wish fulfillment with minimum speed), on the other hand, also correlates with 
perspectival consciousness. Efficiency, in short, is derived from the value of 
time as  "time is money." Time here m eans an objectified, quantified, m easured 
time which is a  manifestation of perspectival consciousness. "Spending time," 
"killing time," "saving time," "using time," and "taking time" are  some of the 
expressions which indicate the nature of perspectival time. Time is not naturally 
occurring any more. Clock time is the indication of the perspectival will to
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control time in a  uni-directional m anner. Perspectival consciousness locates 
and fixes time arbitrarily and spatially. Time is sectorized and rigidified and, 
therefore, fragmented.
it is also important to notice that modernity's predominant values of time 
and efficiency are  derived from an aw areness of the temporal/time anxiety 
G ebser (1949/1985) mentions. Modern perspectival humans are anxious about 
time all the time. Expressions like "give me more time" and "1 need time" signify 
the modern perspectival temporal anxiety. Therefore, an aw areness of 
incompatibility betw een culture differences and the value on efficiency is a  clear 
indication of perspectival temporal anxiety. Fundamentally, it takes much time 
to understand other cultures. Moreover, enhancing culture differences, which 
are presumed to crea te  various problems, is not an efficient or rational thing to 
do.
While the two kinds of presupposed incompatibility are  derived from 
perspectival consciousness, it is extremely important to notice the culture 
differences-as-problematic presumption which created the origin of intercultural 
communication. Intercultural communication is and has been  essentially the 
perspectival solution to solve problems presum ed to be derived from culture 
differences. To put this in other words, perspectival consciousnesses is the
e s .it  is easy to notice that ideologies (i.e.. efficiency and conformity) and metaphysics (i.e.. 
objectivism, relativism) derived from perspectival consciousness have been presupposed and 
sedimented in all aspects of intercultural communication studies in terms of choice of topics, 
definitions, chosen methods, and theories.
It is also important to point out that so-called "Cartesian Anxiety ," a  philosophical term has 
been sedimented in the a rea  of intercultural communication. This "anxiety" is very typical for social 
scientists obsessed with objectivity. In essence, when they can not discover the objective reality 
"out there." they become anxious. Cartesian anxiety is essentially derived from dualism (i.e.. 
subject-object dichotomy), which is the clear manifestation of perspectival consciousness. 
Regarding this notion. Richard Bernstein (1983) argues, in his book "Beyond obiectivism and 
relativism." that "—either there is some support for our being, a  fixed foundation for our 
knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelope us with madness, with 
intellectual and moral chaos" (p. 18). In other words, this anxiety presupposes a  Grand Either/Or.
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origin and creation of intercultural communication a s  a  worthy independent
theme of investigation. Intercultural communication is a  manifestation of
perspectival consciousness that also reflected on perspectival values (and
ideologies) of conformity and efficiency without realizing nihilistic (i.e., self-
negating) consequences.
Therefore, intercultural communication is supposed to deal with the
various problems of cultural differences a s  quickly a s  possible. But, how exactly
Either "there m ust be some fixed, permanent constraints to which we can appeal and which are 
secure and stable" or "there are no such basic constraints except those that we invent or 
temporally accept" (p. 19) which represents objectivists’ and relativists' beliefs respectively. That 
is. Cartesian Anxiety is the either/or dichotomy, which created objectivism and relativism.
The sam e is applicable to the area of intercultural communication. Since participants in 
intercultural communication are not able to engage in the process normally identified with 
intracultural communication, they easily encounter various kinds of communication chaos such as 
misunderstandings and conflicts. Therefore, it is crucial to find the determinate and fixed criteria 
or knowledge to keep us from falling into chaos. In this sense. Cartesian Anxiety deeply haunts 
the area of intercultural communication. Thus, intercultural scholars have tended to seek the 
absolute solution (i.e., knowledge) of the problems due to culture differences.
On the other hand, the attempts to find the absolute solution is reflected on various 
phenomena of intercultural communication. The phenomenon of intercultural communication 
competence is a  good example of this issue. Possession of intercultural communication 
competence (i.e., absolute knowledge) is presumed to be the answer to overcome various 
problems due to culture differences. Intercultural communication competence, here, tends to be 
viewed a s  the m aster knowledge (or skills or ability) applicable in any intercultural context. 
Therefore, numerous researchers have attempted to discover the basic and fixed dimensions 
(i.e.. criteria or standards) of intercultural communication competence (Gudykunst. Hammer & 
Wiseman. 1978; Gudykunst & Kim. 1992; Kim. 1991; Martin. 1988; Spitzberg. 1988 and many 
more) presupposing their existence. While many tried to find out general intercultural 
communication competence, other scholars tended to find out specific intercultural 
communication competence. Unlike the pursuit of general intercultural competence, specific 
intercultural competence attempted to focus on specific knowledge or skills applicable to certain 
specific cultures. Although different researchers take different positions, they take either 
intercultural-competence-as-general-view or intercultural-competence-as-specific-view 
presuming this either/or. Cartesian Anxiety also has influenced researchers attempting to find an 
ideal model of human being in terms of becoming intercultural. including multicultural man (Adler. 
1982). universal man (Tagore. 1961; Walsh. 1973), and intercultural identity formation (Kim. 1988; 
Kim & Ruben. 1988). Discovering such ideal identity is presumed to be the (absolute and fixed) 
answer to overcome the challenges of intercultural communication. It is evident that Cartesian 
Anxiety has affected these studies.
The various studies of intercultural adaptation are another area where Cartesian Anxiety 
has operated. For instance. Kim and Gudykunst (1992) clearly mention "for most people, even for 
natives, complete adaptation, or assimilation, is a  lifetime goal" (p.216). This statement clearly 
presumes intercultural strangers' complete unilinear adaptation as  the ultimate and the  fixed 
solution. Intercultural strangers are presumed to be adapted or assimilated into a  host 
environment in a  fixed linear way in the long run. Otherwise, when they can not accomplish the 
ultimate goal, they are presumed to viewed as "abnormal." This dichotomy clearly reflects 
Cartesian Anxiety.
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did intercultural communication solve the problem s? The next section 
describes the way perspectival consciousness handles these problems by 
referring to the specific (perspectival) solutions the US governments^ devised. 
The next section also indicates the relationship between the solutions and the 
nature of intercultural communication
Active behavioral conform itv a s  the perceived most effective m eans to 
solve the problems of culture differences: Technizationss of intercultural 
communication. The United S tates governm ent had to find out the  most 
effective and appropriate m eans (which are perspectival in nature) to solve the 
problems derived from culture differences. The US government choise w as US 
representatives' behavioral adaptation to foreign nationals' behaviors. 
Therefore, the US governm ent established a  new training facility which could 
enhance the trainees' behavioral conformity. The concrete m eans for this 
behavioral adaptation was, initially, useful foreign language training. The 
training should give enough situational language rules necessary  for each  US 
representative's efficient goal achievement. Therefore, the training was usually 
highly concrete and situational. It w as a  natural consequence that each 
instructor of the foreign language was a  native speaker of the language. It was 
the most effective's and practical way for the trainees to conform their behaviors 
through imitating the natives' language style.
^^.Goveming is a  directional-perspectival issue.
38.Technl2at!on is "a process of becoming technique" (Husserl. 1954/1970. p. 46). What 
happened through technization was that intercultural communication cam e to be seen  as 
increasingly instrumental--as a  mere tool for other purposes, for instance, to accomplish overseas 
assignments.
3 ^."Effective" means having immediate effects or applications. In this sense, "effective" and 
"practical" are almost synonymous. However, a s  Habermas (1968/1973) contended in his Theory 
and Practice, "practical" was defined differently in the past. For instance, in ancient Greek, 
"practical" meant "ethical." Being practical meant being able to make an ethical and prudent 
judgment In each situation (See Aristotle's Ethics for the original meaning of "practical." See
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An important point is that the US culture originally had a  strong belief that 
everything could be controlled and solved tech n ica lly ,in c lu d in g  nature.
There w as a  strong belief and a  will that problem s of culture differences were 
supposed to be  technical problems and, therefore, could be solved technically. 
Therefore, when the US government encountered the problems of culture 
differences, a  technical solution was already presum ed before the problems 
were perceived. Human differences are  objectified and are reduced to 
technical problems. It is crucial to notice there w as a strong manipulative will to 
solve and control the problems as  quick a s  possible for the sake of maximizing 
the US's political power and interest. The solutions which have immediate 
use-values (which are efficient and practical) w ere supposed to be picked 
regardless of the nature of these solutions.
As a  result, the US government, specifically som e linguists hired by the 
US government, created effective language training which could allow the 
trainees to accomplish their oversea assignm ents within a  limited time frame. 
While the training content w as different, the nature of the microcultural training 
Edward Hall introduced later was the sam e a s  the earlier practical language 
training. Both presum ed that problems of culture differences could be 
controlled and  solved technically with limited am ount of time by giving practical 
linguistic a s  well a s  cultural know-how to the trainees. Intercultural
Habermas' (1968/1973) and Bernstein's Beyond Obiectivism and Relativism (1983) for the 
transformation of the meaning. Even without having immediate use-values and applications, 
people could be practical in the past.
^0.“Technique" is derived from the Greek word "techne." which is "a working with the hands, a  
craft, a  manual skill, an art." (Partridge, 1958, p. 698) Thus, a  technique was originally an artistic 
skill for artistic production. It was only employed for productions, not employed for human action 
in an original sense . While techne is not employed for human interaction, it is important to notice 
techne is used for human interaction for the purpose of enhancing (the US's own) interests in 
modern technological world. Since techne has immediate use-value. it becom es practical. Being 
technical is supposed to be practical and effective.
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communication, therefore, had to be technical in nature. Intercultural 
communication originally had been  problematized a s  technical know-how (i.e., 
techne). Here, technization of intercultural communication took place. 
Technization of intercultural communication was the m ost rationaM\ effective, 
and practical solution for the highly goal-oriented (perspectival) US 
government.
Although the technization of intercultural communication might be an 
indispensable process, the decision has been sedim ented in the studies of 
inercultural communication and the movement to the technization necessarily 
led to several consequences. The next section explains briefly how the 
technical know-how-as-intercultural-communication has been  em bedded in the 
present studies, then unveils the consequences.
Historical sedim entation of intercultural communication a s  techical know­
how. After intercultural communication had been studied and problematized as  
technical know-how under a  political context (i.e., the US Foreign Service) 
during late 1940s and early 1950s (1946-1955), intercultural communication 
developed a s  an  a rea  of communication in an academ ic context. Although 
there have been  som e changes, many of the current studies of Intercultural 
communication a re  historically sedim ented products presupposing the origin. 
Particularly, two a reas  of studies illustrate this point.
One is the  a rea  of intercultural training, particularly culture-specific 
training. Culture specific training is still a  vital a rea  of intercultural 
communication which aims to give practical and sp e c if ic  sk ills  to trainees.
.Etymologically. rational came from Latin origin "ratio" which m eans "to reckon." "to divide." as 
well as "to calculate" in the sense  of "to think" (Gebser. 1949/1985: Partridge. 1958). It implies 
calculated technical thinking for the purpose of achieving certain goals. It is. thus, directional and 
perspectival.
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Various rules, norms, values, customs, w ays of thinking, and traditions which 
are specific in a  target culture are introduced through various m eans (e.g., 
simulation exercises, utilization of critical incidents) for the trainees to be able to 
apply them usefully in actual situations. In essence, the nature of any  culture- 
specific training is the sam e a s  Edward Hall's microcultural training, although 
the contents and the m eans to introduce the training can be different. Any 
culture-specific training is essentially skill oriented based on the sam e  belief 
that culture differences can  be  overcom e technically through active behavioral 
conformity by grasping situationally applicable information. As a consequence, 
the trainees who successfully m asters culture specific techniques a re  expected 
to communicate effectively with foreign nationals. Both programs are  also 
based on a  strong will to control and solve culture differences and to seek  out 
efficiency. Particularly, this will to pursue efficiency led to another fam ous 
research trend in intercultural communication.
Relating to the research in intercultural training, one of the m ost 
predominant a reas  in the studies of intercultural communication is obviously 
intercultural communication com petence or intercultural communication 
effectiveness. While there have been m any disagreem ents in term s of 
definitions, perspectives, and methods, all studies of intercultural 
communication com petence or effectiveness have an essential similarity. The 
similarity is the motivation for the studies. W hat is the essential reason any 
scholar wishes to study intercultural communication com petence or 
effectiveness? The scholars necessarily have a  will to pursue efficiency. A will 
for efficiency and convenience essentially have been motivating scholars to 
study intercultural communication com petence and effectiveness. Regardless
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of the contents, people who try to study intercultural communication 
com petence or effectiveness necessarily have a  shared  motivation for 
efficiency, presupposing culture differences as  problems to be necessarily 
solved. The origin of intercultural communication a s  a  perspectival solution is 
clearly present.
The next section unveils several consequences derived from the 
technization of intercultural communication.
A consequence of intercultural communication a s  technical know-how. 
Intercultural communication em erged a s  technical know-how for the purpose of 
controlling and solving the problem s derived from culture differences in an 
efficient and perspectival way. While intercultural communication as-a- 
technical know-how did have som e values, intercultural communication did not 
em erge for the sake of understanding other cultures a s  a  primary motive.
Rather, it emerged as a phenom enon for the sake of enhancing the value of 
efficiency a s  a  prime motive. Therefore, a s  long a s  intercultural communication 
tries to understand culture differences for the sake of maintaining power by 
enhancing efficiency, intercultural understanding has remained shallow. 
Intercultural communication a s  technical know-how always already 
presupposes the understanding of culture differences and a  minimum frame for 
the participant to be able to accomplish his or her goal (i.e., achieving his or her 
oversea assignment). Therefore, understanding for the sake of understanding 
had never been achieved^z. Understanding culture differences was necessary 
only because  it did enhance efficient goal achievement. The motive of the
^2. In a  sense, the way of understanding was very instrumental, like Popper's view of language as 
a  mere tool. Although Hall viewed communication as  a  cultural expression and understood the 
complex relationship between communication and culture, the context (i.e.. the FSI in the US 
Department of the State) in which he w as situated might have forced him to train his trainees in a  
technical and instrumental manner.
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intercultural understanding was for the sake of enhancing own power, not for 
the sake of understanding others.
The motive for the understanding is, in other words, an egoistic one. The 
person who has practical skills for intercultural communication might be able to 
achieve his or her goal efficiently, but he or she would never understand the 
complexity of culture differences. The person might accomplish his or her goal 
through an efficient understanding, but at the sam e time, he or she  might be 
sacrificing a meaningful understanding of other hum an cultures.
Understanding, a s  G adam er (1960/1989) and Bernstein (1983) contend, 
necessarily requires phronesis which is an ethical and prudent understanding. 
Both G adam er and Bernstein argue that technical understanding is always 
already not a  true understanding for human beings. Although intercultural 
communication a s  technical know-how is an inescapable emerging 
phenomenon under a post World War II historical context, the way of 
intercultural understanding for the US representatives w as a  technical surface 
understanding lacking an ethical dimension. Ethics, which are  essential for any 
human understanding, had never been a  primary concern com pared to the 
concern for the value of efficiency. This tendency becam e more severe when 
intercultural communication began to be problematized objectively a s  an 
inquiry of social sciences.
Obiectifvino and theorizing intercultural communication as  the clear 
manifestation of social scientizino intercultural communication: From a  specific 
technical know-how to a general technical know-how. Although communication 
studies joined other social science disciplines during post World War II period, 
intercultural communication began to be  problematized and studied within the
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discipline of communication a s  a  social science during 1970s. However, it was 
the early 1980s when intercultural communication significantly developed as  a  
social science. In other words, many started to argue the necessity of theorizing 
intercultural communication. For instance, Gudykunst, an influential 
intercultural scholar, kept arguing that theorizing intercultural communication 
was a  necessary  s tep  if intercultural communication w as to develop as a  social 
science (Asante & Gudykunst, 1989; Gudykunst, 1983; Gudykunst & Nishida, 
1981 ) He, in fact, a s  an editor of the Annual of intercultural communication. 
changed an editorial policy in 1983 for the purpose of maturing intercultural 
communication a s  an  academ ic field of social sciences. As Gudykunst and 
Nishida (1981) argue: "it is our contention that if the study of intercultural 
communication is to develop further, it needs to move—toward a  consistent 
theoretical framework for the  analysis of communication betw een people from 
different cultures" (p. 88). Put otherwise, theorizing intercultural communication 
was perceived to be  an indispensable task. As a  result, after this change of the 
editorial policy, many started  to theorize intercultural communication. It was a  
process of objectifying, scientizing^G, and theorizing intercultural 
communication.
It is worthwhile to notice the functions and the nature of a  theory as 
intercultural scholars perceive them. Social scientists view the major functions 
theory serves a s  explaining/understanding, predicting, and  controling the 
phenomenon of interest. Here, there is a  pre-judgment that the better a 
scientific theory is, the more it can explain, predict, and control the phenomenon 
of interest. It is important to think about the reason people wish to
'^^.scientizing is a  process of making something scientific.
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explain/understand, predict, and control. Since a  science is, essentially, a  
sense-m aking activity, explanation or understanding is critical. On the other 
hand, why do people predict and control? One essential reason is a  desire for 
efficiency. The circum stances where both prediction and control are impossible 
are  perceived to be uncertain, anxious, unstable, and chaotic. A good scientific 
theory can dom esticate such inconvenient situations into certain, secured, 
stable, and ordered situations through prediction and control. This is the 
process of scientific domestication. As a  consequence, 
inconvenience/inefficiency can be avoided. It is important to notice that a  value 
judgment is already m ade here also. S tated differently, the more a  theory can 
achieve prediction and control, the better and the more practical the theory is.
While theories in traditional sciences aim a t understanding, prediction, or 
control, the initial goal of a  theory of intercultural communication might be 
understand ing^  rather than prediction and control, as  Gudykunst and Nishida 
(1981) and Gudykunst (1983) contended, although the ultimate goal of 
intercultural communication theories is presum ed to be prediction and control. 
Put in other words, theories to explain the general mechanism of intercultural 
communication were necessary  to help intercultural communication move 
toward a  m ature science.
More interesting to  rem em ber is that a  good theory is perceived to be 
more practicaMS. Fisher (1979), for instance, suggested: "The key to choosing 
one theory over another, then, is never which is more 'true' or 'correct' but which
'^^.There is another presumption. It is assum ed that understanding leads to control. That 
knowledge equals power. In fact, the degree of "understanding" has come to mean (in behavioral 
terms) the ability to manipulate. "Understanding" is a  subjective state. Control and manipulation 
have come to equal "understanding."
'^^.And the more practical, the more "rational."
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one is more useful or Interesting." (p. 21) Gudykunst, similarly, frequently 
argues, quoting Kurt Lewin, "There is nothing so practical a s  a  good theory." A 
good theory is presum ed to have a  practical value. Consequently, Gudykunst 
argues for the necessity  of theory in applied intercultural phenom enon. He 
frequently argues that intercultural training will be theory-based rather than 
focusing on culturally specific applicable knowledge and skills. Instead, he 
argued a  theory based  culture-general training might be more useful and 
practical in som e cases. General skills and knowledge which are b ased  on a 
theory of intercultural communication a re  perceived to be applicable to more 
situations and to have more flexibility. The movement of theorizing intercultural 
communication m eant the movement of finding a  general techne from a 
situational techne, while the process of technization remained the sam e.
C onsequences of scientization^s of intercultural communication. While 
theorizing intercultural communication might have been a necessary  step  to 
m ake intercultural communication m ature a s  a  field of communication studies, it 
necessarily had consequences. More specifically, theorizing intercultural 
communication in a  scientific and objective m anner led to a crucial 
consequence. Although this consequence is the sam e for any social science 
which attempts to develop status by theorizing in an objective manner, the 
process necessarily dissociated the subjective dimension from the objective 
dimension, which were originally integrated. A subjective dimension, which 
pertains to the subject and particular perspectives, feelings, beliefs, and desires
'^^.Scientization is a  process of becoming scientific. It is a  consequence of "scientism." 
Habermas, in his Knowledge and Human interests ft 968/1971). explains "scientism" a s  science's 
belief in itself, which is "the conviction that we can no longer understand science as one form of 
possible knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge with science." (p. 67) Therefore, 
scientization of intercultural communication m eans a  process of making the area of "intercultural 
communication" scientific through theorizing and attaining scientific knowledge derived from 
scientific methods and procedures.
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(which a re  considered unjustified), w as bound to be neglected for the sake of 
pursuing objectivity (which is justified knowledge). Being scientific is presumed 
to be objective. Being scientific by being objective is more valuable than being 
non-scientific by being subjective. A clear value judgment w as already made 
here in the nam e of objective science a s  the ultimate goal. As a  consequence, 
subjective dimensions, such a s  particular viewpoints, personal opinions, 
personal experiences, ethics, values, w ere excluded a s  sources of science.
Likewise, such subjective factors w ere excluded for the sake  of theorizing 
intercultural communication. While technization of intercultural communication 
through pursuing situational techne disturbed a  prudent understanding of 
culture differences and complex hum an communication, theorizing intercultural 
communication in an objective m anner resulted in the lack of considering 
subjective factors in the process of theorizing.
Although it might be an indispensable process, the process of excluding 
subjective factors for the sake of theorizing and ultimately maturing intercultural 
communication a s  an Independent academ ic field might be a  crucially 
disadvantageous event for intercultural communication. Such a  process might 
oversimplify the complex nature of "intercultural communication" phenomena. 
Summarv: Intercultural Communication a s  a  Manifestation of W estern 
Perspectival Ideologies
This section summarizes the archaeological historical investigation of the 
origin of intercultural communication. Intercultural communication a s  an 
independent them e of investigation w as foregrounded originally in the US 
within the post-World War II historical context, which correlated to post-colonial 
era (which decolonization process began with the US revolution). On one
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hand, it presum es humanism which w as a  new attitude of respect and equality 
toward "others" originating in the Enlightenment. Intercultural communication 
a s  an independent academ ic study, in other words, presum es that we can 
communicate because  we are  all h u m an .
While intercultural communication presum es humanism, as anthropology 
and comparative cultural studies do, intercultural communication was originally 
a  political m eans to maintain world order in a  dem ocratic m anner so that the US 
could maximize her political interests and  political powers over other nations 
(particularly the USSR) in the post-colonial historical epoch. It also helped the 
US to diffuse the major ideologies (e.g., democracy, individualism) to other 
nations (especially to decolonizing nations) so that the US could remain a  
superpower and com pete with another superpower. Therefore, it was originally 
a  political creation which w as the manifestation of the W estern ideologies (i.e., 
the US ideologies) in general.
Specifically, intercultural communication w as originally created a s  a  
technical cultural know-how which was necessary  for the US foreign officers to 
accomplish their oversea assignm ents in an efficient and a  practical manner. 
Intercultural communication necessarily had immediate use-values to deal with 
problems due to culture differences. Understanding culture differences was not 
the major issue. The major issue was to get the job done a s  quickly as 
possible. B ecause the historical teleology changed, the US only had to 
consider the appropriate m eans to get the  jobs done efficiently. Intercultural 
communication w as an appropriate a s  well a s  practical m eans for the US 
government. It w as a  convenient m eans for them that was not designed to 
decipher complex human diversity. Human understanding was, in fact, not the
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issue in the original context where intercultural communication originally took 
place. Therefore, intercultural communication w as originally highly ideological 
and political in this sen se . It w as a technical and linear solution and a  
manifestation of the predom inant modern W estern values of efficiency and 
conformity. Stated differently, intercultural communication w as a  Western 
ideology and is a  concrete manifestation of perspectival consciousness.
Social scientists, particularly communication scholars, uncritically 
adopted this notion and established an a rea  of communication called 
"intercultural communication." Therefore, intercultural communication as a  field 
of study has been always already a manifestation of W estern perspectival 
ideology. While intercultural communication was originally a  manifestation of 
W estern perspectival ideology, it slightly changed its meaning when the 
historical context significantly shifted after the end of Cold War. The next 
section, as  the second half of archeology, attem pts to clarify the meaning- 
transformation of intercultural communication in the post-Gold War historical 
epoch.
Clarifying the Meaning-Transformation of Intercultural Communication
Up to this point, this research has sought to unveil the origin of 
intercultural communication. While deciphering the origin is indispensable, 
unfolding the process of its transformation is also a  necessary  task for 
archaeological historical investigation of intercultural communication. This task 
is especially important for intercultural communication, since the critical shift of 
historical context (i.e., the en d  of Cold War) which correlated with the 
transformation of the m eaning (although the origin still rem ains present), took
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place during the 1980s. W henever the context shifts, the meaning of the text 
also transforms, since the text is always situated in the background context. 
Deciphering the meaning of the text is always completed by situating the  text in 
the socio-cultural historical context.
Therefore, this second part of the archaeology identifies and clarifies the 
shift of historical context (2-A), then deciphers the transformed meaning of 
intercultural communication by putting it in the new historical context (2-B). 
Finally, the implications of the meaning-transformation are  unveiled (2-C).
2-A. Identifving the Shift of the Historical Context
While history continues on and  on, some crucial historical events-^^ take 
place in time of transition. While th e  end of World War II m eant the finale of 
colonialism, it also m eant the beginning of another ideological war; the "Cold 
War" betw een democracy (led by th e  US) and communism (led by Russia). The 
end of Cold War, therefore, not only w as an event which changed the 
relationship betw een the United S ta te s  and Russia (i.e., former Soviet Union), 
but also an important event which m eant the end of ideological war. The end of 
the Cold W ar clearly indicated a  shift of historical context. Put otherwise, the 
end of Cold War implied a total domination of Western perspectival ideologies 
(e.g., capitalism, democracy) on a  world-wide scale. Historical events, such  a s  
the integration between West G erm any and East Germany and the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, which happened after the end of Cold War, 
clearly point to the predominance of perspectival Western ideologies and logic 
over the others. W estern rational values, which reflect perspectival 
consciousness, are diffusing all over the  world through various m eans (e.g..
4^.it is important to notice even crucial events are transitional because all events are "transitional."
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various kinds of technologies, various forms of m ass media, various 
sojourners). This implies an em ergence of new colonialism of W estern rational 
and linear ideologies. W estern perspectival ideologies are now becoming a  
world ideology. This dramatic shift necessarily transformed the meaning of 
intercultural communication.
(2-B). Clarifvino the Meaning of Intercultural Communication bv Situating it in 
the Post-Cold War Historical Context
Intercultural communication was, specifically, a  necessary techne for US 
representatives to efficiently achieve their goal achievem ents for oversea 
assignm ents during the post World War II period. Intercultural communication 
w as an  indispensable tool for som e limited American foreign personnel rather 
than for everybody. It was an indispensable tool to maintain the US's power 
and interests in international relations. Therefore, many of the studies of 
intercultural communication in the initial stage  w ere so  called "culture-specific" 
studies that attempted to find out situational skills and situational rules 
applicable to particular intercultural encounters. Intercultural communication 
w as highly specialized cultural know-how.
On the other hand, the end of Cold War, along with scientization of 
intercultural communication and the noticeable em ergence of globalization 
derived from revolutionary change of m ass media and other communication 
technologies, changed the meaning of intercultural communication. While 
intercultural communication w as a  highly specialized skill for a  specific 
population in the initial stage, intercultural communication, during the post-Gold 
War period and up to the present is becoming an  indispensable skill for 
everybody in the world. In other words, not only a  particular population of
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people in the US, but also virtually everybody in the world is beginning to be 
aw are of intercultural communication a s  an indispensable tool in the post-Cold 
War period. The study area of intercultural communication is diffusing all over 
the world. Various forms of multi-cultural organizations have been sensitive to 
intercultural training. There are many correlations easily obsen/ed which signify 
the diffusion of perspectival consciousness. W estern perspectival ideologies 
have been diffusing all over the world through diffusion of intercultural 
communication, which is essentially a  manifestation of perspectival 
consciousness. W hen perspectival ideologies transformed to world ideologies, 
intercultural communication also transform ed a  crucial world ideology into what 
w as originally a  W estern ideology. Therefore, intercultural communication 
becam e widespread and is perceived to  be the indispensable tool for virtually 
everybody in the world. There could b e  several reasons for this shift of the 
meaning.
First of all, the post Cold War historical context determined the 
predominance of W estern rational ideologies over others. It also symbolized 
that world order w as bound to be maintained through the Western rational 
ideologies in a  peaceful manner (in principle). In other words, many laymen, 
scholars, and practitioners began to perceive interconnectedness among 
different cultures a s  the essential characteristic of the post Cold War period. 
Besides, revolutionary communication technologies (such as  internet, 
communication satellite, fax, etc.) enhanced  people's aw areness of 
interconnectivity am ong the world. O ne fam ous concept in the post-Cold War 
period is the global villager’s as  McLuhan (1962) originally labeled it. Many
r’Svillage implies collective community where people are emotionally interrelated with each other. 
In this sense, global village might not be an appropriate reference. People in our "deficient" late
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people all over the world w ere Interested in the concept and viewed It a s  a  key 
to protecting them selves from various problems due to culture differences, such 
as  racial and cultural conflicts taking place In the present modernity.
Although It Is a  myth, th e  concept of "global village" symbolizes people's 
keen aw areness of Indispensable Interconnectedness among different cultures. 
In fact, Intercultural communication Is perceived to be Indispensable a s  a  dally 
event. As the aw areness of Interconnectlvlllty among the world becam e acute, 
many started to treat "intercultural communication" a s  an  Indispensable tool. It 
is presumed that in the post Cold War period (i.e., globalizing modernity), 
nobody can avoid intercultural communication. Intercultural communication 
taking place a s  a  dally com m on event Is an Indispensable tool for everybody. It 
is not a  choice any more. Intercultural communication is now a  predominant 
world value.
Second, while people perceived Intercultural communication as  an 
Indispensable skill, they were a lso  beginning to be aw are of the  problems 
taking place domestically and world-wide, mainly through m ass media. An 
Important point Is that people w ere aw are of the problems a s  Intercultural 
problems derived from culture differences. Many domestic and International 
racial conflicts, many co-cultural conflicts (e.g., gay vs. straight,
Intergeneratlonal conflicts) w ere perceived to be intercultural problems which 
Intercultural communication should give the answer. Intercultural 
communication seem s to be treated  a s  the only Inevitable answ er to solve the 
problems of culture differences so  that domestic as well a s  world orders can be 
maintained In a  peaceful m anner. Intercultural communication Is Indispensable
modernity do not interconnect with each  other emotionally. They interconnect with others 
technically (through technologies such as internet and satellite). Global "city" might be more 
appropriate as Brisenski argued.
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not only b ecau se  nobody can avoid the phenomenon, but also because 
Intercultural communication is perceived to be the only m eans to protect people 
from the chaos culture differences bring.
In short, in the post Cold War period, intercultural communication 
transform ed from a W estern ideology to a  world ideology and a  predominant 
world value. It still serves a s  the m eans to maintain world and domestic order, 
protecting people from intercultural problems cultural differences create. It is 
also an indispensable tool and a  m eans for everybody to becom e a m em ber of 
"global village" a s  an end.
(2-C). Unveiling the Implications of the  Meaning-Transformation
There are  several implications of the meaning of intercultural 
communication a s  a  world ideology under the post-Cold W ar historical epoch 
(i.e., late modern deficient perspectival world). This investigation necessarily 
considers the implications of perspectival consciousness a s  the predominant 
world-wide diffusing consciousness under the new epoch.
The implications of the world-wide scale diffusion of perspectival 
co n sc io u sn ess . The diffusion of perspectival consciousness on a  world-wide 
scale is leading to various forms of the  conflict of culture logics within each 
nation. The diffusion of perspectival consciousness m eans the diffusion of 
various forms of perspectival ideologies and logics through various m eans. The 
conflict and confusion take place when the diffusion is so  rapid and acute that 
people in different cultures can not deal with the diffusion any more. Besides, 
people are  not consciously aw are of th e  diffusion. Usually, the process of 
diffusion takes place without recognition. As a  result, each  culture (especially 
non-W estern cultures) is confused betw een the traditional ideologies and logics
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and the perspectival W estern Ideologies and logics. In short, various forms of 
conflict between the  traditional logics and the perspectival logics are  taking 
place all over the world. The essen ce  of the problem is that the diffusion of 
perspectival ideologies is creating the second America or the second W estern 
perspectival world all over the world. This is, in a  sense, invisible imperialism 
regardless of the m ore specific implications of the diffusion.
This diffusion correlates to the conflict of cultural logics on a  world-wide 
scale, but also h a s  another implication. The diffusion not only confuses people 
due to conflicts betw een the traditional cultural logics and the perspectival 
logics, but also som etim es exterminates the traditional cultural ideologies and 
logics. The perspectival values and logics a re  diffused through various m eans 
such as sojourners, various forms of cultural artifacts (e.g., ways of thinking, 
music, clothes, m ass media, various technologies, e t cetera). Such 
perspectival cultural artifacts (regardless of kind) are diffusing all over the world 
making virtually another perspectival culture (e.g., perspectival W estern Japan, 
China, Korea, et cetera).
In fact, people might actively and magically adopt the various forms of 
perspectival logics and ideologies without recognizing its implication. Younger 
generations around the world are particularly susceptible. They are  flexible and 
enjoy perspectival cultural artifacts (i.e.. W estern clothes. Western music, the 
value of freedom and democracy. W estern hair style) as  symbols of being 
modern. Being m odern is being W estern and, therefore, perspectival in 
essence. It is easily observed that younger people from all over the world 
accept and enjoy being modern and W estern. Since being modern is the 
predominant world value in the present world, people attempt to be that way
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rather than being traditional. Being traditional tends to be avoided and rejected 
because  being traditional signifies the out-of-date. The problem is that people 
can not integrate the two different w ays of experiencing the world any more. 
Therefore, various forms of cultural artifacts in each culture which signify each 
cultural traditional values and consciousness are being exterminated^s. This 
implies the extermination of the uniqueness of each culture. People are  doing 
this actively without recognizing the nihilistic results (i.e., people are  actively 
negating their own identity). People only see  things through their uniqueness 
(including their cultural uniqueness). The diffusion of perspectival 
consciousness implies the process of homogenization by exterminating the 
uniqueness of each culture.
The implications of intercultural communication-as-world ideology. First 
of all, intercultural communication is a  cultural artifact, or a  civilizational 
expression in G ebser's term, just like music, art, architecture, technology, etc. 
Intercultural communication is a  concrete manifestation of perspectival 
consciousness which signifies perspectival ideologies (e.g., efficiency, 
conformity, rationality). As long a s  intercultural communication (the specific 
m anners of expression or logic intercultural communication inherently 
possesses) is used within the perspectival region of the world, it might be 
harm less. However, whenever intercultural communication is applied to non- 
W estern cultures, crucial problems arise. Fundamentally, intercultural 
communication is and has been W estern and purely perspectival; and can only
^^.Hojoo ( 1978), for instance, contends various forms of Japanese traditional arts are facing a 
problem of extinction. He argues this is not only because mastering such manual skill takes long 
years of practices, but also because younger generations tend not to pursue mastery of such 
traditional arts. Another problem he mentions is that such delicate manual skills can not be 
reproduced by any machines. While Japanese  traditional arts are facing a  problem of extinction, 
this might be applied in other countries, although the investigator can not determine this issue 
due to the lack of information.
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be applied to W estern and perspectival cultures. Therefore, a  regional logic 
can not explain the logics that are not perspectival in nature. Tragedy began 
when a  regional logic becam e the world logic.
The m ore crucial problem is that intercultural communication is and has 
been, in essen ce , a convenient/efficient and a  dem ocratic m eans (which is 
techne) to assim ilate different cultures into a  "Grand W estern culture." 
Intercultural communication assim ilates culture differences into one "global" 
culture. Since intercultural communication is supposed  to be the Grand Logic, it 
does not allow th e  existence of alternative logics. As a  result, intercultural 
communication serves a  role to exterminate cultural diversity in an 
indispensable and  strange^o manner. Intercultural communication as  the world 
logic implies the process of homogenization of various types of cultural logics.
So, how a re  we doing? It is not looking good. In fact, intercultural 
communication, which is supposed to be the solution, is the very source of the 
problems of culture differences. This becom es more clear when the ultimate 
consequence of th e  presuppositions is critically investigated. Therefore, this 
concluding section of archaeological historical investigation of intercultural 
communication attem pts to unveil the uncanny^i nature of intercultural 
communication.
S ^ h i s  is very strange because intercultural communication and the members of the community 
attempt to understand and respect cultural diversity, while what the discipline has been doing is 
exterminating cultural diversity without the recognition.
"Uncanny" here m eans a state where the ultimate solution transforms to the genesis of the 
ultimate problem. More specifically, "intercultural communication" was supposed to be the 
ultimate solution for respecting cultural diversity. However, "intercultural communication" is 
becoming the ultimate problem to co-exist with other cultures. It serves a  role of exterminating of 
cultural diversity. This process (the turn from a  solution to a  problem) is very uncanny. Regarding 
uncanniness, see  Culler (1982). Freud (1919/1925). Hertz (1979). Miller (1976).
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Deciphering Uncanny C onsequences: Crisis of Culture Differences 
The concluding section of this chapter deciphers the uncanny nature that 
the intercultural-communication-as-perspectival ideology inherently p o ssesses . 
It questions the two fundamental perspectival values that constitute intercultural 
communication and C artesian Anxiety, which has been sedim ented into social 
scientists’ aw areness. Then, the uncanny nature of intercultural communication 
and the crisis of culture differences are  clarified by investigating the ultimate 
consequence of each  value. Finally, the necessity of alternative 
presuppositions is d iscussed  as a  way to close the gap betw een reality and 
theory.
A Questioning of the two values and Cartesian Anxiety
While several solutions to overcom e cultural differences and to maintain 
order (i.e., a  social reality) have been proposed, have we actually solved the 
problems? Do theories of intercultural communication satisfactorily explain 
various phenom ena of communication with strangers in modernity? Recalling 
the continuous increase of interethnic conflicts both domestically and 
internationally, constant incidents of culture shock as well a s  re-entry culture 
shock, immigrants' identity crisis problems, and constant overt and covert 
communication m isunderstandings, social scientists' various solutions appear 
to have not been working well. Strangely, their solutions and theories 
sometim es seem  to cau se  new problems rather than solve old ones. For 
instance, the previously overlooked cau ses  of culture shock might be hidden 
conformity pressure toward a  single social reality a s  a  com m onsense process 
(i.e., as  a  widely accepted norm) a s  well a s  the anxiety of feeling abnormal or 
inferior.
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When a  cultural stranger does not accept what has been  called 
"commonsense," she  or he might experience a  "shock" since she  or he 
expected intuitively to be able to function in a  new environment, but could not. 
This discrepancy between expectation and reality might lead to various 
reactions of "shock" phenomenon. Since the nature of com m onsense involves 
a  sort of strong assimilation power, many ordinary people are  capable of 
understanding the com m onsense and adapting to the com m onsense, creating 
a  static social reality in each  host environment, a s  Kim (1988) claims. However, 
cultural strangers within a  new environment might have difficulty adapting to a 
new social reality (through som e degrees of unlearning) when the discrepancy 
betw een the nature of their previously established reality and the nature of the 
new reality becom es greater. When they (cultural strangers) can not enact the 
com m onsense efficiently and  normally, they feel abnormal and inferior. In a  
host environment, conformity pressure might haunt the cultural strangers, 
causing them to experience various kinds of emotional shocks. Although som e 
people assert the irresponsibility of promoting a  competing different reality, 
since intercultural communication is becoming "ordinary," maintaining a  static 
single social reality through employing the value of conformity seem s to be 
impossible. Rather, if we continue to do so, conflicts (e.g., ethnic war) will 
increase even more, while our still predominant com m onsense and theories 
proposed by social scientists attempt to force us to m ake rather impossible 
requests (i.e., maintaining social order and reality through homogeneity and 
conformity).
Essential problems about various proposed solutions by various scholars 
might be due to the presum ed values and Cartesian Anxiety which are the
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foundation of the solutions. Namely, it is a  natural consequence that the 
solutions have been ineffective when the foundation (of the solutions) itself is 
deficient. Therefore, the next section will examine the validity of the three 
foundations by considering the ultimate consequence of these foundations. 
Ultimate Consequence of Conformitv
What if this world successfully could bridge and overcome cultural 
differences in the long run? Although each culture could maintain a  social 
reality of its own, we are trying to erase, suppress, or even destroy each cultural 
stranger's unique cultural heritage at the sam e time. As a  cultural stranger 
conforms better and more effectively into a  host society, strangely, he or she  
loses unique cultural identity.
Identity is only possible through differences. If everybody is Japanese , 
how can somebody identify himself or herself a s  Jap an ese?  The unique 
"Japaneseness" becom es m eaningless if everybody is Japanese. Successful 
and  efficient conformity by a  cultural stranger in a  host environment might 
becom e a nightmare since the stranger is losing unique identity in the long run 
without fully recognizing it. Successful adaptation, which is supposed to be a 
solution, becom es a significant problem when som ebody accomplishes it. This 
is a  nihilistic and uncanny consequence since an  ultimate solution transform s 
into an ultimate problem without recognizing it.
Both parties (e.g., a  host and a  cultural stranger) can only recognize and 
appreciate their uniqueness and meaningfulness by seeing through the 
differences among them by engaging in the interaction. It is necessary to re­
evaluate the validity of our predominantly accepted presum ed com m onsense 
(maintaining order through conformity) and to seek  out the possibility of
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maintaining order through diversity and multiple differences. In other words, an 
alternative theory, one that can explain, communication with strangers without 
presupposing the values of homogeneity, harmony, and conformity, should be 
developed.
Ultimate consequence of seeking e ff ic ie n c v ^ z
Human beings a re  different from each other. Som e think, express, and 
act in a  directional goal-oriented manner, while others do not. Although both 
are equally meaningful in their own ways, when the  value of effectiveness 
becom es a  criterion, one (most likely one who is goal-oriented) may be viewed 
(and even labeled) a s  more com petent and successful than the other who is 
less goal-oriented. This social judgment is only m ade in terms of the 
comparison based  on the degree of efficiency. This comparison, which is 
based on the value of efficiency, becom es a  big problem when efficiency is 
valued obsessively. Namely, the existence of efficiency is only possible with the 
existence of inefficiency or less efficiency. Seeking efficiency is never-ending 
and never satisfied completely because  there is always more efficient 
existences^. Thus, seeking ultimate convenience or efficiency becom es 
uncanny and m eaningless since there Is no ultimate efficiency. However, 
human beings tend to ignore such an ultimate consequence when they are  
addicted to the value of efficiency. Moreover, the existence of efficiency is 
based on the existence of less efficiency.
S^Efficiency may apply to either individual-level or group (or collective)-level. However, efficiency 
here means individual-level efficiency. It indicates individual’s  own wish fulfillment in the quickest 
way.
53 lh is  kind of "perspectival" efficiency is similar to power. Unless both (efficiency and power) are 
exercised, they lose their vitality.
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If everybody is equally efficient, nobody can recognize his or her 
efficiency. In order to recognize his or her efficiency, somebody needs to 
sacrifice himself or herself. The value of efficiency can only remain vital 
b ecau se  of the hidden sacrifice. The value socially creates many losers and 
few winners. Without recognizing the nihilistic consequence, people are 
o b sessed  with more efficiency, which is presum ed to lead to a  so called 
"winner." It is important to be aw are that "a winner" in this sen se  is judged on 
the basis of efficiency. People som etim es tend to forget or even ignore a  moral 
dimension for the sake of efficiency. Efficiency rationalizes obsession of 
individual interest without considering human relationships and contextual 
factors involved in each  situation. Kramer (1992) argues this point;
By this means, individuals may "account” for their behavior, even if it is 
inconsistent with their ethical values, by telling them selves that the 
behavior and the morality of it are two completely different domains (e.g., 
"that's business"). Indeed, morality, being of the realm of judgment, is 
utterly ignored in lieu of brute behavior patterns, (p. 41 )
The above statem ent implies that since people think, in this modern 
world, behavior and morality belong to different dimensions. People tend to 
think it might be all right (or even necessary) to do things against ethical values 
for the sake of seeking to fulfill their egoistic desire. When people are obsessed  
with self-efficiency, they do practically anything by using any kinds of m eans in 
order to accomplish their ends conveniently. Accomplishing their own 
convenience is the primary purpose, while consideration of morality might be 
secondary or even be ignored. Being ethical, which is supposed to be  a  basis 
for hum an behavior and judgment, is becoming a  secondary issue because it 
does not bring immediate use-values. The value of efficiency m akes human
159
ethics and objective reasons^ (Horkhelmer, 1974) deteriorate and, therefore, 
makes human beings pursue their own desire without considering much about 
the ethical complexity of hum an relationships. O nce they accomplish their 
Individual goals more efficiently than others, yet the m eans they employ are not 
ethical, this tends to be rationalized due to the obsession of the value of 
convenience. This obsession  creates egocentric Individuals who never stop 
pursuing their ego.
The problem of pursuing convenience Is that It never satisfies human 
ego. The more one accom plishes convenience, the more efficiency he or she 
wants to accomplish for the next. Pursuit of efficiency snowballs. However, 
logically. In modernity, the ultimate consequence of pursuing ultimate 
convenience Is the lost of hum an trust and meaningful and enriching human 
relationships based  on a  decen t ethical judgment. Pursuit of efficiency makes 
each human being feel able to live alone without meaningful relationships. In 
this sense, therefore, pursuit of ultimate efficiency leads to extrem e 
Individualism and alienation, a s  Kramer and Ikeda (1994) suggest. Moreover, 
people som etim es feel like they can treat other beings as  m eans to their ends 
when the value of efficiency becom es obsessive. The value ultimately will 
cause various problems derived from a  moral dimension.
The obsession with efficiency not only leads to the deterioration of human 
morality in general. It cau ses  a  problem of meaning, particularly In the area of
his Eclipse of Reason (1974k Horkheimer argues two kinds of reason ; subjective reason 
and objective reason. Subjective reason, for him. is a  calculated thinking for the purpose of 
achieving somebody's subjective goal whatever it is. It is a  directional calculated thinking to 
coordinate the right m eans with a  given end. Therefore, it has immediate utilitarian values. In this 
sense, the more reasonable you become, the more practical and effective you become. On the 
other hand, objective reason is a  higher order reason which pursues human ethics which applies 
for everybody. It tries to think what "good" and “ethical" is. Unlike subjective reason, objective 
reason emphasizes ends rather than means.
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intercultural communication. Although many theories have been developed, 
the value of efficiency affects th ese  theories a  great deal. The theories should 
have use-values (e.g., efficiency, convenience) so  that people can improve their 
convenience by using them . Therefore, the theories are more or less useful in 
term s of facilitating convenience, and not very useful in terms of really 
understanding the enrichm ent of intercultural communication. For example, 
alm ost all theories of intercultural communication contend that 
misunderstanding is a  communication problem derived from culture differences. 
Since it becom es a  barrier to the pursuit of efficient or convenient 
communication process, it is presum ed m isunderstandings should be efficiently 
restricted, minimized, or even destroyed in many ways. However, without the 
em ergency of misunderstanding, we can not really learn much. Failure 
essentially is a  genesis of success.
Experiencing m isunderstandings (failure of successful communication) is 
the beginning step toward understanding becau se  recognizing 
misunderstanding leads to new understanding. Since abnormal 
communication tends to be a  normal process in intercultural communication, 
only through numerous trial and errors, meaningful understanding, which 
understands both one's own uniqueness and the other's uniqueness through 
comparison, can gradually em erge, although perfect understanding is 
impossible. However, in modernity, the obsessive value of efficiency does not 
allow us to view misunderstanding a s  the origin of meaningful understanding, 
but to view them only a s  problems. Misunderstanding becom es a  crucial 
problem only when the value of efficiency is a  central concern.
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Likewise, intercultural communication is becoming a  crucial problem 
since the phenomenon itself exists against the value of efficiency. Therefore, 
scholars attem pt to develop theories to minimize the effects of culture 
differences so that communication becom es more normal and is presum ed to 
be more useful. However, differences generate the origin of meaning itself. 
Culture differences them selves com pose the essential meaning of intercultural 
communication. Total pursuit of efficiency ultimately leads not only to the 
destruction of culture differences, but also of meaningfulness and enrichment of 
human diversity without recognition. It is time to re-evaluate the validity of the 
value of efficiency or convenience in modernity.
Ultimate Consequence of C artesian Anxiety
While the dualistic grand either/or dichotomy h as been facilitating 
theoretical developments in the a rea  of intercultural communication, it is also 
evident that this either/or dichotomy has been increasingly narrowing 
intercultural scholars' visions. For exam ple, in the phenom enon of intercultural 
adaptation, it is believed that a  cultural stranger is supposed to adapt to a  host 
environment linearly regardless of his or her cultural origin. Due to the 
unconscious influence of C artesian Anxiety, people have tended to believe this 
is the best and the absolute (fixed) way. Therefore, capability of adaptation is 
usually associated with individuals' ability, rarely associated with the cultural 
strangers' unique background. However, the way each  cultural stranger tries to 
adjust is supposed to be influenced by his or her unique and complex 
background. It is reasonable that each  cultural stranger has unique way of 
adjusting into a  host environment, although the shared  ways of adjustment
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probably exist In cases of shared  background. T here should be multiple ways 
of adaptation rather than the fixed linear ways.
Likewise, Cartesian Anxiety has led to the developm ent of various two­
valued cultural dimensions a s  strong analytical tools, such as low/high context 
(Hall, 1976), Individualism/collectivism, mascullnlty/femlnlnlty (Hofstede, 1980) 
and so  on. Although such dichotomies have been  parsimonious and 
theoretically useful. It Is also evident that such dichotomies are sometim es 
oversimplified and are not applicable to certain culturels. For Instance, while 
Japan  has been categorized under collectlvlstic culture, HamaguchI and 
Kumon (1982) argue that the collectlvlsm/lndlvldualism dichotomy can not 
explain Ja p an e se  communication behavior well enough. They propose 
"contexualism" as  a more appropriate category to explain unique Jap an ese  
behaviors and values. Although this Is only one exam ple. It seem s that 
Cartesian Anxiety essentially has  limited people's pursuit of multiple 
alternatives. It Is time to question the validity of C artesian Anxiety and pursue 
an  alternative In the area of Intercultural communication.
S S jhe  two-valued cultural variability Is problematic. For Instance. Kramer (personal 
communication. 3-18-96) suggests about the Individualism/collectivism continuum that the 
continuum presupposes the Inability to be both highly Individualistic and highly collectlvlstic at the 
sam e time. The presupposition here Is since high Individualism and high collectivism are  two 
oppositional ends of one sam e line. It does not make sense if a  culture belongs to high 
Individualism and high collectivism simultaneously. Stated differently, this explanatory framework 
Itself presum es a  linear dualistic logic, which Is Inherently a  manifestation of a  Western blind 
prejudice. Metaphorically speaking, although, in fact. It Is a  certain specific kind of blindly wearing 
glass. It has been presumed to be the "universal glass" (presumably a s  a  "derived etic") which can 
be applied to anyone In any cultures. However, obviously this Is a  scientific "myth" which leads to 
a  crucial problem. The way It explains the phenomenon of Intercultural communication Is Itself 
based on certain cultural logic: therefore. It might not be applicable to some other cultures.
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Ultimate Problem Taking Place in the P resen t Late-Modern Deficient 
Perspectival56 World
The foundation of intercultural communication itself is inherently destined 
to negate itself when it fulfills its own teleology. In essence, intercultural- 
communication-as-perspectival ideology does not know how to deal with 
culture differences. Namely, intercultural communication, which is b ased  on the 
presuppositions of conformity and efficiency, simply does not know how to co­
exist with culture differences. The solutions intercultural communication 
proposed or picked were based  on pure ideological and metaphysical 
speculations. Moreover, they w ere only indirectly suggesting that people 
should conform to perspectival ideologies for the sake  of a  "bigger" purpose. 
Multi-cultural identity, intercultural identity, and global village are  all social 
scientific figments based  on the social scientists' strong will for social 
engineering a  new reality.
What is truly confusing is that co-existing with different cultures is in fact 
taking place in the present reality, while perspectival consciousness is diffusing 
and creating the conflict of cultural logics all over the world. In a  world where 
perspectival consciousness is virtually predominant, every perspectival person 
attem pts to a sse rt individual and group rights. Therefore, there are  num erous 
co-cultures and co-cultural m ovem ents. In the reality of the perspectival world, 
allowing the existence of such co-cultural differences is politically appropriate. 
Culture differences have been co-existing in reality with many problems.
^^.Perspectival consciousness is becoming deficient as it negates itself. Several perspectival 
solutions (e.g., global village, being intercultural, the addiction for efficiency) of intercultural 
communication are creating more crucial problems (e.g., gradual loss of cultural diversity, 
impossibility of co-existence with diverse cultures while maintaining orders). This situation 
signifies the deficient state of perspectival consciousness. This is not post-modern, but late- 
modern.
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There is the huge gap betw een reality and theory that can not be fulfilled 
by intercultural communication. Reality is always much more complex, 
consisting of different structures of consciousness intermingled with each other. 
Even perspectival people experience their world in multiple modes of 
aw areness. Intercultural communication a s  the manifestation of perspectival 
consciousness is destined to be unable to close the gap until the foundation of 
intercultural communication itself is challenged and questioned. Whether we 
can question and challenge the perspectival presuppositions and find out the 
alternative ones of intercultural communication directly correlates to whether 
perspectival consciousness m utates to integral consciousness. In reality, 
different structures of aw areness a re  always already interconnecting. While 
there is an  ideology named intercultural communication (particularly within the 
academ ic world), there is an actual phenom enon of intercultural communication 
we directly experience in reality.
The next chapter, therefore, exam ines the actual intercultural 
communication phenomenon which we experience and which is taking place in 
reality. Specifically, the necessary  conditions which constitute a  phenomenon 
of intercultural communication is investigated through an eidetic analysis.
Before moving to an eidetic analysis of intercultural communication, the 
investigator s ta te s  several limitations of the present archaeology as the last 
section of this chapter.
Limitations of th e  P resen t Archaeology 
Although the investigator did his best for this present archaeology, the 
attempt w as far from being complete. In order to connect this attempt with the 
next attempt, the investigator critically reflects on the limitations in this study.
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The first limitation is a  lack of depth in term s of understanding both 
American history and World history. While we tend to presum e history as  mere 
past which dissociates from the present, this is obviously not true. By 
conducting this initial archaeology, the investigator realized how ignorant he 
w as (and he still is) about our history (e.g., history of human civilizations, 
American history, history of Europe, World history, history of intercultural 
activities such a s  diplomacy, missionary, and em bassy, and history of 
anthropology, to nam e a  few). More importantly, he realized we (people living 
in the present epoch) always presum e such histories. Any history is not mere 
past, but ever-present history. Our p resen t is intimately interconnecting with our 
history (and histories). The past is not gone or extinct. The past is gur past and 
is ever-present. The investigator recognized this by doing this archaeology.
For instance, this archaeology implies the establishm ent of intercultural 
communication (as an academ ic field) had an intimate relationship with the 
post-war, post-colonial historical era  and the US's role in that context. But, the 
process of decolonization did not begin a t the end of World War II. Such 
process has its own history and can be traced back to the US revolution in the 
late 18 century. Moreover, Enlightenment and humanism, which the US 
revolution and the movement of decolonization presum e, may b e  traced back 
further. In this study, the investigator could not clarify the background of the US 
revolution and the origin of humanism and Enlightenment in detail. As a  
consequence, this attem pt obviously lacks depth in terms of articulating the 
interconnection between the origin of intercultural communication and its 
corresponding em bedded history. In the next attempt, the investigator must
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learn more about American history and  the history of Enlightenment and 
humanism.
Another limitation comes from the  fact that the investigator limited his 
examination to the US region and its corresponding language. Giving up the 
search for the possibility that the a rea  might have taken place in other places 
(other than the US) in other languages (other than English) definitely limited the 
validity of the investigator's claim. In the  next attempt, he m ust pursue this 
possibility. Regardless of the difficulty, it is important to pursue such a  
possibility.
Delimiting the domain, on the other hand, as an independent academ ic 
field also limited the study. Even though intercultural communication might not 
take place a s  an  independent field of inquiry, many scholars in different 
disciplines (such a s  anthropology, sociology, political science, international 
relations, education, psychology, social psychology, et cetera) problematized 
the topic in their own way with different motives and interests. The investigator 
limited the study significantly by ignoring the relationship am ong such 
conscious efforts cultivated in the academ ic world.
Fourth, as  is obvious, intercultural communication belongs to the field of 
communication. Yet, this archaeology did not investigate the original 
establishm ent process of communication a s  a  discipline. Investigating the 
process of its establishm ent and the relationship between the origin of 
communication and intercultural communication leads to a deeper 
understanding of the present intercultural communication and how it has been 
shifting. In fact, this leads to another limitation. While communication (and 
intercultural communication) aims to b e  social scientific, communication as a
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discipline already always presum es the history of social science. Actually, 
communication has been trying to be scientific in order to gain more legitimate 
sta tus a s  a  discipline of social science. Therefore, investigating the origin of 
social science is also crucial along with unfolding the  origin of communication. 
Such an archaeological attem pt should enhance the  validity of the present 
claim about the origin of intercultural communication.
Fifth, delimiting the search  for the origin of intercultural communication as  
an academ ic study also significantly limited this study. The area of intercultural 
communication presum es the existence of the various forms of intercultural 
activities such a s  diplomacy, missionary, trading, e t cetera. Intercultural 
communication, in a sen se , h as been taking place from the beginning of human 
civilization. In the future, the investigator needs to learn more about such 
histories so  that he can understand the essen ce  of "intercultural 
communication" in a more meaningful manner.
For the above reasons, the present attempt is limited. But, at least, this 
limited attem pt successfully m ade him realize what he did not know and how 
ignorant he w as before. In this sense, this attempt w as very meaningful for the 
investigator. Archaeology is essentially an on-going process.
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CHAPTER SIX 
An Eidetic Analysis of Intercultural Communication
Prior chapters were attempts to unfold the sedimented meanings of 
"intercultural communication" and its transformation. The was to unveil the 
several ideologies and metaphysics which have been  creating the phenom enon 
of intercultural communication as  well a s  creating an ultimate contradiction. As a  
consequence, the archaeology in the previous chapter demonstrated that 
intercultural com m unication-as-an ideology d o es have a crucial referential 
problem. In short, there is a  severe bifurcation betw een intercultural 
communication-as-an ideology and "intercultural communication" we directly 
experience in our reality. Intercultural communication as  an ideology is different 
from our direct experience of "intercultural communication." However, prior 
studies have never critically investigated the ontological status of real 
"intercultural communication." This task should be carried out because the 
ultimate foundation of all genuine knowledge is derived from our direct and 
personal experience.
This chapter, therefore, attempts to unveil the "intercultural 
communication" we directly experience. The purpose is to decipher the 
necessary  conditions which constitute the ontic status of intercultural 
communication. Therefore, this chapter tries to do another kind of 
phenomenology of intercultural communication based  on the above 
archaeological historical investigation. This archaeology should help us bracket 
metaphysical and ideological aspects of intercultural communication (which is the
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first step of eidetic analysis). Such a  phenomenological attempt requires certain 
systematic procedures derived from a  phenomenological method called "eidetic 
analysis." This chapter, thus, follows the five-step procedure described in the 
method section. Those five steps are reappear below:
1. Suspending metaphysical speculations about the existential status of a 
phenomenon;
2. Describing a phenom enon;
3. Apprehending the necessary  conditions for a  phenom enon to take place;
4. Clarifying the investigator's prejudices about the ontic status of a phenomenon;
5. Interpreting the concealed meaning of a  phenomenon.
Phenomenological Suspension of Metaohvsical Prejudices 
The first step  of a  phenomenological method is the phenomenological 
suspension of metaphysical and ideological prejudices about the ontic status of a 
phenomenon. The first thing the investigator should do is to suspend any 
metaphysical a s  well a s  ideological speculations about the phenomenon's nature 
of reality. Put otherwise, the investigator necessarily suspends any speculations 
about what is presum ed to be "intercultural communication." This process is 
crucial, since such speculations might distort or even preem pt the exploration. 
However, as Kramer and Mickunas (1992) indicate, "the most difficult aspect of 
this process is the effort to becom e cognizant of one 's blindness--" (p. xiii). This 
process, first, indispensably recognizes his prejudices about the phenomenon's 
(i.e., intercultural communication) nature of reality. W hat is presumed to be 
"intercultural communication" should be elucidated and  then suspended in this 
stage. Before getting into the procedure, the investigator must em phasize one
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thing. He tries his best to elucidate m etaphysical prejudices about intercultural 
communication in order to bracket those speculations. However, the process is 
never complete, since the investigator is a  historical being located in a  specific 
historical epoch and specific place; he can  not e scap e  from his prejudices. He 
s e e s  things from his prejudices in a  way G adam er (1960/1989) described. W hat 
he  can do is to enable his prejudices a s  much a s  possible in a  very critical 
m anner, remembering he h as prejudice, regardless of his effort to avoid it. He 
attem pts to continue a  critical attitude by questioning himself continuously. The 
process of enabling his prejudices is a  never ending one.
In this step, the investigator not only attem pts to suspend the 
presuppositions about the existential sta tus of intercultural communication, but he 
also attempts to bracket the ideological presuppositions of intercultural 
communication which a re  historically sedim ented. The archaeological historical 
investigation in the previous chapter helps us to s e e  and reflect this form of 
presuppositions. Bracketing such historically sedim ented ideological prejudices 
is also indispensable, since such ideological presuppositions automatically 
always already cau ses  people to see, problematize, and explain the phenom enon 
in a certain manner.
Metaohvsical Speculations about Intercultural Communication
As suggested in the review section, the phenom enon of intercultural 
communication has been predominantly considered a  communication process 
am ong (or between) two or more individuals from different cultures. There are  
several presumptions about this common view.
First, intercultural communication is presum ed to be human 
communication which requires a  direct person-to-person contact. Put otherwise,
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intercultural communication has been presum ed to require anim ate beings, which 
are the only participants of the communication event. More specifically, the 
communication events other than person-to-person communication have been 
excluded from the inquiry of intercultural communication. However, intercultural 
communication might take place when people encounter a  foreign environment. 
Then, they appear to engage in intercultural communication even though they do 
not meet a  foreigner. An experience of learning a  foreign language seem s to 
make people eng ag e  in intercultural communication also. Even though the 
experience does not require direct human communication, the process itself 
appears to be a form of intercultural communication. T hese  exam ples might 
suggest a  direct hum an contact might not b e  a  necessary  condition to constitute 
intercultural communication. Stated differently, this condition might be a 
metaphysical prejudice about intercultural communication's nature of reality. 
Consequently, such prejudice is bracketed a t this point.
While the requirem ent of direct hum an contact might b e  a  metaphysical 
speculation about the ontic status of communication, there seem s to be another 
metaphysical prejudice about "culture." Intercultural communication was 
presumed to be a  communication among people from different cultures. This 
definition involves a  crucial metaphysical speculation. This definition, namely, 
implies people are  the only and the pure representation of a  culture. Different 
cultures m ean different people from different cultures. W hatever a  culture is, the 
physical condition that two individuals from two different cultures communicate 
automatically guaran tees intercultural communication w hatever the quality of the 
communication is ab o u t However, such m ere physical condition might not 
always make communication events intercultural. Is a  communication between
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an intercultural married couple intercultural or interpersonal? Is each individual 
still a  pure representation of each  different culture? This is a  difficult question. 
For ano ther exam ple, suppose a  person w as born in France, but spent most of 
his adulthood life in the US. Is he a  representation of France, America, both, or 
neither? When he communicates with his long-time American friend, does the 
physical condition m ake the communication intercultural or interpersonal or both 
or neither? There seem  to be many ca se s  in which a  mere physical condition, 
two individuals from two different cultures, exists, yet does not automatically 
guarantee the communication event to be an intercultural one. Moreover, this 
mere physical condition might be just a  physicalism -a metaphysical speculation 
about intercultural communication. Such prejudice should be suspended at this 
point.
Besides, hum an beings (animate beings) might not be the only 
representation of a  culture. For instance, every culture has numerous cultural 
artifacts^ m ade in its own culture. Regardless of kind, cultural inventions mean 
and ex p ress  something. All of the cultural artifacts are civilizational expressions 
(G ebser's term). Each cultural artifact signifies something. This "something" is a  
manifestation of culture. Shimode (1975) implies that cultural artifacts are the 
most concrete form to signify the essen ce  of the culture. If something made in 
Japan  by Ja p an ese  is accepted among Jap an ese  and recognized a s  a  Jap an ese  
cultural artifact, it might signify something about the nature of the J a p a n e s e ^
Here I am using the term, "cultural artifacts" in a  very broad sense. Cultural artifacts, in this 
paper, are any kind of cultural inventions. Anything can be a  cultural artifact (e.g., art. buildings, 
languages, religions, ways of thinking, any kinds of traditions, such as  rituals or customs, et 
cetera) a s  long as  it w as invented with certain motives.
^ h i s  is not the case always. For instance, Japanese cars or Japanese  stereos are globally 
marketed products which might not signify the uniqueness of Japanese  culture unlike Japanese 
"kimono" signifies. Yet, such transcultural artifacts signify something about the diffusion among 
different cultures.
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culture a s  well a s  the transformation. In other words, any cultural artifact might 
be a  concrete manifestation of a  culture. Moreover, a s  Roland Barthes (1972) 
suggested, not only can we not not signify, but also everything can not not 
signify. This m eans that every cultural artifact might communicate with us by 
signifying something. Everything m eans something. When people encounter a  
foreign cultural artifact, the experience might be  a  form of intercultural 
communication. Presupposing a  human a s  the only representation of a  culture 
might be another metaphysical prejudice of intercultural communication to be 
suspended.
There is yet another metaphysical prejudice about the traditional 
definition^ of intercultural communication, especially about a  "culture." The 
traditional definition presum es each communication participant involved in 
intercultural communication is a  member of a  group. Therefore, intercultural 
communication is som etim es equated with intergroup communication 
(Gudykunst, 1985). Interethnic communication, intergenerational communication, 
and communication am ong co-cultural groups are  presumed to be a part of 
intercultural communication. These are consequences of viewing a  culture as  
"any pre-existing group." This definition treats culture very categorically so that a  
culture is distinguishable from others. While a  "culture" in this definition of 
intercultural communication is presum ed to be a  pre-existing group that each  
participant can  identify with a s  a  member of the group, such presumption might 
be speculation about the nature of reality of "culture" or "group." The ontic status 
of "culture" should be bracketed a t this point.
^The traditional definition of intercultural communication refers to an interactive communication 
process between people from different cultures. Since Edward Hall, intercultural communication 
has been presumed to be human communication. Second, the definition views culture as  pre­
existing group category (e.g.. nation, ethnic group, racial group, etc.).
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The traditional definition of intercultural communication might involve 
several presuppositions about w hat intercultural communication is. Although 
intercultural communication in the definition might be a  form of intercultural 
communication, there might b e  other forms of intercultural communication which 
have been excluded from the common definition. Metaphysical speculations 
about intercultural communication automatically exclude potential forms of 
intercultural communication ttiat a re  incompatible with the metaphysics. 
Therefore, any metaphysical prejudices about the ontic status of intercultural 
communication, which might limit or distort the present investigation, should be 
bracketed until further examination has been taken place.
Ideological Speculations about Intercultural Communication
As the archeological investigation indicates, there are  several historically 
sedim ented presuppositions about the area  of intercultural communication which 
are ideological in nature. Since such ideological presuppositions also lead us to 
preem pt or distort the investigation, it is important to clarify and bracket them until 
more solid evidence em erges.
As the archeological investigation indicates, intercultural communication 
has presum ed culture differences a s  problematic. This presupposition is 
essentially ideological. Culture differences are presum ed to be problematic only 
because  they (i.e., culture differences) are  presupposed to be  incompatible with 
the predominant value of efficiency a s  well a s  incompatible with the orders (e.g., 
dom estic as  well a s  international orders). Therefore, enhancing culture 
differences has been perceived a s  politically inappropriate. Culture differences 
are supposed to be suppressed, overcome, bridged, even eliminated.
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B ecause such  presuppositions are essentially speculations derived from 
certain ideologies, culture differences might not be  problematic all the time. 
Rather, culture differences often lead people to identify their uniqueness. It is 
often the case  that sojourners who are  staying in a  foreign environment 
rediscover the uniqueness of their native country. Culture differences might not 
be problematic all the  time. However, intercultural communication has 
presupposed culture differences a s  problematic due to rather political reasons. 
Such presuppositions automatically limit the perspective and the investigation of 
intercultural communication in an uncritical manner. In this stage, such 
ideological speculations are  to be bracketed to avoid preempting and distorting 
the investigation.
Phenomenological Description 
The second step  of the eidetic analysis, in this study, is the description^ of 
the phenom enon of inquiry. As Spiegelberg (1960/1982) contends, a  description 
presupposes a  framework of class nam e since describing itself is based on a  
classification of the phenom enon. He also stated, "all it can do is to determine 
the location of the phenom enon with regard to an already developed system  of 
classes." (p.693) Phenomenological describing might be  easier for the more 
familiar phenom ena such a s  a  book, a  pen, or a  chair. It is easier since people 
can intuitively understand and agree what "a book" or "a pen" or "a chair" is. 
Determining the location of such phenom ena is a  relatively easy task since the 
boundary of the c lass  nam e is distinguishable clearly from other phenomena. On
^ This Is sort of a  strange step, coming right after suspending speculations about what 
intercultural communication is. This step attempts to describe what intercultural communication 
is. In a  sense, one of the characteristics of the eidetic analysis is circular in nature. Each 
procedure intimately relates with other procedures. It is important to notice that even though each 
step is separated, this is done for the sake of convenience. In reality, each procedure will mingle 
with the others, although the major operation in each step can be noticed.
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the other hand, describing new phenom ena or new asp ects  of old phenom ena 
requires much more reservation, caution, and effort. It is no doubt, a  difficult task  
to accomplish. Spiegelberg (1960/1982) points out this issue;
But a s  soon a s  we w ant to describe new phenom ena or new aspects of 
old phenom ena, w e can do little more than assign them places within the 
wider framework of c la sse s  with w hose other m em bers they show a t least 
som e similarity or structural resemblance, since we a re  unable to nam e 
their distinguishing features, (p. 693-694)
In one way or another, describing such new phenom ena or new aspects of 
old phenom ena can becom e controversial; consequently, th ese  descriptions 
might be prejudiced. In fact, in such a  case, the description can  not escape 
prejudice. The thing to do is to be aw are of one's prejudice(s) in a  very critical 
manner and not to forget that the description is inadequate. Describing 
intercultural communication fits this category. Intercultural communication is 
essentially a  new phenom enon. Moreover, the phrase "intercultural 
communication" already involves sedim ented connotation, which has been 
deeply em bedded historically. Therefore, describing intercultural communication 
might becom e prejudiced without recognizing this. Nonetheless, this section is 
an effort to describe the phenom enon of intercultural communication with caution 
and reservation. Since "describing by negation is usually the sim plest way to at 
least indicate the uniqueness and irreducibility" (Spiegelberg, p. 694) of a 
phenomenon, we must attem pt to describe intercultural communication by 
clarifying what "intercultural communication" is and what it is not.
Describing the Phenom enon of Intercultural Communication
This section briefly exam ines whether "intercultural communication" is a  
phenomenon in our actual and  direct experience in reality. This is important
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because if intercultural communication is a  m ere figment and is not based on our 
direct experience, the current task is m eaningless.
Is intercultural communication an  actual experience in our reality? Yes, 
the investigator thinks so because of direct experiences of it. At least, two 
situations seem to the investigator to reveal intercultural communication in a  
particularly clear manner. The first situation is our active engagem ent of 
intercultural communication, while the second is the undergone experience of 
intercultural communication from the outside. When we initiate communication 
with som eone from a  foreign country, for instance, we might be aware we are 
actively experiencing intercultural communication. On the other hand, when 
som ebody from a  different nation initiates communication with us and we end up 
communicating with him or her, we have undergone experiencing intercultural 
communication. Particularly, w henever we are  staying in a  foreign environment 
a s  a  stranger, we experience intercultural communication with more clarity.
In any case, what is important here is that we experience "intercultural 
communication." In fact, in the p resen t modernity, we experience various forms 
of intercultural communication in various ways on a  daily basis. Intercultural 
communication is a  phenom enon we directly experience in our reality.
Describing intercultural communication is an  extremely difficult task. First, 
intercultural communication a s  a  reflectively identified phenomenon is a  newly 
em ergent (actually created) phenom enon in modernity. As Spiegelberg (1982) 
suggested, "as soon a s  we want to describe new phenom ena or new aspects of 
old phenomena, we can do little more than assign them places within the wider 
framework of c lasses with whose other m em bers they show at least some
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similarity or structural resem blance, since we are unable to name their 
distinguishing features." (p. 693-694)
There is another reason  describing intercultural communication is a  
difficult task. In order to describe a  phenomenon of intercultural communication, 
describing "communication" is also necessary. Even though the description of 
"communication" might be ideal, obviously, accomplishing the task in a  critical 
m anner is beyond this study's capacity. In order to do an  eidetic analysis (i.e., an 
analysis to delineate necessary  conditions of a  phenomenon) of intercultural 
communication in a  critical manner, an eidetic analysis of communication is 
necessary. While the task deserves close attention, this section focuses on 
describing "intercultural communication" as  its primary purpose.
First of all, intercultural communication is a  form of communication. It is 
classified a s  a  form of communication. It belongs to a  category of 
communication. The next logical question is to describe communication. Again, 
this is a  very difficult task. In fact, there are more than one hundred ways of 
describing communication (Dance & Larson, 1976). Nonetheless, the attem pt 
m ust be made.
Describing a  phenom enon of communication. On the basic level, 
communication, initially, is not a  substance or an organism which can subsist by 
itself. Unlike substance, communication does not have extension and duration.
It is rather a  directional p rocess which requires a  carrier or medium. In other 
words, communication is a  dependent entity.
Communication is usually described in terms of conveying m essages.
This description correlates to the etymology of the word "communicate," which is 
communicare, meaning to impart, to give, or to make known. Furthermore,
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etymologically speaking, communication, community, commune, com m onsense, 
communal are  all derived from the sam e  word origin, communis, which m eans to 
make common or the state of being shard  by all or many (Partridge, 1958). This 
suggests that communication involves som e mutuality, com monness, or 
sharedness. This correlates to our direct aw areness of communication. 
W henever we are directly aware of communication in reality, the exchange of 
m essage with varying degrees in various m anners seem s to involve in the 
phenom enon of communication. W hen w e convey and exchange a  m essage, 
what exactly are  we exchanging? W hat we are  exchanging through various 
forms of m eans in various ways Is not a  lifeless mechanical objective m essage, 
but an idea or a  meaning. Describing communication in terms of exchanging 
meaning or ideas seem s to correlate to both the origin of the word 
"communication" and to our direct experience of it in our reality.
Describing a  phenomenon of intercultural communication. We experience 
intercultural communication in our reality. W e experientially know the 
phenom enon of intercultural communication based  on our direct aw areness of it. 
We experience intercultural communication by distinguishing the boundary 
between intercultural communication and  other phenom ena intuitively based  on 
our direct experience of it (without recognizing that we do this). In other words, 
we intuitively (experientially) know what is intercultural communication and what 
is not. In short, experientially and intuitively, we know the essen ce  of intercultural 
communication^. What we have to do is to describe intercultural communication 
relying on our actual experience a s  a  guideline for our description.
^The reader needs caution for this interpretation. The investigator, who has been studying the 
concept of "intercultural communication, experiences intercultural communication in his life. At 
least he thinks so. However, this does not m ean everybody experiences and identifies something 
a s  "intercultural communication" in a  similar way. Critically speaking, it is still unsure whether 
"intercultural communication" is a  highly intersubjective phenomenon. In this sense, "we." that the
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The simplest way to describe a  phenom enon is by negation, a s  
Spiegelberg (1982) contends. Therefore, this section examines what is not 
intercultural communication. Experientially, we know what is and what is not 
intercultural communication. For example, when we are communicating with our 
familiar friend in our familiar hom e boundary in a  mindless manner, we may not 
be aw are of the event a s  "intercultural." The communication is natural and flows 
effortlessly. We do not reflect on how we are  communicating. Rather, we 
experience such  communication pre-reflectively with "natural attitude."
W henever we are  living in our natural world with natural attitude, we are simply 
aware of the things and people surrounding us a s  they are pre-reflectively. They 
are taken for granted as  the background of our natural world. We can do things 
and communicate with people pre-reflectively and  naturally within our natural 
world. Under this circumstance, we are not aw are of such communication a s  
intercultural communication. The communication which we can experience with 
our natural attitude is not described a s  intercultural communication. As long as  
we are experiencing things and people with our natural attitude, the unity of our 
natural world is maintained. "Intercultural communication" does not yet becom e a 
theme of aw areness.
On the other hand, when we experience intercultural communication, the 
communication is unnatural and somehow different. It takes effort to get the 
meaning across  and to understand what the communication partner tries to say.
In other words, we are aw are of Intercultural communication by experiencing 
various forms of "conflicts" with varying degrees. The communication is not 
going the way we are used to. B ecause of the unnaturalness, we experience
investigator used in this section, might not be appropriate. It is possible "intercultural 
communication" is a  highly intersubjective phenomenon among only "intercultural" scholars, 
although the phrase "intercultural communication" appears to be widely accepted.
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intercultural communication rather reflectively. We tend to reflect how we are 
communicating w hen we experience intercultural communication. We can not 
communicate naturally and effortlessly anymore. Intercultural communication 
somehow breaks the  unity of our natural world. It (intercultural communication) 
shifts our natural attitude to an unnatural and reflective attitude. Somehow, we 
can not take things granted any more. In this sense , intercultural communication 
is similar to the experience of moving to a  new  environment. The shift of attitude 
is Indispensable in order to deal with the unnaturalness derived from intercultural 
communication in one  way or another, and consequently to regain the unity of our 
horizon. In this sen se , intercultural communication is very similar to any 
experiences of new learning that require reflectiveness and trial and error.
In this stage, this description of Intercultural communication might be 
selective, yet necessary . As Spiegelberg (1960/1982) contends, "it [selection] 
forces us to concentrate on the central or decisive characteristics of the 
phenom enon and to abstract from its accidentals." (p. 694) Another thing to 
notice Is that this description is based on the Investigator's prejudice. Although 
this is indispensable, it should be noted. In th e  next section, the investigator 
moves to "comparison" stage.
Aoorehendlnq N ecessarv Conditions Through Comparison
The com parison s tage Is one of the m ost Important s tages In an eidetic 
analysis, since comparison essentially elucidates necessary  conditions for 
something to show Itself a s  a  phenomenon. For Instance, com pare a  chair to a  
desk. We experientially know what a  chair is and  what a  desk is. Stated 
differently, w e know the meaning of both "a chair" and "a desk." More
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specifically, we not only know the m eaning of both phenomena, but we already 
know how the two are similar and different from each other based  on our direct 
experiences about them. In a  sense, w hen we know what "a chair" is, we already 
always presuppose the knowledge of num erous existences which are not a  chair 
because we com pare am ong them. Comparison already presupposes a  process 
of elucidating similarities and  differences existing among phenom ena. 
Comparison clarifies identify. A chair can  maintain its identity becau se  there are 
numerous non-chair existences. If nothing other than a  chair exists in our world, 
the chair can not be identified a s  a  chair. A chair is only identifiable in relation to 
other existence which are not a  chair. A chair can only be meaningful and unique 
because it is different from other existence. When we are living in our world with 
a natural attitude, we naturally presum e knowledge of numerous phenom ena.
We can make sen se  of num erous phenom ena pre-reflectively. S tated differently, 
we just experientially understand the e sse n c e  of each phenom enon and essential 
relationships between each  phenom enon pre-reflectively. It is also important to 
notice comparison is done so  that we can  function naturally in our world. Without 
recognizing It, we are comparing num erous phenomena; consequently, we can 
make sense  of them pre-reflectively. However, since this comparison takes place 
pre-reflectively, we usually can  not clarify what the essence of each  phenom enon 
is, although we know the e ssen ce  experientially. In other words, in order to 
elucidate the e ssen ce  of one phenom enon, conscious comparison is necessary. 
This conscious and system atic comparison is the task of this stage.
Particularly, Spiegelberg (1960/1982) suggests two kinds of comparison in 
order to elucidate necessary  condition(s) for something to show itself a s  a  
phenomenon. The first is comparison within the sam e phenom enon, while the
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second is comparison between a  phenom enon of interest and other different 
phenom ena. The first comparison exam ines an "internal relations within one 
essence." (p. 699) For example, this applies to the process of comparing one 
chair to other different kinds of chairs. By comparing numerous different kinds of 
chairs, regardless of real or imaginative chairs, the necessary  components which 
constitute a  general chair (i.e., e s sen c e  of chair or chairness) are clarified^. 
Spiegelberg (1960/1982) explains this process illustrating "triangle" a s  an 
example a s  following:
Thus, in the case  of the triangle we shall have to determine whether three 
sides, three angles, and certain shapes and sizes of these  sides and 
angles are  necessary to them  or required by the essen ce  "triangle," or 
whether they are merely com patible with it. Q uestions like the following 
would arise: Can a  triangle without these elem ents still be a  triangle rather 
than another figure? Or would a  figure without them be an essential 
impossibility, since it would include incompatible ingredients? (p. 699-700)
In order to accomplish this task, Edmund Husserl indicated "free
imaginative variation" [freie Variation in der Phantasie) a s  an  appropriate
operation. A process of free imaginative variation is, a s  Kramer and Mickunas
(1992) contend, a  thought experim ent conducted by comparing imaginatively
created numerous kinds of the sam e  phenomenon. Therefore, in essence, our
past experiences of the phenom enon a re  actively employed a s  the source of
information. A systematic procedure is indispensable. The major goal, here, is to
clarify the nexus among com ponents within a  phenom enon a s  its necessity,
possibility, or impossibility is revealed a s  a  consequence of the free imaginative
It is extremely important to notice in this point that clarifying the essential components which 
constitute the general essence of a  phenomenon requires a  different procedure called 
"investigating general essences" a s  Spiegelberg (1982) regarded the second step of his 
phenomenological method (p. 696-699). Although this deserves the distinct procedure, this 
procedure is a  prerequisite for elucidating essential relationships within a  phenomenon. Besides, 
in order to Investigate general essences, comparison is necessary. It seem s natural to include 
this procedure as  an integral part of the current process of comparison.
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variation. Therefore, the investigator, first, lists all kinds of potentially necessary 
components which constitute the phenom enon of intercultural communication by 
imaginatively creating different kinds of intercultural communication. Second, he 
leaves off each of the components one by one completely or replaces each of 
them with different components. As a  result, the two procedures allow the 
investigator to decide which elem ents a re  necessary  and which are  not 
necessary to constitute the phenom enon of intercultural communication. When 
an omission or substitution of one com ponent changes the ontic status meant by 
the name of intercultural communication in an essential manner, the component 
is a  necessary one to constitute the phenom enon of intercultural communication. 
On the other hand, when an omission or substitution does not change the ontic 
status of intercultural communication in an essential manner, the com ponent is 
not an essential elem ent for the phenom enon to appear itself a s  intercultural 
communication.
Finally, it is important to notice that this process, particularly the process of 
the free imaginative variation, requires cautions and reservations since the 
investigator is bound to rely on his p ast experiences about intercultural 
communication alm ost entirely.
Comparison Among Different Kinds of Intercultural Communication
In the beginning, the investigator needs a  series of concrete intercultural 
communication phenom ena a s  exam ples which stand for the eidos (essence) of 
intercultural communication. By lining up particular intercultural communication 
phenom ena in a  continuous series b ased  on the order of their similarities and 
relationships to each  other, we should b e  able to grasp the essential components 
which constitute a  phenom enon of intercultural communication.
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The next section lines up particular intercultural communication 
phenom ena in a  continuous m anner in terms of the type of culture differences 
which characterize each  particular intercultural communication we experience in 
our real experiences.
The m ost clearly identifiable intercultural communication might be 
communication betw een two people from different nations, such as  
communication betw een Jap an ese  and Germ ans. Communication participants' 
difference in nationality characterizes this most typical type of Intercultural 
communication. The difference in nationality has been perceived a s  the most 
noticeable elem ent of intercultural communication since the difference in 
nationality usually correlates to the difference in the participates' native language 
which c rea tes  noticeable culture differences. This difference in the native 
language also  tends to create noticeable intercultural problem s (e.g., 
m isunderstandings, conflict). This type might be the m ost typical and easily 
identifiable intercultural communication event.
While the next type of intercultural communication takes place within the 
home boundary, the ethnic boundary and the correlative ethnic differences 
characterize this type of intercultural communication. The type of intercultural 
communication which is characterized by ethnic differences is usually called 
interethnic communication, such as  communication am ong Chinese-Americans 
and IVIexican-Americans. While ethnic differences may or m ay not correlate to 
the language differences the participants u se  a s  the first language, the ethnic^ 
difference tends to correlate with noticeable culture differences (e.g., differences 
in cultural tradition, value differences) which lead to the aw areness of intercultural
^ Defining "ethnic" is complex and requires another phenomenological investigation.
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communication. Historically, interethnic communication has been perceived a s  a  
typical form of dom estic intercultural communication (Kim, 1984; Nwanko, 1979; 
Sarbaugh, 1979; to nam e a  few).
While interethnic communication might be  one of the most noticeable 
forms of domestic intercultural communication, there might be many forms of 
Intercultural communication within the home boundary. Intergenerational 
communication, characterized by the age or generation difference, is an example, 
while intergroup communication, which political power inequalities characterize 
(e.g., communication betw een gay and straight, betw een disabled and abled, 
between dominant groups and oppressed or minority groups), is another potential 
form of intercultural communication taking place within the domestic boundary. In 
each  particular case  of this category, there is no language difference. 
Nonetheless, each involves a  different type of culture differences (some people 
call these  differences co-culture difference); therefore, each might be a  form of 
intercultural communication. Therefore, recently, many (Gudykunst, 1985, 1988; 
Gudykunst & Kim, 1992; Sarbaugh, 1979) consider the difference between 
intercultural and intracultural communication m eaningless, since often 
intercultural communication takes place intraculturally.
Gudykunst (1985,1988) and Gudykunst and  Kim (1992) actually contend 
that intergroup communication or communicating with strangers is more 
appropriate than the term "intercultural communication." Gudykunst (1988) 
argues that intercultural communication is a  form of intergroup communication. 
Culture differences are  subsum ed in group differences in this argument.
The extension of this argum ent ultimately leads to another famous 
argument; all kinds of (human) communication a re  intercultural communication to
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som e extent. The rationale for this argum ent is that no one can  escap e  from 
belonging to som e sort of (co-)cultures or groups. This argum ent correlates to 
another argument: there is no pure interpersonal communication. Even the 
communication betw een wife and husband Is not purely interpersonal. Rather, it 
can not escape from being intergroup communication to som e extent. 
Consequently, any hum an communication is intercultural to som e extent.
Lining up different kinds of intercultural communication in a  continuous 
manner in terms of the  type of culture differences, the Investigator m ust attempt 
to grasp the essential affinity among different kinds of intercultural 
communication. W hen this operation is performed, it becom es clear that 
intercultural communication is not defined by spatially pre-existing boundaries. It 
does not have to be limited by national boundary. It can take place intraculturally.
If every hum an communication interaction is intercultural communication to 
som e extent, does this m ean that every hum an communication is intercultural 
communication all the time to som e extent? It can be argued that every human 
communication is potentially a  form of intercultural communication. 
Communication betw een Jap an ese  and American, for example, might be a  form 
of intercultural communication m ost of the  times because of the difference in 
nationality and the correlative language difference. However, it does not m ean 
the interaction is always intercultural. Som etim es, we communicate with others 
well enough without even speaking a  word®, yet without being aw are of the 
communication a s  "intercultural."
Assume an extremely (apparent) intercultural situation like a  
communication betw een one 18 year old Namibian girl and a  60 year old white
®. This does not mean intercultural communication is linguistic in nature. Intercultural 
communication might take place without a  word also.
188
American man. Their communication might appear to be completely intercultural. 
They have nothing in common. Their languages, values, world views, and things 
they like and dislike are totally different. They might think they can not even 
engage in communication since they do not even share the sam e language.
Does this m ean their communication is always intercultural? Do th ese  
differences in their attributes determine the Interaction a s  an intercultural one all 
the time? Their communication, in fact, might be very intercultural m ost of the 
times. Nonetheless, they might engage in intracultural communication also. For 
instance, suppose the old man falls down suddenly in front of her. Even though 
they feel like they can  not communicate with each  other, at the very moment he 
falls down, she  realizes something is wrong instantly without effort through his 
painful facial expression and his tone of voice. In this case, they appear to 
communicate with each  other perfectly without even speaking a  word. In this 
particular moment, their communication seem s to transcend intercultural 
communication. In other words, in this moment, they seem  to transcend any 
culture differences. Their communication seem s to be "intracultural" (in the true 
meaning) or "trans-cultural." Humans are  much more similar than we think (on a  
very basic level).
Next, suppose communication between a  wife and a  husband, which is 
rather opposite the previous example. Their communication might be 
predominantly "intracultural" or "interpersonal," which requires little effort. Stated 
differently, both of them might make s e n se  of each  other without effort. They 
som etim es even communicate without saying anything. However, their 
communication might sometimes be intercultural also. Not only is everybody 
different, but also everybody changes a s  time goes by. Particularly, when one of
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them (i.e., either a  husband or a  wife) behaves in an  unexpected manner, the 
other party might feel strange and perplexed. He thinks he can make sen se  of 
her behaviors, but in fact he can not. In this moment, he appears to experience 
intercultural communication. The communication in this moment for him seem s 
to be an  experience similar to when he m eets a n  individual from a  foreign nation. 
He feels anxiety and uncertainty since he can not m ake sense  of her. The 
communication is not natural any more.
As the above exam ple illustrates, hum an communication is not always 
intercultural communication, but is ootentiallv intercultural for a  particular 
moment, whatever the form of the communication is. It is necessary  to judge 
when exactly we experience intercultural communication. Obviously, in essence, 
intercultural communication might not be determ ined by the pre-determined 
attributes of the groups or (co-)cultures involved. Put in other words, unlike what 
m ost intercultural scholars have been arguing, pre-determined empirically 
m anifested differences, regardless of the kind, might not necessarily constitute 
the essential ontic sta tus of intercultural communication. The differences in 
experiential background am ong communicators do not either guarantee nor pre­
determ ine a  phenom enon of intercultural communication.
Rather, regardless of the type of intercultural communication, whenever 
som ebody experiences intercultural communication a s  such, she  perceives the 
culture differences betw een her and the other in various m odes of aw areness 
and through various phenom ena. But, what do "culture differences" exactly 
m ean here? When som ebody says, "I can not m ake sen se  of a  Jap an ese  boy," 
w hat exactly is it that the person can not m ake se n se  of? In this case, what 
exactly could not make se n se  w as the logic a  J a p a n e se  used. Differences in
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culture mean differences in logic. Each culture (and each individual) has its own 
logic. A logic is a  manifestation of a  culture.
The term "logic," a s  it is used  here, in a  very broad way, m eans the basis 
of understanding or the structures of any sense-m aking activities. A "logic" is, in 
G ebser's terms, a  structure^ of aw areness which is the very basis of any sense- 
making activities. As G ebser argued, people experience the world in multiple 
structures of aw areness. An apparently rational individual can be very emotional 
a t times. What it m eans here is that we naturally use different logics to make 
sen se  of our world. Som etim es, we are aware of our world rationally, while we 
perceive our world irrationally or pre-rationally and emotionally a t other times.
It is still unsure w hether we perceive the existence of different logics (i.e., 
our structures of consciousness), but we are, no doubt, aw are of differences in 
styles and sometimes difficulties in intercultural communication. What we are 
aware of is differences in styles. There are many ways and styles that culture 
differences manifest. W henever we experience intercultural communication as  
such, we perceive differences in styles (i.e., differences betw een your way/style 
and my way/style) while the differences are m ost likely uncertain. In other words, 
it is here argued that the aw areness of differences in sty les  is a necessary  
elem ent which necessarily constitutes a  phenomenon of intercultural 
communication. It can be  said that intercultural communication is a  specific place 
where different cultural logics show themselves. We are aw are of style 
differences within "the specific place."
9. There are numerous different ways a  structure (e.g., the mental-rational structure) manifests. 
For instance, a  dominant structure of consciousness in both England and America is the mental- 
rational, yet the manifestation of the mental-rational structure is very different between the two. 
Each has its unique way. In this sense, differences in culture are differences in style.
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While such aw areness of style differences is potentially a  necessary 
element, is the specific mode of the aw areness also necessary? Based on the 
free variation, we are potentially aw are of style differences in multiple modes of 
aw areness. It is possible to be  aw are of style differences 
magically/emotionallyy^rerationally, mythically/ambivalently/irrationally, or 
perspectivally/linearly/rationally. Different people potentially might be aware of 
style differences differently (i.e., in different modes of aw areness).
By way of contrast, the next section lines up another series of particulars 
which might not fully develop. Think about a  sojourners' various intercultural 
experiences In the new environment. Eating foreign food, living in different 
places, and watching TV in a  foreign language are definitely exam ples of 
intercultural experiences. W henever we are aware of these events, we are 
aware of "style" differences in various ways with varying degrees, just like 
experiencing intercultural communication. The only difference betw een these 
intercultural experiences and intercultural communication is the nature of the 
content of aw areness. While the content of the aw areness of any intercultural 
experience can be either inanimate or anim ate existence, that of intercultural 
communication might be limited to anim ate existence. Since such  a  decision 
correlates to the ontic status of "communication," the decision in this analysis 
should be bracketed until the further examination is carried out.
In summary, although a  further investigation about culture is needed, an 
aw areness of differences in styles is a  necessary  component to constitute the 
phenomenon of intercultural communication. The aw areness necessarily breaks 
the perceiver’s  unity in his or her natural world. In order to re-integrate the unity, 
the perceiver indispensably experiences so called "intercultural communication."
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At this stage, this is all we can say. Next, the second part of this comparison 
exam ines essential relations between several e ssen ces  through free imaginative 
variation. It com pares intercultural communication to other similar phenom ena in 
a  system atic way.
Comparison Between Intercultural Communication and Other Similar Phenom ena 
When the investigator com pares intercultural communication to other 
similar phenomena, he necessarily considers several things. Rrst of all, the ontic 
referent "intercultural communication" is com posed of two different referents, 
"intercultural" and "communication." More accurately, since "intercultural" is 
derived from a  prefix "inter" and "cultural," the ontic referent, "intercultural 
communication" is a  com posite referent derived from three referents. Therefore, 
intercultural communication involves three kinds ("inter," "culture," and 
"communication") of different essences. Consequently, it is necessary to 
com pare each essence  with the others in a  system atic way in order to (a) 
elucidate necessary conditions for intercultural communication to take place and, 
(b) to clarify the essential relationships betw een intercultural communication and 
other similar phenom ena. This task requires careful thinking and great caution.
While this Is going to be a challenging task, this task is carried out by the 
free imaginative variation. As Spiegelberg suggested , "keeping one e ssen ce  
constant we try to combine it with various other essen ces, leaving off som e of its 
associates, substituting others for them, or adding essen ces  not hitherto 
encountered together with them." (p. 701 )
Intercultural communication and any new experiences. First, intercultural 
communication is very similar to any new experience such as  learning a  new 
thing, moving to another place, or meeting new people. Both intercultural
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communication and any new experience make the  participant of the experience 
reflective and  unnatural. When we are aw are of both kinds of experiences, the 
unity of our natural world is somehow broken (with varying degrees and in 
various ways); therefore, our natural and pre-reflective attitude shifts to an 
unnatural and  reflective attitude.
While there are similarities, there are  also essential differences. Second, 
in every new experience, we expect unexpectedness and unpredictability. At 
least, in every new experience, we are  waiting for something unexpected to 
happen. In this sense, any new experience is not strange.
On the contrary, when we experience intercultural communication, we are 
not always expecting unexpectedness and unpredictability. When we 
experience intercultural communication in our hom e environment, our experience 
of intercultural communication is not necessarily a  new experience. Sometimes, 
we can experience very "old" and familiar communication a s  intercultural 
communication. For example, when communicating with a  spouse, we do not 
perceive it a s  intercultural communication. The communication is "old," familiar, 
and expected. However, once in a  while, we experience unexpected 
unexpectedness in the communication. For instance, a  wife is conversing with 
her husband. It is supposed to be a  natural and e a sy  communication. But, 
somehow, both argue in a totally unexpected m anner. This is not supposed to 
happen. It takes effort and reflectivity to understand the unexpectedness. 
Somehow, you know some sort of conflict of logic is going on, although the 
difference of the  logic between you and your partner is still very uncertain. 
Familiar and natural intracultural (or transcultural) communication transforms to 
intercultural communication, which is uncertain and  unnatural. It is uncanny
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becau se  familiar communication changes to unfamiliar and  unnatural 
communication. In other words, we can experience "familiar and old" 
communication a s  intercultural communication in reality. Not only are we 
different, but also we change along with temporal flux.
This uncanny feeling also  takes place in a peculiar manner when we 
experience intercultural communication in a  foreign environment. When we do 
this, it is very similar to any new experience. W hatever we experience in a 
foreign environment is a  "new" experience, in this sen se , we expect 
unexpectedness and unpredictability. We are waiting for the culture differences 
we encounter in such a context. However, in a  peculiar manner, we experience 
unexpected unexpectedness once in a  while. W e find out unexpected similarities 
in a  foreign environment. What we expected w as not similarity, but difference. 
However, we find this unexpected similarity w hen we experience intercultural 
communication in a  foreign environment. This experience is also very uncanny.
In a  sen se , through the experience of intercultural communication, we also 
experience similarities and differences at the sam e  time in a  strange and 
unexpected manner.
Any hum an communication is, in a  sen se , a  potential intercultural 
communication. Fundamentally, intercultural communication potentially might 
take place virtually in any hum an communication regardless of the nature of 
relationship, place, and time. W hat essentially m akes intercultural 
communication is the uncanny feelings we experience through the exchange of 
ideas and m eaning in various m odes of aw areness, while not all new experiences 
are uncanny.
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Intercultural communication and adaptation. Intercultural communication 
and experiences of adaptation have similarities and differences. As In every new 
experience and Intercultural communication, In experiencing forms of adaptation 
(e.g., moving to another place, marrying somebody, e t cetera) we are aware that 
different logics are com peting-ours and the newly emerging ones. In both 
Intercultural communication and experiences of adaptation, we experience 
competition, or a t least the meeting of different logics.
However, while adaptation moves to a  new logic linearly by somehow 
suppressing an  old one, Intercultural communication essentially deals with the 
conflict of logics In a  very different way. When we experience any type of 
adaptation, we have no choice but conform to a  new logic. The new logic has 
more power than the old logic. The new logic attem pts to override the old one In 
one way or another. Adaptation essentially p resupposes linear conformity, 
power^o, inequality, and homogeneity.
On the other hand, when we experience intercultural communication, we 
deal with the difference in the  logics in various ways. W e might reject the 
difference emotionally and pre-rationally. We might also Irrationally deal with the 
conflict by attempting to avoid it despite our curiosity or its imperative. It might be 
the case that we seek  out and sort out the differences betw een the different 
logics In a  rational manner. In experiencing Intercultural communication, we are 
dealing with the differences in the logics in various ways, including potential 
adaptation In multiple m odes of aw areness (i.e., maglcally/pre- 
ratlonally/emotlonally, mythlcally/irratlonally/paradoxically, and 
perspectlvally/ratlonally/llnearly). While we experience adaptation a s  only a
'•0. According to Gebser, power is any making which is a magic. Any might or potent is usurped 
strength, and thus always threatened by impotence. In other words, power loses its vitality unless 
it is demonstrated.
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perspectival m ode of consciousness, a s  a  perspectival phenomenon (I e., based  
on linear conformity), we experience intercultural communication in multiple 
m odes of aw areness.
Summary  ^^
This section, based  on the two kinds of comparison, summarizes the 
necessary conditions delineated through eidetic analysis. In summary, 
intercultural communication is not a  fixed event that is pre-determined by the 
differences in the experiential background pre-existing among communication 
participants. It rather takes place potentially in all forms of human communication 
regardless of time, place, and the nature of the differences pre-existing am ong 
the communicators.
Instead, w henever we experience intercultural communication, it is like a  
dynamic place, metaphorically speaking, where different logics (i.e., different 
ways of sense-m aking or different structures of experiencing reality) show 
themselves through the exchange of ideas or meaning. We are aware of the 
differences in styles through Intercultural communication. In essence, the 
aw areness itself is uncanny since it forces us to be aware of human differences 
In an unexpected manner. It Is also uncanny In another sense. W henever we 
experience the phenom enon, we are  certain about the existence of differences 
but at the sam e time we are uncertain about how the differences are manifested. 
We essentially experience intercultural communication and its corresponding 
uncanniness in multiple m odes of aw areness. Again, it is a dynamic place where 
the uncanniness breaks the unity of our natural world. W hen the uncanniness 
breaks the unity, w e experience the different logics and the corresponding
 ^  ^ This summary, in a  way. functions as  a  "constitution" of a  phenomenon of intercultural 
communication. It needs to be elaborated in a  systematic way at another time.
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phenom ena nam ed "intercultural communication." Essentially, we experience 
intercultural communication in multiple m odes of aw areness in order to re­
integrate the unity of our natural world. In this sense, the experience of 
intercultural communication always forces us to reflect the taken for granted 
com m on-sense world by foregrounding it. It essentially changes our natural 
world to the unnatural world. This becom es problematic.
Challenging the Investigator's Prejudices about 
the Ontic S tatus of a  Phenomenon 
Before interpreting the hidden m eaning of a  phenomenon of intercultural 
communication, the investigator tries his best to challenge his potential blind 
prei'udices about his eidetic analysis of a  phenom enon of intercultural 
communication. First of all, he treated "intercultural communication" a s  a  
phenom enon we directly experience in reality This might be a  prejudice. 
"Intercultural communication" might be a  m ere social scientific figment which 
does not have a  referential reality. If so, what are  the phenomena we directly 
experience in reality as  "intercultural communication?" There are  certain 
phenom ena we directly experience a s  "intercultural communication." What are 
they? Is it better to make a  new term which refers to this ontic sta tus of this 
phenom enon? In fact, it might not be a bad idea. The ontic status of 
"intercultural communication" has been  ambiguous. We have been presuming 
the ontic s ta tus of intercultural communication without knowing the potential 
ambiguities. B ecause of the ambiguities of the existential status of "intercultural 
communication," the investigator is still unsure whether he can call his direct 
experience of certain phenom ena "intercultural communication" a s  such. While
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there are certain "intercultural communication” pi lenom ena taking place in reality, 
it is unsure whether w e should call them "intercultural communication" or call 
them something else . Since there have been  ambiguities about the existential 
status, your "intercultural communication" and  his "intercultural communication" 
could possibly be different. All the investigator can say  here is that the referent 
nam ed "intercultural communication" and its referential phenom ena might not be 
the sam e. There could be a potential dissociation betw een the two.
Therefore, the necessary  conditions delineated through the present eidetic 
analysis could be the necessary  conditions which constitute the investigator's 
"intercultural communication." His "intercultural communication" might not be the 
sam e a s  others' "intercultural communication." The only thing he can say  is that 
he attempted to delineate the necessary conditions which correlate to his direct 
experience of "intercultural communication" a s  faithfully a s  possible. Moreover, 
he tries his best to analyze the phenom ena them selves, not the expressions that 
refer to them, a s  Spiegelberg (1960/1982) suggested . Yet, the necessary  
conditions he elucidated are  potentially just the  manifestation of his prejudice until 
many others engage in the similar task and com pare e ach  prejudice.
Second, there might be another prejudice. In this eidetic analysis, the 
necessary  conditions the investigator elucidated might b e  the necessary 
conditions which constitute any intercultural experiences. All intercultural 
communication phenom ena are intercultural experiences, but not all intercultural 
experiences are intercultural communication. There could be additional 
necessary  conditions which constitute the fundam ental configuration of 
intercultural communication phenomena. Another eidetic analysis of
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"communication" is necessary  for a  more critical eidetic analysis of intercultural 
communication. This is a  significant limitation for the p resent analysis.
Finally, this present eidetic analysis is necessarily a  manifestation of the 
investigator's prejudices. While he tried his best to reflect and see  his blind 
prejudices, there might be m ore blind prejudices. Therefore, the necessary 
conditions he delineated for this study are to be com pared to the others' versions 
in a  critical manner. Such com parison Is encouraged, particularly about 
"intercultural communication," for which the ontic sta tu s  is still ambiguous.
Interpreting Concealed Meanings 
In the final analysis of eidetic analysis of intercultural communication, the 
investigator attempts to interpret the concealed m eanings of the phenomenon of 
intercultural communication. The goal in this step is to discover "meanings which 
are not immediately manifest to our intuiting, analyzing, and describing." 
(Spiegelberg, 1982) The investigator m ust go beyond what is given.
In the first place, we experience intercultural communication through being 
aw are of the different cultural logics (i.e., different structures of awareness). 
Intercultural communication is a  sort of peculiar place where multiple ways of 
experiencing the world and multiple cultural logics (i.e., multiple structures of 
aw areness) appear through the  exchange of idea. Intercultural communication 
m akes us recognize not only that different people s e e  and make sen se  of their 
world in different ways, but they se e  and make s e n se  of their world in multiple 
m odes of aw areness. Intercultural communication reflexively illuminates the 
diversity of our human world.
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Intercultural communication also forces us to se e  our prejudices. As 
Kramer (1992) suggests, we only se e  our prejudices and our uniqueness in 
relation to others who are  different. Through the comparisons^, we see  
ourselves. Intercultural communication, therefore, makes us reflect and s e e  our 
blind prejudices we never knew before. In this sense , intercultural 
communication leads to self-understanding. W e can know the unknown 
prejudice through intercultural communication. W henever we interpret things, we 
only do that by using our own prejudices. Our prejudices are tools we use in 
order to make sen se  of things, people, and our world. Whenever we experience 
intercultural communication, w e can reflect and recognize our prejudices in 
relation to the different prejudices others have. The more important point is that 
our prejudices are not one kind. There are multiple kinds of prejudices. 
Intercultural communication illuminates the multiple kinds of our prejudices. 
Although the manifestation of each  kind of prejudice is different from all others, 
intercultural communication m akes us realize the similarity of the prejudice 
among us in an uncanny manner. In a way, we a re  familiar with the structure of 
the prejudice, while we are uncertain of how exactly it is different. While the 
manifestation of the prejudice is different, the logic and the structure behind the 
prejudice is not so different, a s  G ebser (1949/1985) notes. We are not that 
different. But at the sam e time we are not that similar. The experience of 
intercultural communication, in other words, reminds us of latent hum an 
similarities and latent human diversity at the sam e time in an uncanny manner.
^2 The comparison is also possible between ourselves over time.
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Limitations
The final section of the p resen t eidetic analysis points out several 
limitations. First of all, "intercultural communication" is a  form of communication. 
Nonetheless, the investigator did not examine the necessary  conditions which 
constitute the phenom enon of "communication." The lack of conducting an 
eidetic analysis of "communication" leaves a  significant limitation to this present 
analysis. Regardless of the difficulty of the task, the investigator needs to 
challenge the task if he wants to know more about "intercultural communication."
Another limitation is related to the procedures. The p resen t analysis 
omitted two procedures which could be  involved. Conducting th ese  two 
additional procedures (i.e., watching m odes of appearing and watching the 
constitution of phenom ena in consciousness, see  Spiegelberg, 1982, p. 682) in a  
critical m anner should lead to a  deeper understanding of the phenomenon.
Finally, again, the concluding claim the investigator m ade in this study is 
his version (i.e., his interpretation out of numerous interpretations) and is 
definitely the manifestation of his prejudice (i.e., perspective) regardless of his 
effort to critically reflect his prejudice. Therefore, his concluding claim should be 
compared and contrasted with others' alternative claims. The investigator is 
more than successful if his interpretation somehow contributes to the field of 
intercultural communication a s  a  m em ber of the field and a co-bearer of the 
history of intercultural communication. He also hopes that his attem pt stimulates 
other m em bers who are also co-maker of the field of intercultural communication 
in one way or another.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Latency in Intercultural Communication
Latency—what is concealed—Is the dem onstrable p resence of the future. It 
includes everything that is not yet manifest, as well a s  everything which has 
again returned to latency. (G ebser. 1949/1985, p. 6)
In this dissertation, the investigator dem onstrates that the current field of 
intercultural communication h as  suffered from a bifurcation between the 
intercultural communication taking place in reality (i.e., intercultural 
communication in reality) and  intercultural communication a s  an ideology (i.e., 
intercultural communication in theory) through a  semiotic literature review 
(Chapter 2) and an archaeological historical investigation (Chapter 4). Simply 
stated, intercultural communication, a s  a  field, has many latent aspects which are  
still concealed. In other words, there are  still latent presuppositions, latent 
theories, latent methods, latent topics, e t cetera. Every latent aspect correlates 
to latency of intercultural communication. What we who are interested in 
intercultural communication) m ust do is examine the latency of intercultural 
communication in order to close the gap between reality and theory.
Therefore, the final section indicates several latent aspects of intercultural 
communication. The first part mentions a latent presupposition regarding the 
meaning of culture differences, and is followed by a  discussion of the latent 
potentiality of the relationship betw een culture differences and maintaining 
orders. Then, latent theories, latent m ethods, and topics in studying latency of 
intercultural communication a re  exam ined. The study concludes by implying the 
true meaning of "being intercultural" and human diversity.
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A Latent Presupposition in Intercultural Communication 
This section attem pts to clarify a  latent presupposition about the meaning 
of culture differences, unveiling this latency by illustrating the way of identifying 
inanimate objects and hum an existence. A latent presupposition about 
differences and  maintaining order correlates to the first latency.
Culture Differences a s  the G enesis of Meaning and Identity
The p resen t intercultural communication (as an area of study) presum es 
culture differences a s  problematic. Yes, culture differences do becom e 
problematic. Culture differences do becom e a  barrier for effective communication 
and efficient hum an understanding. Culture differences are sometimes 
problematic. While culture differences may becom e problematic in reality (e.g., 
interracial conflicts), there is something else we already always presum e in terms 
of culture differences. In order to clarify this another presupposition (which is still 
latent) in term s of culture differences, it is worthwhile to illustrate the way we 
identify inanim ate existence and other people.
The wav of identifying inanimate existence. Suppose there is a  pen in front 
of an investigator. Som ebody asks, "what is it?” He answers it is a  pen. 
Somebody asks, "how do you know it is a  pen?" This sounds like a  stupid 
question, yet this is a  very philosophical question that the investigator should take 
seriously. In fact, this is a  very difficult question. Intuitively, the investigator 
knows it is a  pen. He just knows it is a  pen intuitively based on his previous 
experiences. He already knew this was a pen. However, there is a  deeply 
em bedded presupposition a t this point. The very reason he knows this is a  pen is 
that he already knows what is not a pen. This is not a  chair, nor a  pencil. He 
knows this is a  pen  b ecause  he knows what is not. In other words, the moment
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he sees  it, he judges it is a  pen  presuming the differences betw een the pen and 
all the things which a re  not pen. He intuitively know the clear boundary between 
the pen and things which are  not pen. A crucial point to notice here is that he 
could identify it a s  a  pen  only becau se  of knowledge of the differences between 
the pen and other objects. If he did not know the differences between the pen 
and the others, he could not identify it a s  a  pen. Differences are the very source 
of identity. Something can  b e  a  pen only because there are things which are not 
a  pen. Pen can be meaningful only because  there are other objects which are 
different from a  pen. Pen functions meaningfully because  pen has its unique 
function which is different from other objects. Differences render meaning and 
identity.
However, once we know the meaning and the function of each  inanimate 
object through direct experience by using it, we take for granted the meaningful 
differences betw een each  inanim ate object. This is possible b ecause  the 
essence of each inanimate object remains the sam e until it becom es abnormal 
(e.g., things are  broken som etim es). S tated differently, we intuitively and perfectly 
know the essen ce  of each  inanimate thing presuming the essential differences 
(i.e., the essential interconnection) between each thing. W henever we see  each 
inanimate thing, the thing is only identified and becom es meaningful in relation to 
other different existence. There is a  deeply em bedded latent presupposition 
about the very way we perceive and identify inanimate things. We are presuming 
differences as  the very source of identifying each object without mindfully 
recognizing so. Yet, it is true that differences are the genesis of identity and 
meaning. This presupposition can, in fact, be applicable to the very way we 
perceive other people.
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The wav of identifying other anim ate beings. This section exam ines the 
way we perceive and identify other people in relation to the way we Identify other 
inanimate objects.
Suppose the investigator is communicating with his friend. He is a  person 
familiar to the investigator. He identifies his friend a s  a  male African American. 
W hen he identifies his friend in this way, he presum es what is not his friend. He 
presum es his friend is not Jap an ese , nor a  white American. In other words, he 
identifies his friend presuming the differences betw een him and other people.
The way the investigator identifies his friend is the sam e way of identifying 
inanimate objects. If his friend is not different from other people including the 
investigator, he looses his identity and meaning. He can be unique and 
meaningful because  he is different from others, just like a  pen can be meaningful 
and  retain the identity of pen in relation to the existence of other different objects. 
In order to retain Identity, regardless of anim ate or inanimate existence, 
differences are necessary. Again, differences are the genesis to render meaning, 
uniqueness and identity.
While differences render identity and  meaning in both inanimate and 
animate beings, the evaluation of the differences are clearly different betw een the 
identification of inanimate objects and the identification of other people. W hen 
we perceive the differences between us and  other inanimate objects, we do not 
perceive the differences a s  problematic. Since the boundaries and the 
differences between the objects and us a re  perfectly clear, there is nothing to fear 
about the differences. The differences can  not be  problematic. We know exactly 
what they are. In a peculiar way, there is a  perfect understanding betw een the 
objects and us. There is no room for miscommunication in this case.
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On the o ther hand, when we perceive the differences betw een us and 
others, we usually perceive them as  problematic. This becom es more clear when 
we perceive culture differences betw een us and others in experiencing 
"intercultural communication." There is an  essential reason  for us to perceive the 
human differences (particularly culture differences) a s  problematic. The essence  
of any inanimate objects remains the sam e '', while the e ssen ce  of human 
existence does not stay the same. While there is a clear boundary between 
inanimate objects and people and betw een each  inanimate object, the boundary 
and the difference betw een each individual is ambiguous. This is so not only 
because every one  of us is different, but also because each  one of us is always 
already changing a s  time goes by. Not only are  we uncertain about the 
differences betw een each  of us, but also we are  uncertain what we are  and 
precisely how we are  changing. The boundary between human existence is 
always already ambiguous. The very reason we perceive human differences a s  
problematic is b ased  on this ambiguity about the differences. We know there is a  
diversity, but we are uncertain about the exact difference.
This problematic aw areness becom es more intense when in experiencing 
"Intercultural communication." When we experience Intercultural communication, 
the "culture" differences and the boundaries a re  so uncertain that we feel 
unsecured and anxious. As a result, we perceive them as  problematic. This is 
very problematic becau se  we are very uncertain about the culture differences, 
while we are very certain about the existence of the culture differences. There 
a re  culture differences in a  very obvious m anner, but the culture differences are
^The essence  of each inanimate thing remains the sam e until it becom es problematic in terms of 
its function. The essence  changes when it becomes useless or broken, for instance.
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too uncertain to b e  dealt with. Yes, culture differences becom e various forms of 
barriers to effective intercultural communication. But the very reason we perceive 
the culture differences a s  problematic is not due to the culture differences 
themselves, but due to the fear of uncertain culture differences. The more crucial 
problem is that we are uncertain about the culture differences between us and 
others not only b ecau se  we are uncertain about others but also we are uncertain 
who we are and w hat w e are. The very foundation of identity is threatened 
through m eetings with others who a re  uncertainly different from us. For this 
reason, we are aw are of culture differences a s  problematic.
While this is natural for hum an existence (especially for perspectival 
people), it should not be forgotten that the very existence of culture difference is 
the genesis which is making our identity meaningful and unique in a  latent 
manner. While we naturally perceive culture differences a s  problematic, the 
differences make us recognize who we are and recognize our uniqueness. The 
investigator, for instance, cam e to recognize his Jap an ese  identity and the unique 
nature of Jap an ese  culture while living in the US. He did not identify his 
Jap an esen ess In the sam e way when he was in Japan. He did not even think 
about the meaning and  the uniqueness of being Jap an ese  and the Japanese  
culture. Through the multiple culture differences betw een Japan  and the US, he 
recognized his identity a s  Jap an ese  and  the meaning of being Japanese. 
Intercultural communication always already leads to self-understanding and helps 
us identify who we a re  by comparing u s  to others who are different from us.
While culture differences are perceived a s  problematic, culture differences are 
always already the genesis  of identity and  uniqueness. Moreover, the fact we are 
different implies we have something unique and meaningful to give and provide.
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Being Ja p a n e se  is unique and meaningful in the US, since Jap an ese  can 
potentially offer something meaningful, unique, and different to the US culture 
and people who a re  not Jap an ese . Differences, regardless of kind, essentially 
strengthen each  other’s uniqueness and identity. This is a  latent truth hidden in 
intercultural communication and culture differences. As a  latent potentiality, 
regardless of their evaluations (e.g., hatred, rejection, avoidance, appreciation, 
curiosity, et cetera), culture differences are always already the genesis of identity 
which is meaningful and unique. In fact, if we open our eyes to see  this latency, 
we do not have to  presum e culture-dlfferences-as-problematic a s  the only 
presupposition. In fact, the incompatibility between culture differences and 
maintaining orders (i.e., an essential presupposition in intercultural 
communication) m ay not need to be presupposed. On the contrary, maintaining 
orders through culture differences may be possible as  a  latent presupposition of 
intercultural communication.
Maintaining O rders through Culture Differences
The m odern world presupposes maintaining order through harmony or 
sam eness. However, Murphy and Min Choi (1992) argue, based  on the theory of 
"systasis” which w as introduced by Jean  G ebser (1985, originally in 1949), that 
there can be compatibility betw een order and diversity. According to G ebser 
(1985), "systasis is the conjoining or fitting together of parts into integrity" (p.
310). Employing this notion, Murphy and Min Choi explain the compatibility 
between order and  differences a s  follows:
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Rather, differences via relationships define the parts a s  coconstituting. 
Simply put, what are seen  a s  "components" are  codependent on one 
another; they share sides rather than represent an  ultimate reality. As 
opposed to a  static hierarchy, the systatic process generates a  system of 
fluid, coconstituted, and  coconstituting identities that are  generated from 
shifting differences. T he ever-present process of flux resem bles a mosaic 
of ever-changing pattern -systasls is com parable to a  living quilt. The 
integrity of each patch Is manifested by the existence of different patches. 
Together, such fluid identities constitute patterns-'order.' " (p.212)
As described above, unless a  fixed reality is presumed, order and 
differences do not conflict with each  other. Here, order is mere association of 
differences. Moreover, preserving order through (allowing) differences seem s to 
be the only way since various people and groups have different realities that have 
always already existed within a  country. War is the ultimate suicidal attem pt to 
preserve order through destroying differences. If attem pts to preserve order 
though sam en ess  continue, the long-term consequence might be very disastrous. 
In order to coexist with others, the systatic relationship with others m ust be 
pursued. Murphy and Choi contend "the systatic process is constantly 
generating a  'non-totallzed whole,' because this type of 'order' Is multi­
dimensional, flexible, and unrelated to 'a  reality.' " (p.212) Each individual is 
meaningful and unique b ecau se  he or sh e  is different in relation to others. The 
origin of m eaning is due to the coexistence of differences. Each individual can 
identify himself or herself only through differences between him or her and 
others. The so called systatic relationship Is the coexistence of multiple 
differences which render meaning. Identity, and uniqueness. Likewise, culture 
differences might not be the source of various problems, but the origin of unique 
and meaningful cultural identities. Maintaining order through human diversity is 
possible when we unveil the latent relationship between human diversity and 
human Identity.
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Latent Potentiality in Studying Intercultural Communication 
The second latent aspect is latent potentiality for studying intercultural 
communication in terms of a  theory, a  method, and a  topic. It is indispensable to 
reveal this latency. We m ust problematize intercultural communication a s  
bearers, but also as  co-bearers of a  history of intercultural communication. 
Theoretical Latency in Intercultural Communication
Not only do different people experience intercultural communication 
differently, but also people experience Intercultural communication in multiple 
m odes of aw areness. More specifically, the experience of intercultural 
communication may be magical/pre-rational/emotional, 
mythical/irrational/ambivalent, or perspectival/rational/linear. The experience of 
intercultural communication is much more complex than it appears to be. 
However, many of the current theories of intercultural communication only explain 
a  rational dimension of its experience. While such theories explain som e aspects 
of intercultural communication, they becom e partial and simplified regardless of 
approaches (e.g., positivistic, system, ethnographic approach). It is crucial, 
therefore, for such theories to recognize their limitations and partiality in a  critical 
manner. But in fact it is difficult to recognize their limitations and  partiality in a 
precise manner, since there are no theories of intercultural communication that 
explain latent dimensions (mythical and magic dimension) other than the rational 
aspect. Without any theories which explain latent aspects of intercultural 
communication, the rational theories might have difficulty identifying their own 
partiality and limitations in a  critical manner. Comparison essentially clarifies 
limitation. More importantly, such theoretical comparison unveils the uniqueness
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and the meaningfulness a s  well as  the partiality and the limitation. There is latent 
theoretical potentiality intercultural communication has not yet fully Investigated. 
There are latent aspects an d  dimensions which have never been explained. It is 
important to rem em ber that the original function of theory, theoria, was not to 
predict nor control, but to distinguish "reality from appearance, knowledge from 
mere belief and opinion." (Bernstein, 1976, p. 180)
In this respect, this study provides a  theory to explain latent dim ensions of 
intercultural communication. More specifically, the investigator employed J e a n  
G ebser's (1949/1985) multiple structures of aw areness a s  the theoretical basis 
for this study. G ebser's theory explains multiple dimensions (including latent 
dimensions) of intercultural communication which is taking place in reality. The 
theory functions in the original role theoria w as supposed to serve. The theory 
explains people's intercultural communication experiences in terms of their 
multiple modes of aw areness. It not only explains a  rational dimension, but other 
latent dimensions of Intercultural communication in a  complex, a  realistic, and 
above all in a  meaningful^ manner. The investigator, in this stage, Is not 
advocating this theory. He is simply stating that the theory has a  convincing 
exploratory power to explain the complex reality of intercultural communication. 
This sort of theory which unveils the latent a re a s  of intercultural communication is 
beneficial not only b ecau se  of its strong exploratory power, but also because  it 
strengthens the uniqueness and the m eaningfulness of other theories of 
intercultural communication by giving them a  point of comparison.
^Explaining human diversity in a  complex and a  realistic manner without presuming ideological 
and metaphysical speculations seem s very meaningful.
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Methodological Latency in Intercultural Communication
There a re  various methodologies (e.g., traditional scientific approach, 
ethnographic approach, critical approach) and corresponding methods (e.g., 
survey, experiment, interviewing, observation) for the study of various 
phenom ena of intercultural communication. As is obvious, these approaches and 
the corresponding m ethods presum e Cartesian dualism (i.e., subject-object 
dichotomy, which leads to relativism and  objectivism). While each method can 
be strengthened with careful considerations, the argum ent offered is that there is 
a  latent method which is characterized by reduction rather than induction (i.e., 
subjective m ethods such a s  ethnography or conversational analysis) or deduction 
(i.e., objective traditional scientific m ethods such as  survey or experiment). Such 
methods, which are  characterized by reduction^, are totally latent in intercultural 
communication. Such methods of reduction, such a s  a  phenomenological 
method (i.e., eidetic analysis or archaeology) or semiotics, are  beneficial for 
several reasons. First, they’ try to avoid metaphysical speculations which might 
preempt its investigation by going back to things them selves. Going back to 
things them selves implies the refutation of subject-object dichotomy that leads to 
relativism5 and objectivism. Rather than presuming dualism, the
^Obviously, reduction does not mean to decrease. It means a  process of discovering the 
invanant by ignonng and omitting the nonessential and accidental factors one by one. it is a 
process of reducing a  nonessential to an essential in a  systematic way, usually through 
companson.
'’Sometimes, the phenomenological method is perceived to be subjective. This is totally 
misleading. Rather, phenomenology and phenomenological method refutes subject-object 
dichotomy. In essence, there is no knowledge without our personal direct experiences. In other 
words, personal direct experiences are the genuine source of knowledge, a s  Spiegelberg (1982) 
contends.
5 In the field of intercultural communication, the notion of culture relativism is very famous and 
accepted. It assum es every culture is relative to and different from each other. Therefore, to 
understand different cultures, one must understand them from their cultural viewpoints. This is 
applicable to understanding others. Since each one of us is relative and different from each 
other, understanding her from her viewpoint is necessary. People call this cultural empathy. This 
notion of empathy which was derived from relativism is in fact problematic. Although the attitude
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phenomenological m ethod exam ines the things (i.e., the texts or the phenomena) 
them selves without presum ing metaphysics. Particularly, the investigator argues 
the potential value of Gebser*s semiotic analysis of cultural artifacts. While 
semiotics generally implies the study of signification and meaning by examining 
the form of the things' (whatever they are) manifestation, G ebser's semiotics® 
attem pts to delineate (and reduce) the structures of aw areness, manifested in the 
cultural artifacts, by comparing the forms of each artifact in a  systematic manner. 
This is a  latent method of studying intercultural communication. We presum e 
human existence a s  the prime (and actually the only) source of each method. 
However, there are m any in tercu ltu ral artifacts which are  the true manifestation
of empathie understanding is very helpful, it is not realistic. We understand others only through 
our viewpoints. Understanding others from others’ viewpoints through som e leap Is a  myth. 
Likewise, understanding other cultures from their perspectives is a  myth. This mythical empathie 
understanding bnngs up another crucial problem, in this form of understanding, we do not have 
to use our own perspective to understand others. Therefore, it becomes impossible to critically 
evaluate the differences between us and others. Understanding the differences and the 
similarities between us and others is essential for true understanding. This is the sam e story for 
understanding other cultures. What we truly have to do for understanding others or other cultures 
is not to emphasize but to reflect and clarify our own blind perspectives, uniqueness, or prejudices 
as  critically a s  possible through comparing others or other cultures with our own. We only 
understand other cultures through our cultural perspectives. For perspectivai men. that is the only 
way to make sense. Ethnocentrism is in a  way indispensable. The thing we have to do is to 
critically enable the blindly accepted ethnocentrism. We have to know our ethnocentrism in a  
critical manner. We have to be ethnocentric because the only way to understand other cultures is 
to understand through our cultural perspective. We experience intercultural communication by 
using our perspective and by understanding the differences between us and others through 
comparison. Finally, as G ebser's five structures of awareness implied, just a s  we are not totally 
different but relatively different, so is culture. Each culture is relatively different; This implies we 
are different and similar at the sam e time.
®Gebser’s  semiotic analysis of comparative elimination is extremely beneficial for cross-cultural 
communication. We presume each  culture has its own logic (e.g., collectivistic in Japan, 
individualistic in the US). However, culture is not fixed. Rather it is always transforming just like 
we are transforming. It is important to notice culture is a  manifestation of logic as  well as the 
process of cultivating logic itself. Culture is a  process as  well a s  an effect. Japanese 100 years 
ago are very different from the present Japanese. In fact, when we use humans as the prime 
source to examine the cross cultural differences, many problems arise. Instead of using people 
as a  prime source, comparing the manifestation of various kinds of cultural artifacts made in a 
culture to the manifestation of those  in another culture seems to be a  reasonable way to examine 
the differences and the similarities between the two cultures. The semiotic analysis of cultural 
artifacts also helps us to examine the transformation of a  culture without speculation. In any 
case. Gebser's comparative cultural semiotics (i.e.. cultural phenomenology) is a  latent method in 
studying both intracultural, cross-cultural and intercultural communication in a  unique and a 
meaningful manner.
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of the integration of two different structures of aw areness. A semiotic analysis of 
intercultural artifacts Is a  latent method of understanding the reality of Intercultural 
communication. This method can help us understand the complex and hidden 
reality of Intercultural communication^.
Latent Topics In Intercultural Communication
As the final aspect of la tency , it is now possible to suggest som e latent 
topics In Intercultural communication. It is obvious that one of the predominant 
a reas  in intercultural communication has been  devoted to (perspectivai) solutions 
(e.g., various forms of Intercultural training, Intercultural effectiveness, 
intercultural communication competence, intercultural adaptation) to the problems 
associated with culture differences. Particularly, Intercultural communication 
effectiveness/com petence has been one of the major topics in the current 
"globalizing" late-modernlty. However, the studies of communication 
effectiveness or com petence are  creating new problems in an uncanny m anner 
rather than offering a  solution.
While studying effectiveness does help in facilitating the process of 
intercultural communication, it requires more careful consideration (especially 
about ethics) than we realize. There Is a  latent area  which has been missing In 
the field of intercultural communication. While effectiveness in intercultural
^For instance, a  semiotic analysis of various kinds of multicultural organization (by analyzing the 
forms of its organization) might signify something interesting about the reality of intercultural 
communication. While a  semiotic analysis is a  latent method to study intercultural 
communication, phenomenological method and historical method, such as a  biographic textual 
analysis, are also latent methods. One example might be a  historical and biographic analysis of 
diaries kept by people whose life was in a  transitional era. A Japanese ' diary, which was written 
about experiences in the transition era between Edo and Meiji eras, is about intercultural 
experiences related to the revolutionary change of cultural logic. This example definitely offers 
interesting insight to the area of intercultural communication. Finally, here it is also important to 
notice that many of the cultural artifacts are. in fact, intercultural in nature. We are already always 
cultivating our culture through interactions with other people (i.e.. other cultures/other logics/other 
ways of understanding).
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communication has been a  dom inant topic, meaningful intercultural 
communication is a  latent topic area. Instead of attempting to facilitate effective 
and efficient communication a s  a  goal, we must investigate how different people 
meaningfully engaging in intercultural communication in different ways. In reality, 
people m anage culture differences in their own ways. The way they manage 
culture differences might not be  effective. But different people have their own 
unique and meaningful ways and  styles to deal with culture differences.
People are  different. Som e are  effective, while others are less effective at 
intercultural communication. Nevertheless, everybody experiences and deals 
with this in his or her own way. People have their own ways to adjust to a  
different and new environment. Investigating the people 's unique styles of 
adjustment, for example, seem s to be more valuable than searching for the 
ultimate way of intercultural adaptation. Investigating different people's® different 
m anners of engaging in intercultural communication in reality correlates to 
investigating their unique m anagem ent of their identity. Meaningful intercultural 
communication is a  latent topic.
Another latent topic is the variation in forms of conflict of culture logics 
between the traditional and the new. This issue is crucial. Any form of diffusion 
(e.g., technological or transformational) of multiple culture logics are always 
already intercultural. This topic is appropriate in the a rea  of intercultural 
communication, but it has b een  a  latent topic^.
^Different people, here, implies not only do different people from other cultures but also different 
people from within the same home boundary. This leads to another latent topic, which is the 
native's intercultural communication. Not only different people from different cultures experience 
intercultural communication differently, different people from the sam e boundary experience it 
differently. So called "host" nationals' intercultural communication has been a  latent topic. 
People have tended to presume intercultural communication as  strangers' intercultural 
communication.
^Another latent topic is communication in a  transition era. In any transition era. multiple 
structures of awareness and the corresponding multiple cultural logics appear themselves. The
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A Latent Meaning of Intercultural Communication
When we hear "intercultural communication," we probably associate it with 
a  sort of communication event betw een us and somebody who is from a  foreign 
nation. Of course, such a ca se  ten d s  to m ake the communication intercultural. 
While we might experience various differences and difficulties in understanding 
each  other, we som etim es discover similarities in an unexpected manner. Even 
when we feel we have nothing in com m on in an  intercultural communication, we 
accidentally find out som e similarities or com m onness in the event once in a 
while. We find out we are not as  different a s  we expected. We had once 
believed that we and the others a re  so  different that we have nothing in common. 
But, in fact, we have som e similarities. We are  surprised by the fact we are not 
that different. We tend to forget about the fundamental similarities which have 
always already existed among us in a  latent manner.
On the other hand, when w e com m unicate with a  spouse, we do not 
usually perceive the event a s  "intercultural communication." We presum e to 
understand each  other. However, o n ce  in a  while, we experience differences and 
conflicts in an opinion or a  belief in a  totally unexpected manner. S pouses think 
they knew each other well enough, but later becom e convinced otherwise We 
are surprised by the fact we are not a s  familiar about each other as  we expected. 
In a  sense, we tend to easily forget we are different. We also forget people 
change a s  times go by. The e sse n c e  of each  individual has never been the 
same.
conflict of multiple logics appear through vanous phenomena. Particularly, any phenomena which 
manifest the conflict of different cultural logics are always already intercultural.
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The above two scenarios make us recall we are  always already different 
a s  well a s  similar. Not only are  we not very different but also we are not very 
similar. Human communication is always already potentially intercultural. In 
short, a  phenom enon of so  called "intercultural communication" is the very 
experience which allows us to rem em ber our latent human similarities and our 
latent human diversity. This dynamic mixture of hum an similarities and hum an 
diversity m akes the human world always already unique, meaningful, vital, and 
above all intercultural. We do not have to be intercultural. Rather, w e are 
always already intercultural. Living a s  a human being in a human world always 
already m akes the essence of human existence in a  state of being intercultural.
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Appendix 
Historical "Intercultural" Activities
The field of "intercultural communication" attempts to understand other 
cultures and the complex process of interaction among people from different 
cultures. Although this interactive p rocess has not been problematized and 
studied in a scientific manner, people have been trying to understand other 
cultures since the dawn of hum an civilization with different motives. While som e 
tried to understand other cultures b ecau se  of a  political motive such a s  a 
diplomatic activity, others did so  b ecau se  of a  religious motive such as  a  
missionary activity. Others were motivated to understand other cultures based  
on a  commercial motive such a s  trading, while som e were motivated to explore 
new worlds and new civilizations out of pure curiosity. The point is that people 
have long been making conscious efforts to understand and learn other cultures 
(e.g., languages and customs). They wrote chronicles about each  other's habits 
and ways with various motives, not unlike modern anthropologists. In a  way, the 
activities of the modern intercultural scholars are neither original nor new, 
although their way (and their motive) for investigating "intercultural" phenom ena 
a s  a field may be somewhat new. Many people have been engaged in 
intercultural activities throughout the history of human civilization in various 
places in various historical epochs. Therefore, acknowledging intercultural 
activities which have been taken place throughout the history of human 
civilization is significant, although it is impossible to complete the task in an 
exhaustive manner. Therefore, this appendix attempts to acknowledge som e of
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these  intercultural activities (e.g., diplomacy and missionary) which have taken 
place historically. The point is not to review the entire history of "intercultural" 
activities thoroughly, but to recognize how "intercultural communication" a s  a  field 
has  been a  part of our history.
Diplomacy
Exploring new worlds and understanding other cultures might not b e  the 
primary motive for diplomacy. Nevertheless, diplomacy^ m eans "the 
maintenance of official relations betw een tribes and people" (Numelin^, 1950, p. 
124). This activity necessarily involves minimum consideration toward others 
(e.g., other tribes, others from different cultures) which requires deliberate efforts 
to achieve its goal (i.e., to maintain peaceful relations with other tribes and 
nations). Its history, a s  Magalhaes^ (1988), Nicholson^ (1954,1983), and 
Numelin (1950) argue, can be traced back to the dawn of history. Numelin 
(1950), for instance, in his profound and well docum ented study, The Beginnings 
of Diplomacy, contends that diplomatic activities began during the so-called 
Classic Antiquity, or even among the peoples of the Orient, such as  China, or 
India. He even sta tes  that it can be traced back to primitive surroundings, and 
that its roots may be found among the the primitive peoples in Asia, the N egroes
 ^ A word "diplomacy" is etymologically derived from a  French "diplomatie" which m eans the 
maintenance of external relations, or the art and manner of conducting international affair. This 
can be traced further back to a  Greek word "diploma" which is adopted in Latin. "Diploma" was a  
paper folded double (Partridge. 1958) which w as a  document which conferred certain privileges 
upon the bearer and the nam e originally refers to the folding of the document. A word 
"ambassador" and "embassy" on the other hand have the  sam e etymological origin which is a  
Latin "ambi" which m eans "on both side or all around" which implies the interactive nature of the 
word. Regarding etymology, see  Eric Partridge's (19581 Origins: A short etymological dictionan/ 
of modem English. (London; Routledge & Kegan Paul)
2. Numelin. R. (1950). The beginnings of diolomacv. London: Oxford University Press.
3. Magalhaes, J. C. D. (1988). The pure concept of diplomacy. Westport, Connecticul: Greenwood 
Press.
Nicholson. H. (1954). The evolution of diplomatic method. London: Cassell.
Nicholson. H. (1963). Diplomacy. London: Oxford University Press.
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of Africa, the Indians of North and South America, the stone age inhabitants of 
the Australian steppes, and the island-dwellers of O ceania. It appears that even 
among the m ost primitive peoples, there were certain complex patterns of mutual 
interest which are  a  condition of contact. As long a s  hum an communities existed 
side by side, not in a  perm anent sta te  of enmity (and som etim es even then), 
certain rudimentary forms of diplomacy evolved. According to Numelin (1950), "it 
has been n ecessary  for the leaders of primitive societies (kings, chiefs, councils 
of elders) to maintain som e sort of mutual relations, first through occasional 
m essengers, later through envoys and other suchlike representatives" (p. 13). 
Similarly, PhillipsonS (1911/1979) argues that more or less systematic 
interchange of em bassies and the related diplomatic practices already took place 
among the peoples of the m ost distant antiquity. The earliest treaty of detailed 
record, for instance, is the settlem ent of a  boundary dispute completed in 2850 
BC between the city states of Lagash and Unna and of Shatt-el-Hai in Babylon 
(Numelin, 1950). The first international treaty of which a  full text is preserved was 
completed in 1280 BC between R am ses II, king of Egypt and C hetasar 
(Hattushilish III), prince of Hittites (M agalhaes, 1988; Numelin, 1950). Historically 
Egypt seem ed to make continuous deliberate efforts to maintain diplomatic 
relations with its neighbors (e.g., Babylon, Assyria, Hatti, Cyprus, e t cetera). 
BaikieG (1929) and  Velikovsky^ (1952) point out that especially during the days 
between Amenhotep III (1411-1375 BC, a  king of Egypt) and Amenhotep IV 
(1375-1358 BC, a  King of Egypt), the world around Egypt w as marked by 
constant and well-regulated international relationships. In fact, the ruins of
G. Phillipson. C. (1979). The international law and custom of ancient Greek and Rom e. (reprint 
edition, originally published in 1911). New York; Amo Press.
G. Baikie. J. (19%). A history of Egypt (vol. II). London.
7  Velikovsky, I. (1952). Aoes in chaos (vol. I). Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company.
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Akhenaten’s  capital of Akhetaten (i.e., Amenhotep IV), including the library or 
muniment-room of his Foreign Office, were found in 1887. Baikie (1929) in his 
book. History of Egypt, argues that such findings imply that Egypt and her 
neighbors were in regular correspondence with one another, where diplomatic 
enyoys w ere continually coming and going, where the issues of passports and 
safe conducts is part of the regular duty of the respectiye Foreign Offices, where 
commercial intercourse w as shepherded by frontier-guards and w as subject to 
the Inspection of custom s officials. Ancient Egyptians seem s to haye m ade a  
continuous effort to maintain diplomatic relations in a  systematic manner; they 
eyen recognized the need of Foreign Offices. Diplomacy, a s  a  form of 
"intercultural actiyities" has been  taking place since the ancient time.
Missionary^ Actiyity
Diffusing culture also takes place through organized missionary actiyities. 
Missionaries haye been  diffusing their religions (e.g., Christianity. Buddhism, 
Islam, et cetera) and their cultures throughout the history of religion. It is no 
doubt that all the great religions of the world were spread by missionaries, but 
none of them seem s to be completely dominated by the missionary idea with the 
exception of Christian religion. De Vaulx^ (1961 ) and Wissler^o (1923) similarly 
contend that conscious and organized missionary work is one of the dominating 
characters in cultures of the Euro-American type. Wissler (1923) also argues that 
missionaries haye brayed the g reatest dangers to carry the missions (i.e., to
®. The word, "mission" has a  Latin origin "mittere" which means to let go, cause to go, or to send. 
"Mittere" changed to another Latin "missio" (i.e.. a  sending, a release, discharge) which is the 
direct origin of mission (i.e.. persons sent, especially on a  religious duty). Mission, therefore, 
seem s to connotate deliberate movement toward certain direction. See Partridge (1958) for 
etymological information.
^ De Vauix. B. (1961). History of the missions. New York: Hawthorn Books.
Wissler. C. (1923). Man and culture. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company.
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teach men in the farthest corners of the earth about the universal dem ocracy of 
the righteous life) of Christian belief to non-believing peoples. St. Paul's 
missionary journeys (4 different journeys) cover from Jerusalem  to Rom e during 
the first century.
Organized missionary activities^'' in non-W estern regions, on the other 
hand, have also been popular especially between China and India. For Instance, 
a  Buddhist monk, Kumarajura, joined dissem inators of Mahayanlst Buddhist 
teachings In China In AD 386. Similarly, from the fifth century, Buddhist 
missionary efforts have existed In Ceylon, Kaplla, and the Gupta kingdom 
through the exchange of em bassies. The first recorded pilgrimage In China, on 
the other hand, was that of Fa Hsien. He reached India and spent 10 years  there 
and visited Ceylon before returning to Tsung-chou by se a  In 414. Such 
pilgrimages were very popular in the late 7th century In China. This religious 
activity Is best exemplified by Hsuan Tsang who began 16 years of travel to India 
In 671 AD only for the sake of searching for religious truth not for wealth or fame. 
When he returned to China with other monks, they brought 75 Buddhist texts 
from India. This w as an organized and conscious effort to learn from other 
cultures.
Other Forms of Intercultural Actlvlties^^
There are many other forms of Intercultural activities besides diplomacy 
and missionary activity. Geographical exploration Is one example. Historically, 
people have tried to explore new worlds out of pure curiosity. The Chinese, for 
example, were successful explorers with deliberate and conscious efforts until the
' 'The major source in this section is The Times Atlas of World Exploration (1991). Harper Collins 
Publishers.
'^The major source of information in this section is The Times Atlas of World Exploration (1991 ). 
Harper Collins Publishers.
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15th century AD. The exploration of Central Asia, for instance, began with the 
mission to Bactria of Chang Ch'ien In 138 BC. Chang Ch'ien, who was an 
am bassador of the Emperor at that time, reported situations in Central Asia, the 
Middle East, and even Egypt. His information about other worlds (and other 
cultures) stimulated Chinese imperial missions. Eventually. Chang Ch'ien's 
journey route becam e a  "Silk Road," which is known for caravans journeying from 
China to P ersia from 106 BC.
Map making activity is another exam ple of intercultural activity relating to 
geographic exploration. People try to explore new worlds and make m aps so that 
they can identify their spatial location in relation to others. In a  sense , any kind of 
map making activity seem s to be a  conscious and system atic attempt to 
understand new worlds (and other cultures). Such map making (intercultural 
activities) activities took place in various p laces (e.g., China, India, Islamic world, 
the Greco-Roman World, etc.) and in different epochs (from the ancient till now). 
Islamic world, for example, tried to m aster such a  geographic wisdom since the 
ancient days. The Babylonian map, which is a  stone tablet, dem onstrates the 
vast geographic knowledge of Islamic world around 400 BC including Babylon, 
Assyria, and Armenia in cuneiform script. Anyhow, understanding different kinds 
of map making activities in different epochs appears to be an  interesting project 
in terms of understanding different cultures’ world views.
Trading activity is another important form of intercultural communication. 
People have been  interacting with each  other for trading purposes across 
geographic regions in different epochs. Although trading activities have taken 
place since th e  dawn of human civilization (Numelin, 1950), the prime w as 
reached in the  13th and 14th centuries when the Mongolian conquest of China,
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Persia, Central Asia, much of Russia, and the Middle East directly linked Europe 
and eastern  Asia for the first time in history. Foreign merchants sought C hinese 
goods (e.g., Asian silk, spices, etc.) anticipating great fortunes they might get 
from China through the famous "Silk Road." Such foreign merchants appeared  to 
have kept chronicles about different cultures. These chronicles about new worlds 
probably stimulated many Europeans' interests in Asian silk, spices, and other 
luxury goods. Descriptions of the wealth of the East, whether real or imagined, in 
turn propelled many foreign m erchants to travel to the new world (the East).
Marco Polo's chronicles about foreign worlds, by far, is the most renowned one. 
With commercial interests, m erchants historically have been "intercultural" 
explorers. They learned about other cultures, brought information about them, 
and stimulated others' interests in new and different worlds.
In summary, people have been  exploring and learning about new and 
different cultures since the dawn of human civilization in different forms of 
activities (e.g., diplomacy, missionary, map making activity, trading activity, etc.) 
all over the world. Such activities are  conscious, deliberate, and highly 
systematic efforts of "intercultural communication" rather than simple and random 
activities. Intercultural communication, in other words, has been taking place 
long before it w as established a s  an  academ ic field of study. Although this 
supplem ent only acknowledges som e of the historical "intercultural" activities 
through several illustrations, obviously so called "intercultural communication" a s  
an independent academ ic field owes a great deal to our history of various forms 
of "intercultural activities." Ignoring such a  rich history of "historical intercultural"
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activities only m eans a  lack of our academic integrity and of self-understanding. 
History is, after all, ever-present as G e b s e r '’  ^ (1949/1985) contends.
^3. Gebser. J. (1959/1985). Ever-present origin. (Original work published in 1949) Athens, OH; 
Ohio University Press.
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